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2Abstract
Just as oranges are not the only fruit, strikes are not the only type of industrial 
dispute. This thesis examines two other forms of bargaining breakdown: dispute 
procedure usage; and action short of a strike - particularly overtime bans. It therefore 
covers two distinctive phenomena but some of the issues examined are relevant to both 
forms of disputes, whilst others are specific to one particular type. Complementary 
issues include the evaluation of economists’ theories of bargaining impasses and the 
relevance of both areas to the ’new industrial relations’ debate. Both parts also shed 
light on the important conceptual implications of applying the body of largely North 
American theory to the UK context. Chapter 1 illuminates the linkages between the 
two areas at greater length, provides important definitions, explains the data used and 
summarises the six substantive chapters.
Chapters 2 to 5 examine final-offer arbitration (FOA) in the context of Britain’s 
new style agreements on criteria connected to five issues: the incidence of dispute 
procedures and their specifications; the core question of effectiveness in terms of 
deterring disputes; the incidence of industrial action under particular dispute 
procedures; the impact of procedures on negotiated and arbitrated settlements; and the 
functioning of dispute procedures in action. These chapters suggest that although the 
evidence is mixed, there is no convincing support for the superior effectiveness of 
FOA over conventional arbitration or other impasse procedures.
The almost totally unresearched area of action short of a strike is examined in 
chapters 6 and 7. The relative incidence of strikes and non-strike action is assessed 
using data from various UK surveys over the period 1966-1990 and principally with 
newly available data source - the CBI Pay Databank. Data from this source are also 
used to test possible explanatory factors behind the tactics of industrial action.
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1. Introduction
Strike incidence, measured as the number of stoppages, is currently lower in the 
UK than at any time since the early 1930s (Milner and Metcalf 1993). The massive 
decline in strike activity is probably the most well known industrial relations 
phenomenon of the 1980s. Fittingly there is a huge literature on the subject of strikes 
(the most recent review of this material is by Edwards 1992). Some writers have, 
however, been quick to acknowledge that strikes are but one form of industrial action 
and that industrial action is only one manifestation of industrial disputes. Despite this 
the industrial disputes literature almost totally ignores other forms of industrial action 
and other types of bargaining dispute. Typically studies of ’industrial conflict’ list all 
the different types of disputes then proceed to only analyse strike action. This 
research redresses some of the balance in favour of other types of disputes by 
examining the use of third party intervention and the incidence of action short of a 
strike in UK manufacturing in the 1980s.
2. Concepts and definitions
a. Introduction
’Industrial dispute’ is the key unit of analysis here. This term is often used to 
describe a strike in progress but a strike is clearly only one possible type of industrial 
dispute. For these purposes, an industrial dispute is defined as a breakdown or 
impasse in collective bargaining or negotiations. An impasse has two main forms in 
the UK industrial relations system: the involvement of a third party to aid resolution of 
the dispute; and/or some form of industrial action. Although most of the terminology 
used in these two areas is quite familiar, some terms such as mediation describe 
different procedures in North America and the UK - hence the need for definitions.
b. Use of third party dispute procedures
Third party intervention is manifest in a number of different ways. In the 
British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (Millward, Stevens, Smart and Hawes
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1992: Chapter 6) it is defined broadly to include the involvement of senior 
management in multi-establishment organisations outside the individual workplace as 
well as full-time union officials, employers’ associations and a range of more 
genuinely independent organisations such as the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS), established in January 1976 by the Employment Protection Act 1975. 
In this research it is more narrowly defined to include only intervention by fully 
external third parties. In the overwhelming majority of cases this involves the 
statutory body ACAS, which is charged with the general duty of the improvement of 
industrial relations with particular reference to collective bargaining. The involvement 
of ACAS usually takes one of three forms: conciliation, mediation or arbitration.
i. Conciliation: Conciliation is defined by ACAS as:
"The practice by which the services of a neutral third party are used in a 
dispute as a means of helping the disputing parties to reduce the extent 
of their differences and to arrive at an amicable settlement or agreed 
solution. It is a process of orderly or ration discussion under the 
guidance of the conciliator." (ACAS 1991: 103)
The conciliator holds private and confidential discussions with each side either in 
separate or joint meetings. In either case, the conciliator provides a conduit for 
communications between the sides. The conciliator will usually seek to clarify the 
dispute and determine areas of common interest between the two sides. The onus os 
on the parties to reach their own settlement since the conciliator has no power to force 
concessions or impose a settlement. Moreover the conciliator cannot express an 
opinion about the facts of the dispute or about the respective merits of either sides’ 
arguments.
Collective conciliation has been a feature of the British industrial relations 
system for nearly a century having started officially with the Conciliation Act of 1896 
which made provision for the appropriate minister to take steps to bring about the 
settlement of trade disputes through conciliation or other means. Conciliation provides 
the bulk of ACAS’s work on collective disputes and it is the only form of intervention 
which actually involves ACAS officials. Note that in North America ’mediation* is 
used to describe a procedure akin to UK conciliation.
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ii. Mediation: This is a half-way house between conciliation and arbitration in that an 
independent person is called upon to make formal recommendations on how a dispute 
could be resolved. Therefore mediation is more interventionist than conciliation since 
a judgement about the dispute is made but is less draconian than arbitration because 
the parties are under no obligation to accept any recommendation. ACAS argues that 
mediation is appropriate for the resolution of quite complex and interdependent issues, 
for example a major reorganisation of jobs or grades or work patterns, but that ’it is 
not generally regarded as the appropriate medium for the resolution of straightforward 
distributive conflicts, for example an annual pay claim" (ACAS 1991: 111). In spite 
of the mediator’s presence the dispute remains mainly in the hands of the parties and 
they retain complete control of the outcome as with conciliation. Mediation is far less 
common than conciliation or arbitration with referrals running at around 10 per cent of 
the number of arbitration cases. In the US and Canada a ’fact finder’ performs a 
similar role to a UK mediator.
iii. Arbitration: Arbitration involves the determination or settlement of an issue by an 
independent third party who makes an award which the parties agree to abide by. In 
seeking arbitration the parties have, therefore, given authority to the third party to 
actually impose a settlement. The arbitrator, or occasionally the Board of Arbitration, 
usually appointed through ACAS determines the issue. Although awards are, with rare 
exceptions, not legally enforceable and their acceptance by both sides is voluntary, 
since its inception ACAS has a 100 per cent success rate in having its awards 
accepted. Arbitration is very much viewed as an instrument of last resort which 
should not be viewed lightly by either party. Under the Employment Protection Act, 
ACAS must ensure that three conditions are fulfilled before arranging for arbitration: 
the consent of both sides; that conciliation of the dispute has been considered; and that 
any agreed procedures have been used and have failed to result in a settlement.
The aim of this research is to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of two 
different types of arbitration: conventional - where an arbitrator is allowed, within 
certain terms of reference, to make any award they deem fit including compromising 
between the two final offers; and final-offer arbitration - which stipulates that an 
arbitrator must find wholly for one or the other side in a dispute. The second, much
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less common, type of arbitration has also been labelled pendulum, flip-flop, last offer 
and straight choice arbitration.
The popularised term in the UK ’pendulum arbitration’ is actually a rather 
misleading description for two reasons: it suggests that the arbitrator alternately swings 
between one side and the other from dispute to dispute which may or may not be the 
case; and a pendulum’s locus does not consist of just two points A and B but rather an 
arc from A to B. Therefore actually ’pendulum arbitration’ describes arbitration where 
the only constraint on an arbitrator is that he or she cannot select a point outside the 
range of the parties’ final offers, so in fact it might be a better colloquialism for 
conventional arbitration. Singh (1986) states that the term flip-flop arbitration comes 
from electronic engineering. Apparently a ’bi-stable multivibrator’ is also known as a 
’flip-flop’, is a device used in data-processing systems. It has two possible states (0 or 
1), must change rapidly from one state to the other and the state value must be clearly 
evident This appears to be a more accurate metaphor than the swinging pendulum but 
as ’final-offer arbitration* is the preferred North American terminology (and work on 
dispute procedures is concentrated there), FOA is used in this research.
The first theoretical exploration of the relative merits of FOA as an alternative 
to conventional arbitration was conducted in a seminal article by Stevens (1966).
Some commentators have since claimed that Stevens invented FOA (for example, 
Feigenbaum 1975). However, Treble (1986 and 1990) has shown that the first 
examples of FOA in labour disputes existed in the UK in Victorian and Edwardian 
periods, the earliest FOA procedure being the conciliation board set up in the 
Nottingham hosiery industry in 1860 (Cuthbert 1960). Another example is provided 
by coal mining industry negotiations between 1894 and 1914. Note also that Wages 
Councils which set pay rates for 2.5m people in unorganized or weakly organized 
sectors (and which have been in place for almost the whole of the twentieth century) 
also resolve impasses via FOA. A Wages Council has three parties - employers, 
workers and independent members. The process of negotiating terms and conditions 
involves conciliation, mediation and, at the last resort, a straight choice between the 
two sides by the independent members (Wood 1985: 421). Flanagan (1990) also 
points out that FOA actually preceded Stevens by more than two millennia rather than 
just a century as Treble argues, since it was employed for the trial of Socrates in 399
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B.C.. Nevertheless Treble appears to have located the earliest case of an FOA dispute 
procedure in industrial relations.
c. Industrial action
Industrial conflict is a broad field including unorganised, individual action such 
as absenteeism and labour turnover, and collective (usually) organised action such as 
strikes and overtime bans. Various authors have investigated the links between 
individual and collective action but very few have considered the relationship between 
strike and non-strike collective action. This thesis assesses the relative incidence of 
the different forms of action and empirically investigates the relationship between them
i.e. the tactics of collective industrial action. Although the main types of action are 
well known, definitions of them may be worthwhile.
Four main types of organised industrial action are widely acknowledged. These 
are: the strike, a stoppage of work by a group of workers; the overtime ban; a 
restriction on working time through the collective refusal to work overtime; the work 
to rule, adherence by a group of workers to the letter of agreements, regulations and 
other instruments relating to their employment; and the go slow, quite similar to the 
work to rule, but may not actually involve adherence to work rules, rather aims to 
reduce productivity through reduction in effort. Other much less common forms of 
action include the work in or sit in, blacking of work and stop work meetings. See 
Turkington (1976) for a description of the main forms of organised and unorganised 
action.
3. Issues
There are two main issues addressed in the research both of which are multi­
faceted and have implications for wider industrial relations and labour economics 
debates. In terms of the two types of arbitration, the key issue is the impact of final- 
offer and conventional arbitration on collective bargaining processes and outcomes. 
Note that there is a separate debate on whether on a macro level arbitration systems 
(of whatever variety) are preferable to right to strike systems (see Bruce and Carby- 
Hall 1991 for a recent contribution to this debate), but the concern here is to 
investigate the issue of, given an arbitration system, what is the most effective form 
that it can take.
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There are a range of mainly US theories about the effectiveness of different 
types of arbitration in terms of dispute deterrence (i.e. their own use), industrial action 
outcomes and settlements. These are fully discussed and analysed in chapters 3 and 4. 
Most of the relevant UK writers have preferred to concentrate on the impact of FOA 
and conventional arbitration on the process of bargaining and the mechanisms of 
arbitration. This debate is analysed and assessed with evidence from new case studies 
of FOA in action in chapter 5. However, before these assessments of the impact of 
different forms of arbitration on bargaining, chapter 2 examines the issue of the 
incidence of FOA in UK plants in the 1980s. The question of why some bargaining 
groups adopt particular dispute procedures has never been explicitly addressed before 
mainly because in North America, where research on dispute procedures is 
concentrated, the great majority of studies examine the public sector where procedures 
are imposed by legislatures rather than voluntary agreed to by the parties.
The central question in terms of action short of a strike is two-fold. What has 
happened to action short of a strike relative to strikes in the 1980s and what can 
explain the relative incidence of some of the main forms of action? Although some 
authors have recorded the relative levels of the different types of action - which is not 
recorded in official Department of Employment figures - no study has ever examined 
possible explanations for the relative incidence of strike and non-strike action. This 
was made possible for this research through a new, comprehensive data source - the 
CBI Pay Databank - which is fully described below.
Taken together these two distinct areas of research shed light on a number of 
wider themes.
. Dispute causes: Economists have a hard time providing a theoretical and 
empirical answer to the question of why disputes occur. This thesis examines the issue 
using different outcome variables, two different data sources and two different 
instruments. Its conclusion must be rather non-committal: competing economic 
theories of disputes are all able to explain why some disputes occur but no single 
theory dominates the others in its explanatory power. However, this rather vague 
conclusion is offset by the conclusion that research on disputes need not only consider 
why disputes occur but should also examine the form disputes take and the impact of 
them.
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. New industrial relations: The ’new industrial relations’ (NIR) debate is 
illuminated by evidence on an outcome variable not previously examined (action short 
of a strike) and by findings on whether one of the phenomena of NIR, the new style 
deals (Rico 1987) and FOA, has proved as successful as its proponents suggest it 
would be. Furthermore, the research highlights the need for more empirical 
assessments of the impact of new style deals on workplace industrial relations.
. Different industrial relations contexts: A significant element of both areas of 
research is the extent to which US developed theories of bargaining disputes have to 
be reconsidered and adapted when applied to the UK industrial relations context. Even 
the most abstract theories often have some grounding in the particular national context 
of the author. This is certainly the case for most of the strike theories developed by 
US economists which are based on a very different industrial relations environment to 
that in the UK and elsewhere. Interest in testing the US strike theories has meant that 
the variety of other form of industrial action have been largely ignored and hence there 
has been no empirical consideration of the tactics of industrial action. This contrast of 
contexts is explained and its implications for empirical testing of the theories is drawn 
out particularly in chapter 7.
In a different way these contrasting contexts are also important for the 
assessment of FOA and conventional arbitration in the UK. Three significant 
differences between the US and UK contexts of FOA stand out. The private sector, 
public sector backdrop is prominent. Second, all the UK examples are part of 
voluntarily signed collective agreements, rather than imposed through legislation. 
Finally, UK collective agreements are not usually legal contracts, unlike in the US, 
such that a no-strike clause in a UK agreement is only morally binding on the parties, 
therefore industrial action is not legally ruled out even after arbitration. These three 
factors all have an important bearing on the expected and actual impact of FOA on 
collective bargaining in the UK compared to the US.
. Strikes: Perhaps the overriding concern of the research is to suggest that the 
strike-centric basis of the great majority of studies on disputes and even just those on 
industrial action means that much of the richness in UK industrial relations has been 
ignored. The lack of any previous empirical investigation of dispute procedures and 
action short of a strike means that a prominent field of industrial relations has lain
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unploughed for too long. This thesis provides insights into a world of industrial 
relations disputes where strikes are very much a minor player.
4. Aims and methods
a. Final-offer arbitration
Final-offer arbitration in the UK was investigated with three principal research 
aims in mind: To assess determinants of the incidence of FOA; to empirically 
evaluate FOA effectiveness; and to assess attitudinal information about its impact, 
from interviewed practitioners. An overarching aim was to establish evidence on FOA 
effectiveness in the UK to emulate that in the US, and to properly assess UK-based 
FOA on the basis of US developed theory.
The ad hoc way in which FOA agreements have sprung up in the UK compared 
to examples in the US and the relatively small number of plants with FOA, had 
notable implications for the research methods adopted. North American examples of 
FOA are almost wholly in the public sector, so studies there have been able to draw on 
secondary data, showing the outcomes and processes of public sector bargaining 
rounds, to test the effectiveness of different dispute resolution mechanisms. All of the 
UK cases of FOA agreements signed in the 1980s, however, are in private sector 
companies. Therefore most of the data had to be generated through primary research. 
Furthermore because less than fifty UK workplaces actually have FOA agreements, all 
possible research sources and methods had to be used to fully illuminate the subject.
Secondary sources were appraised for evidence on all the above issues. Most 
of this evidence is presented in relevant chapters. However, evidence from company 
accounts, which was investigated with the intention of ascertaining information on the 
incidence and effectiveness of FOA in new style deal plants and companies, proved to 
be highly problematic. Appendix A provides an assessment of the value, or otherwise, 
of the information collected but the information is not reported in the main text.
The core research design for this study of FOA was always intended to be a 
statistical analysis of data on outcomes from a number of bargaining rounds in FOA 
agreement workplaces compared to an appropriate control group of workplaces without 
FOA and including a number of relevant control variables. However, simply defining 
the sample to be studied and acquiring the relevant data on it, was much less
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straightforward than doing so for the public sector in North America where the field of 
study is well defined, the impasse procedures are established in statute law and the 
outcomes are publicly recorded. This is fully explained in section 5.
b. Action short of a strike
The relative incidence of strikes and action short of a strike was investigated 
using a secondary data source - the CBI Pay Databank. The specifications of this 
source are detailed in section 5. The richness of the information included in the 
databank precluded any need to seek supplementary information through a second 
survey. Furthermore the anonymised nature of the CBI Databank meant that follow up 
interviews at particularly interesting plants (for example those with relatively high 
levels of one type of action) were not possible.
5. Sources and data
a. Final-offer arbitration
Information on the extent of FOA agreements in the UK is immersed in more 
general studies of no-strike deals or single union deals signed in the 1980s. This 
helped to provide a ready made comparison group for the FOA plants. The non-FOA 
but no-strike or single union establishments are a convenient and appropriate control 
group for their counterparts with FOA, since this lessens the potential difficulty of 
confusing an FOA effect with a general cooperative industrial relations effect. It must 
be acknowledged though that this sampling frame could create problems of external 
validity in that both the FOA and control groups are classed as part of the new 
cooperative industrial relations sector. In other words, it may tell us little about the 
effect of putting FOA into an old-style non-cooperative bargaining situation.
In terms of actually identifying the new style deal plants as a group, there are 
quite a number of surveys which provide the names and some details of these 
companies (Income Data Services [IDS] 1987, Trade Union Congress [TUC] 1988, 
Industrial Relations Review and Report [IRRR] 1989, Labour Research [LR] 1989). 
These reports do not all concur on the details of the agreements by any means which 
is put down to ’a difficulty in outsiders accurately interpreting individual clauses in 
agreements’ in one of the reports (TUC 1988: 11). The number of agreements listed
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and discrepancies in the number of FOA deals is indicated in Table 1.1. In sum the 
reports record 27 different FOA agreements in a total of 84 ’new style’ deals. In the 
case of six plants the reports differ in their classification of the impasse procedure.
Trade unions involved in these deals were contacted to both clarify the status of 
existing agreements and supply details of any new agreements or any agreements not 
specified in the available reports. The electricians’ union, the EETPU claimed to have 
another five FOA agreements and a further fifteen non-FOA single union deals not 
cited in the literature. However, the EETPU also revealed that in some of the 
companies referred to in the above reports, they had never had or no longer had 
agreements. Meanwhile, the engineering union, the AEU claimed to have another five 
single-union agreements in the UK not listed in the reports. Other unions contacted 
did not disclose any new information about FOA or non-FOA single union or no-strike 
deals.
After trawling all the available sources the final list consisted of 114 different 
workplaces which had been cited has having either FOA or non-FOA new style deals. 
The number of workplaces eventually surveyed was 101. The initial total of 114 was 
cut back for two main reasons:
. Two or more workplaces given different company names in the reports and/or 
by the trade unions revealed to be the same workplace.
. Workplace addresses not established after thorough search.
Workplace addresses were obtained from a variety of sources including trade unions 
contacts, the Census of Production, the Dunn and Bradstreet Index, the Kompass 
Directory and phone directories. Having established separate addresses for all and 
phone numbers for most of the 101 workplaces they were telephoned in December 
1990 to obtain the name of a contact, usually the individual responsible for employee 
relations matters (the personnel manager in most cases).
Ideally the research instruments had to yield comprehensive information on the 
process, progress and outcomes of a series of bargaining rounds in the individual 
plants, as well as a certain amount of background data for control variables. None of 
the three possible research instruments - postal questionnaire, face to face 
questionnaire/interview and, telephone interview - seemed adequate on their own to 
provide the spread of information needed. Consequently the research was structured 
into two phases:
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ii. Postal survey: A postal survey to obtain substantive information on plant 
characteristics, the impasse procedure and three impact measures: incidence of impasse 
procedure use; incidence of industrial action; and pay settlements, over the preceding 
five years (1986-1990). A copy of the questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix B.
The survey was sent in February 1991 to the 101 plants. Of the seventy-five 
plants which responded (a response rate of 74.3%), three did not actually recognise a 
trade union for bargaining and therefore must have either derecognised a union or were 
incorrectly identified in the trawl of sources. These three responses were therefore 
rejected from the sample on the grounds that collective bargaining over pay did not 
actually take place.
The twenty-six non-respondents are detailed in the contents of and notes to 
Table 1.2. Unfortunately the sample does not contain all the plants elsewhere listed as 
having FOA (seven of the non-respondents are recorded elsewhere as FOA plants), the 
non-respondents do not appear to be particularly biased in a way which discredits the 
representativeness of the sample.
The basic characteristics of the 72 valid respondents are summarised in Table 
1.3. The sample shows a preponderance of plants which employ more than 250 
workers, have high union density, are either UK or Japanese owned, operate in the 
electronics or engineering industries and were established on their present site in the 
1980s. The provision of impasse procedures in the sample is detailed in chapters 2 
and 3.
Two data sets were constructed from the responses: one comprising the 72 
plants which recognise a union for bargaining; and one in which each bargaining round 
is a separate case. The latter file of 297 bargaining rounds (some respondents did not 
supply a full five years data) was constructed on the basis of holding all else equal 
apart from information on the use of disputes procedure, industrial action and pay 
settlements. This is not an ideal data set in that certain plant characteristics may have 
varied over the five year period, for instance plant size or union density, but significant 
results on the impact of an FOA agreement on this data set are more feasible than on 
the smaller individual plant-based sample.
21
ii. Case study interviews: The survey was followed up by detailed interviews at 
eight of the FOA plants where an impasse was reached in at least one year over the 
period examined, to try to obtain more detailed empirical and attitudinal information 
about FOA effectiveness generally and in particular bargaining rounds in these 
workplaces.
Selection of the plants at which to interview practitioners was determined by 
three factors: A collective agreement with a dispute procedure which includes FOA; 
an impasse in at least one year; and access - a willingness to be approached for further 
information. Having already acquired a substantial amount of quantitative data about 
the sample as a whole and bearing in mind the problem of decreasing marginal returns 
the number of interviews was kept deliberately low.
Of the twenty-seven plants in the sample with an FOA procedure, nine had an 
impasse in at least one year but one workplace indicated that it was not willing to be 
approached for further information. Six of the remaining eight had reached arbitration 
in at least one year’s bargaining over the period surveyed, whereas the other two had 
only reached the conciliation stage of their respective procedures in one year. The 
latter two were still considered suitable for interview since some but not all the 
questions would be relevant to them, plus it was hoped that they would provide some 
information about what prevented them from using the arbitration itself.
FOA is designed to affect the bargaining behaviour of both union and 
management negotiators but for the purposes of this research we were particularly 
interested in the impact of FOA on the management of industrial relations in these 
plants, consequently only management representatives were asked for interviews. The 
individual responsible for industrial relations (usually the personnel manager) agreed to 
an interview in all eight of these plants. In one plant the personnel manager also 
arranged for a short interview with the senior shop steward of the largest union, but 
this was the exception. Because of our particular interest in the incidence of FOA 
within these deals we also arranged to interview Roy Sanderson, now National 
Secretary of the FPA, the white collar section of the EETPU.
The composition of the interview panel is reasonably varied considering the 
similarities of the sample from which they are drawn. There is some geographical 
concentration, however, with three plants in the South East, only one in the North-
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East, two in North-West England, one in North Wales and one in East Anglia. Three 
of the plants are located on relatively new industrial estates, but interestingly none are 
located in the hot-bed of new style deals - South Wales. Only two of the plants were 
greenfield sites when the deal was signed, so the majority do have some form of 
bargaining history. Three of the plants are multi-union and the remainder have single­
union recognition with the EETPU (or EESA). All the plants are in manufacturing, 
with four in electronics or electrical engineering, one in the food industry, one paper 
producer and two vehicle manufacturers.
The interviews were conducted in September 1991. Of the eight interviewees 
one wished their company to be kept anonymous throughout the report, but the others 
are content to be named and quoted on most (but not all) issues. All the interviewees 
were sent a pre-publication copy of a previous paper to check that all confidences were 
respected.
b. Action short of a strike
The data come from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Pay Databank 
collected on a quarterly basis since 1979. The Databank refers to pay settlements and 
industrial action at the level of the bargaining group. Note that the data are 
completely anonymous such that no individual bargaining group, workplace or firm 
can be identified. Moreover, these data are not in the public domain and can only be 
obtained with the permission of the CBI.
Each year information is sought from a sample of establishments, structured by 
the number of employees (in the original sample the establishment was chosen 
randomly from the 1977 Census of Production). The data made available are restricted 
to manufacturing. Each establishment is asked to provide information on up to 3 
bargaining groups within the workplace (typically the 2 largest manual and largest 
non-manual bargaining groups).
The CBI data are designed to provide a continuous picture of the level of wage 
settlements and related details through time. In any given period the live survey 
consists of approximately 1,200 establishments in manufacturing. The questionnaire 
responses are, however, based at the level of the individual settlement group. With an 
average of 1.7 settlement groups reporting in each establishment, the survey covers
23
around 2000 groups from which a 60-65% response rate is achieved in any given year. 
Responses to the survey are obtained in respect of groups of both manual and non- 
manual weekly paid employees in private manufacturing, where at least one item of 
the pay and conditions package is modified by determination at company or 
establishment level. The survey therefore excludes ’national level only’ bargainers.
The questionnaire is completed by a member of the management negotiating 
team who has direct involvement in the settlement process. In addition to determining 
the rate of increase in wages as a result of the settlement, the survey asks respondents 
further questions covering the implementation data and expected duration of the 
settlement, the level of wage claim and any non-wage dimensions to the settlement. 
Details are also sought on an extensive list of potential pressures impacting on the 
wage settlement process including information relating to the use of any industrial 
action taken in support of the claim.
The data refer only to industrial action during the course of pay negotiations (or 
pay awards). Information is collected on the threat of action, whether action was taken 
and, if so, its form - overtime ban, go-slow, strike or other (or some combination of 
these) - and duration of the most important form of action.
Industrial action is infrequent in non-union workplaces. Millward and Stevens 
(1986: Table 10.3) report the incidence as being less than 0.5 per cent in non-union 
plants using the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1984 data. This is probably 
also the case in the 1990 survey but the union/non union variation in industrial action 
incidence is not fully reported in the accompanying volume to WIRS 1990 (Millward 
et al 1992: 282).
In the CBI sample around 1.5 per cent of non collectively bargained pay 
settlements involved some form of industrial action. This is substantially less than the
6.6 per cent level for collective bargaining groups and the data is restricted to exclude 
settlements not involving collective bargaining. The proportion of such establishments 
was 72 per cent of the CBI Pay Databank in 1979 and 70 per cent in 1986. In 
manufacturing as a whole, Millward and Stevens (1986: Table 9.2) report that 55 per 
cent of plants employing manual workers used collective bargaining to determine pay. 
Average workplace size is substantially larger in the CBI sample than the WIRS 
sample, and, as union recognition is maybe more likely the larger the workplace
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(Milner and Richards 1991, Disney, Machin and Gosling 1992), this probably explains 
the larger overall fraction of workplaces where pay is determined by collective 
bargaining. In this research both the full sample and the unionised sub-sample are 
utilised for different elements of the analysis.
For more details of the CBI Pay Databank survey and other analyses of it see 
Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1986), Ingram and Cahill (1989), Ingram (1991) and 
Metcalf, Wadsworth and Ingram (1993).
6. Summary
Chapter 2 thoroughly investigates the incidence of FOA agreements in the UK 
using evidence from secondary sources, the postal survey and the eight case study 
interviews. Four main issues are addressed: the characteristics of new style deal plants 
as a whole; why some new style deals have adopted FOA when others have not; the 
implications of this for the more general question of dispute procedure incidence; and 
explanations for the variety of FOA procedures seen in the few UK plants with FOA 
agreements. The analysis reveals a central role for the EETPU and in particular one of 
its leaders, Mr Roy Sanderson, in the incidence of FOA agreements in the UK. It also 
appears that two main types of FOA agreement exist in the UK: FOA as an intentional 
dispute deterrent; and FOA as a dispute resolution mechanism intended to be used only 
over minor disputes but to be vetoed by management over higher stakes disputes.
There is also some evidence to suggest that a much broader investigation of the 
development of dispute procedures in the UK is warranted.
The key issue of FOA and dispute deterrence is addressed in chapter 3, a core 
chapter. This provides an examination of: the theory of FOA and bargaining disputes; 
the comprehensive body of North American theory, using both real world and 
experimental data; the dispute deterrent effect of FOA and conventional arbitration 
using data from the postal survey and mainly attitudinal information from the 
interviews; and the incidence of industrial action among new style deals compared to 
incidence figures from other surveys. The principal finding is that FOA does not 
appear to have been a particularly successful dispute deterrent in the UK except in 
multi-stage dispute procedures. There is, though, evidence to suggest that the new 
style deals as a whole have been very successful at deterring industrial action 
compared to other UK plants.
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Increasingly US academics and policy makers have turned to the question of 
the impact of arbitration statutes on settlements, both those negotiated and those 
arbitrated. The theoretical debate and resultant empirical evidence based on North 
American public sector bargaining data are summarised and the implications for 
analysing the effect of arbitration arrangements on settlements in the UK are 
illuminated in chapter 4. The UK context of FOA provides an opportunity to test a 
core element of the theory which has never before been empirically examined. Results 
from the postal survey data accord with findings from the few analogous US studies 
that arbitrated and negotiated settlements are not significantly different from one 
another under both FOA and conventional arbitration. The data also provide tentative 
support for a ranking of negotiated settlements (highest to lowest) from conventional 
arbitration to non-arbitration procedures to no dispute procedure to FOA avaliable 
environments. This is consistent with most US evidence and one strand of the theory 
concerning arbitration availability and negotiated setdements. Chapter 4 concludes 
with a brief consideration of Pay Review Bodies and settlements in the context of 
theory and evidence on arbitration availability.
The bulk of existing UK work on FOA concerns the practicalities of FOA once 
it is invoked and the problems associated with FOA usage. To a large extent his 
mirrors the academic debate in the US since the bulk of the early (i.e. 1970s) US 
literature concentrates on the very same issue. The US work appears to be more 
analytical and constructive in that commentators have devoted considerable energies to 
devising dispute procedures which combine FOA’s dispute deterrence with 
conventional arbitration’s opportunity for arbitrator discretion. However, studies in the 
UK have far more grounding in actual cases of FOA use which are surprisingly 
lacking in the US literature. The issues of FOA usage are analysed in chapter 5 by 
first reviewing these studies. This review is augmented by an examination of evidence 
from the interviews at the eight FOA plants described above. The combination of 
these three sources provides the most comprehensive assessment of the practicalities of 
FOA in action. The chapter concludes that certain unique feature of FOA in the UK 
compared to the US have led to particular problems of FOA usage. These include: the 
less than constructive opinions and actions of arbitrators; the role of full time union 
officials in disputes; and the flexibility of the non-legal UK industrial relations system.
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These factors may also help to explain why FOA appears not to have been a 
particularly successful dispute deterrent in the UK private sector.
Turning to the area of strikes and action short of a strike, chapter 6 documents 
the relative incidence of strikes and other forms of industrial action since 1966 and 
chapter 7 examines the 1980s picture more closely through multivariate analysis of the 
CBI data. Although the evidence is not overwhelming, it appears that their may have 
been a reversal in the relative prevalence of overtime bans and strikes (the two most 
popular forms of industrial action) from the 1970s to the 1980s. Whereas most of the 
1970s surveys record strikes as more prevalent than overtime bans, and hence some 
commentators concluded that action short of strikes was on the relative decline, the 
CBI databank reveals the opposite picture for manufacturing in the 1980s. Details of 
the various industrial relations surveys since 1966 and their findings on industrial 
action are summarised in chapter 6. The chapter provides various caveats to the main 
conclusion that, in respect of which type of action was preferred, the tactics of 
industrial action appear to have been very different in the 1980s compared to the 
1970s. If true, this is another change in industrial relations outcomes, contributing to 
the picture of a new industrial relations, which has not been previously substantiated.
Chapter 7 provides the first ever attempt to empirically analyse industrial 
dispute tactics in the UK (and perhaps even further afield). The stimulus for the 
analysis is three-fold: the fact that the relative incidence of the two main forms of 
action has shifted over time - something needs to be explained; the richness of the CBI 
data - a source which permits the necessary investigation; and a dissatisfaction with the 
application of economic theories of strikes to the UK industrial relations environment. 
The combination of these factors means that the chapter addresses two distinct issues 
within industrial disputes. First, tests of economic explanations for bargaining disputes 
to complement the analysis of chapter 3. Second, testing for explanations of the 
relative incidence of different forms of action by means of multinomial logistic 
regressions. The CBI data reveal that, similarly to the data on disputes in new style 
deal plants, the various economic theories of disputes all have their merits and 
demerits and they appear to be unrankable in terms of their explanatory power. On the 
second issue, the factors which appear to have most influence over whether disputes 
are pursued by means of the overtime ban or the strike are linked to union organisation
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and the macroeconomic environment. Less stringent evidence suggests that industrial 
relations legislation, the level of overtime working and characteristics of bargaining 
groups may also play their part.
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Table 1.1
Extent of FOA and non-FOA new style deals
Study Number of FOA 
agreements
Number of non- 
FOA agreements
Total
IDS (1987)* 14 24 38
TUC (1988)** 18 8 26
IRRR (1989)* 24 28 52
Labour Research (1989)* n/a n/a 76
Number of different 
agreements cited
27 n/a 84
Notes: * Single union deals
** No strike deals
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Analysis of non-respondents
Three characteristics of the 26 non-respondent workplaces are compared to the 
respondent sample (75 original plants reduced to 72 after ejecting those not 
recognising unions) in table 1.2 below. Note that there is complete information for the 
non-respondents on union recognised but only partial information on the impasse 
procedure and country of ownership.
The most significant figure is the relatively high number of non-respondents 
reported to have final-offer arbitration (seven of the ten plants for which impasse 
procedure information was available) compared to 50 per cent of the plants with 
impasse procedures in the sample. Note that the impasse procedures for the majority 
of the non-respondent plants are not known, so this result is not conclusive evidence of 
a higher proportion of FOA plants in the non-respondents than in the sample.
It had been suggested that the non-respondents with FOA may have had more 
problems with the procedure than the respondents and therefore were less keen to have 
their experiences publicly reported. If true this would lead to an under reporting of the 
FOA impasse rate. In fact the opposite may be true because only one of the non- 
respondent companies has been reported elsewhere as using FOA over the past five 
years (Lewis 1990). If this is the only case of FOA use amongst the non-respondents, 
their impasse rate is 2.9% (one impasse in 35 bargaining rounds, in seven plants over 
five years) compared to 7.9% of the sample FOA rounds. However, this is not 
conclusive proof of over reporting because it is also possible that there have been other 
cases of FOA use amongst the non-respondents which have not been reported. This 
possibility seems likely given the fact that the postal survey revealed four cases of 
FOA use that had not previously been reported.
Therefore, although the high level of FOA within the non-respondent group is 
slightly worrying it does not appear that they are disproportionately those that used 
arbitration compared to the respondents. It seems more likely that the non-respondents 
have a lower impasse rate but it is not possible to be conclusive either way.
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Table 1.2 
Analysis of non-respondents
1. Impasse procedure 2. Unions recognised
Procedure Respondent 
sample (n=54) 
Valid %
Non-respondents
(n=10)
Valid %
Union Respondent 
sample (n=75) 
Valid %
Non­
respondents 
(n=26) 
Valid %
FOA 50.0 70.0 AEU 24.0 23.1
Conventional
arbitration
31.5 20.0 EETPU 48.0 57.7
Non-arbitration 18.5 10.0 GMB 6.7 11.5
TGWU 10.7 7.7
3. Country of ownership
Country Respondent 
sample (n=72) 
Valid %
Non-respondents
(n=12)
Valid %
UK 34.7 75.0
Japan 33.3 16.7
USA 16.7 8.3
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Table 1.3
Characteristics of the sample
Characteristics N % Characteristics N %
1. EMPLOYMENT BY SIZE BAND 5. LOCATION BY REGION
<25 1 1.4 North 12 16.7
25-99 8 11.1 Yorks and Humberside 5 6.9
100-249 26 36.1 East Anglia 2 2.8
250-499 13 18.1 South East 11 15.3
500+ 24 33.3 South West 2 2.8
Wales 28 38.9
2. COUNTRY OF COMPANY HQ Scotland 1 1.4
Northern Ireland 3 4.2
UK 25 34.7
Other EC 7 9.7 6. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Europe non-EC 3 4.2
Japan 24 33.3 Metals 4 5.6
USA 12 16.7 Mechanical 9 12.5
Other 1 1.4 Electronics 31 43.1
Vehicles 4 5.6
3. UNION RECOGNISED Food and drink 6 8.3
Plastics 8 11.1
AEU 18 25.0 Other 10 13.8
EETPU 36 50.0
ISTC 1 1.4 7. PLANT VINTAGE
GMB 5 6.9 DATE ESTABLISHED
TGWU 8 11.1
Multi-union 4 5.6 Pre 1980 24 33.3
1980-85 15 20.8
4. UNION DENSITY 1986 8 11.1
1987 6 8.3
0-24% 8 11.1 1988 9 12.5
25-49% 12 16.7 1989 7 9.7
50-74% 31 43.1 1990 3 4.2
75-100% 18 25.0
Don’t know 3 4.2
TOTAL 72 100.
Source: LSE ’New Style’ Industrial Relations Survey (see section 3).
Notes: AEU - Amalgamated Engineering Union, EETPU - Electrical, Engineering, Telecommunication and 
Plumbing Union (both now merged into AEEU), ISTC - Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, GMB - 
General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union, TGWU - Transport and General Workers Union.
Chapter 2
Dispute procedure incidence and final-offer arbitration
1. Introduction
The principal issue addressed in this chapter is the incidence of final-offer 
arbitration (FOA) in UK private sector agreements in the 1980s. The analysis has two 
layers: distinctive features of the group of new style deal plants as a whole and 
particular characteristics of those plants within this group who have FOA. A number 
of different sources both empirical and qualitative are used: previous surveys, reports 
from previous case studies and other anecdotal secondary information (analysed in 
section 2) and information from the primary research instruments - the postal survey 
and the case study interviews (section 3). Note that this issue is not only of interest 
because of its implications for assessing the impact of FOA on collective bargaining 
but also because it opens up a area of industrial relations which has never been 
systematically researched, viz explanations for the incidence of dispute procedures in 
general.
Most industrial relations commentators in the UK have accepted as an historical 
given the existence or absence of a dispute procedure in any particular collective 
agreement Whilst there have been some attempts to gauge the impact of such 
procedures, for instance on the probability of strike action (Blanchflower and Cubbin 
1986, Booth and Cressy 1990), most studies of dispute procedures have been content 
to document the extent of different procedures and the machinations involved in their 
use (iinter alia Sharp 1950, Marsh and McCarthy 1968, Lockyer 1979, Millward and 
Stevens 1986: chapter 7, Lowry 1990 and Millward, Stevens, Smart and Hawes 1992: 
Chapter 6). The whys and wherefores of variations in provision over time and 
between workplaces and/or industries has been virtually ignored. Note that in addition 
the many US and Canadian studies of arbitration provide no precedents on this issue 
because they concentrate on public sector arbitration arrangements which have 
developed by statute rather than through voluntary agreements as in the UK private 
sector.
The analysis of general dispute procedure incidence is therefore particularly 
interesting partly because it has not been investigated before, but moreover because it
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could provide important information on the assumptions underlying one economic- 
based strike theory. Reder and Neumann’s (1980) joint cost theory of strikes, simply 
stated, rests on the notion that protocols (or dispute procedures) are developed in 
certain situations to avoid expensive strikes. Since protocols are costly to generate, the 
likelihood of a procedure being developed (and modified or complicated) depends 
upon the joint costs (to the parties involved) of a potential stoppage. Whilst this 
theory can be criticised on a number of other levels - unspecific predictions, 
malleability, cross section British evidence suggesting that protocols far from deterring 
disputes are positively associated with strikes (Blanchflower and Cubbin 1986) - its 
assumptions of why protocols are developed has been unchallenged and untested. 
Although only on a small scale the analysis of FOA incidence below provides some 
interesting pointers on this question. The little existing UK anecdotal evidence on this 
is assessed in section 4 as a conclusion to the chapter.
A final introductory point concerns the historical context of FOA. The new 
style agreements incorporating FOA are not the first examples of this type of 
arbitration for pay disputes in the UK. Interestingly FOA did not, as most US 
commentators believed until recently, originate in the US circa 1966 (Feigenbaum 
1975). Treble (1986) explains that the first example of a formal FOA procedure for 
collective bargaining disputes was inaugurated in the conciliation board of the 
Nottingham hosiery industry in set up in 1860 by A.J. Mundella (for details see 
Cuthbert 1960). The arbitrator on the board was never actually called upon to cast his 
deciding, and, presumably consequently, the board was judged to be a success in 
securing industrial peace. Treble has researched more thoroughly into similar FOA 
procedures in some coalmining industry conciliation boards in the period 1893-1914 
(Treble 1990). These examples of FOA were therefore in operation in Britain long 
before Stevens’s seminal article extolling the theoretical virtues of FOA (Stevens 
1966). Therefore it should be made clear that the following analysis is not concerned 
with the origins of FOA procedures or FOA theories but much more narrowly with the 
incidence of FOA procedures in UK new style agreements in the 1980s.
A secondary and more qualitative aspect of this chapter is explanations for the 
type of FOA procedures that have developed in the UK. FOA is a simple concept and 
procedure. However, in both the US and the UK this simplicity has been muddied by
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pre-arbitration dispute procedure stages, non-compulsory reference procedures (in UK 
only) and by amendments to the fundamental mechanism of a straight choice between 
final offers (mainly in the US). Very few collective agreements (UK) or bargaining 
laws (US) provide what might be termed ’pure* FOA - a bare minimum of pre- 
arbitration stages, compulsory reference and simple straight choice arbitration 
mechanism. The variety of FOA procedures is outlined and explanations for certain 
adaptations to this pure form are assessed in section 5.
2. Evidence on FOA incidence from secondary sources
The available secondary information concerning this issue is primarily 
quantitative, the characteristics of FOA plants, but there is a small amount of 
qualitative information which provides further clues about the incidence of FOA. The 
quantitative analysis operates at two levels: The characteristics of the new style deals 
group as a whole; and the characteristics of the FOA plants compared to their non- 
FOA counterparts within the group.
The scarcity of secondary source information on many of the workplaces to be 
surveyed means that most of the conclusions concerning incidence are little more than 
hints at what might be the determining factors in the incidence of FOA agreements. 
The number of missing cases in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for the 101 plants identified, 
indicate the relative sparsity of information on some characteristics.
a. The type of workplace involved in new style agreements
The fact that much of the work on the extent of FOA agreements is concerned 
more generally with new style deals creates some problems for discerning particular 
characteristics of plants or firms with FOA agreements. More general literature 
indicates a number of important features:
. Industrial sector: There is a well-documented concentration of new style 
deals in the electronics industry. Nearly 30% of all the new style deal plants 
are in the electrical and electronic engineering class but there has been a spread 
of the deals to other industries (Bassett 1986: 132-147).
. Inward investment: A substantial number of the plants (for which this 
information is available) are owned by foreign based companies, particularly
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Japanese. However, the proportion of UK owned new style deal plants within 
the group has increased over the 1980s (Labour Research 1989).
. Greenfield sites: Almost 30% of all the plants (and 55% of those for which 
the date of establishment is recorded) were established in the 1980s. This 
greenfield site characteristic of the plants is particularly emphasised in much of 
the relevant literature (Bassett 1986, Labour Research 1989, IRRR 1989).
Again there are some exceptions where a company has inaugurated new style 
industrial relations or working arrangements at current establishments, for 
instance the agreements at Eaton (Axle Division) in Newton Aycliffe (Industrial 
Relations Review and Report [IRRR] 1986a) and at United Merchant Bar in 
Scunthorpe (IRRR 1986b).
. Region: New style deal workplaces are geographically concentrated in Wales 
(North, around Wrexham, and along the industrial South coast belt) and in 
North East England. Workplaces in these three areas alone make up virtually 
half of the total group. This is probably linked to a number of factors 
including conditions in the local labour market, local land availability, price and 
development incentives, and local union officials. On this regional factor, an 
interesting comment came from the TGWU regional officer in Cardiff: "I can’t 
see any greenfield site ever agreeing again to sign agreements that are not 
single union. It’s not going to go away and if anything it’s going to grow." 
(Labour Research 1989: 10).
. Union recognised: The EETPU has a sole recognition agreement with 55 per 
cent of the plants. There are only four other unions with a significant number 
of agreements signed, the AEU, GMB and TGWU. In three of the plants more 
than one union is recognised but the plants are still classed as new style 
because they have an FOA agreement.
b. Notable features of FOA agreement plants within the group
There are substantial gaps in the information, which make a definitive 
conclusion on any particular characteristics of the FOA workplaces compared to the 
non-FOA group difficult to make. The results of various cross tabulations are 
summarised in Table 4.2. Certain points are worth noting and may prove of relevance 
to an analysis of the incidence of FOA agreements.
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. The UK owned plants are disproportionately less likely to have FOA 
agreements than their foreign-owned counterparts.
. Proportionately more of the agreements involving the EETPU and the GMB 
are FOA than the agreements where other unions are involved.
. A greater proportion of the plants established in the 1980s have FOA 
agreements than those plants established before 1980.
. FOA agreements are particularly prevalent in the office machinery, electrical 
and electronics engineering sector. This is an even greater proportion than for 
the new style deal plants as a whole.
It is quite probable that a number of these results would not stand up 
independently in a more controlled analysis. It may be that FOA, workplace vintage 
and union recognised are actually all determined by the country of ownership. Foreign 
owned firms may be more likely to recognise the EETPU and GMB than other firms, 
have begun operations on the UK site in the 1980s and coincidentally favour FOA.
Any one of the other factors could be similarly crucial but because of the high number 
of missing observations a more controlled analysis is not possible from the available 
secondary data sources.
c. Attitudinal information on the incidence of FOA
There is a general ’package problem’ here in that, because FOA has been 
introduced in the great majority of cases with other measures, it is difficult to 
distinguish reasons expressed by parties for the introduction of the FOA clause in 
isolation, as opposed to reasons for the whole package.
An exception to the package type agreement (it appears to be the only one) is 
the agreement at Iveco Ford signed in November 1986 seven months after the 
announcement of a joint venture between Ford and Fiat’s truck subsidiary in Britain, 
Iveco UK. FOA was the only main procedural change in industrial relations brought 
about as part of the agreement between company and unions (IRRR 1987b). The 
clause was actually simply attached to the main Ford grievance procedure in place of 
the final, national stage of appeal.
Having said this, unfortunately the case study reveals very little about why 
FOA was introduced as opposed to some other form of impasse procedure, apart from
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the fact that management was interested in establishing a ’new relationship’ with the 
unions at the plant. At least this indicates which party probably proposed FOA, but it 
does not adequately explain management thinking behind the proposal.
Reasons given by management for the introduction of new style deals (both 
FOA and non-FOA) have been recorded in some case studies and surveys. However 
none of these sources provide specific information on managerial reasoning behind 
FOA procedures. Briefly stated, management thinking behind the introduction of new 
style arrangements include: the avoidance of multi-unionism; the avoidance of 
adversarial industrial relations; the opportunity created by a greenfield site; a business 
crisis (IRRR 1989).
Apart from individual case studies various commentators have hinted at the 
answers to some of these questions but nothing equivocal, based on case study 
evidence has yet been written. For instance, Lowry (1990) states that in general 
management has been quite anti-FOA, but does not cite individual cases supporting 
this. On the other hand some case studies indicate that management was actually the 
progenitor of the FOA clause, for instance at BICC Optical Cables Unit (IRRR 1987c) 
and Bowman Webber (Income Data Services 1988), so Lowry’s argument may not be 
soundly based. The case of Bowman Webber is particularly interesting because a third 
party was directly involved in the form of the Industrial Society which helped the 
company and the EETPU draw up an agreement which they signed in December 1984.
Bassett (1986: 116) and Trevor (1988: 40) provide some anecdotal evidence 
about the role of Roy Sanderson, then the EETPU’s national engineering officer and a 
strong advocate of FOA, in negotiating many of the union’s early new style 
agreements and particularly in negotiating the Toshiba (Plymouth) agreement, the first 
new style deal signed in 1981. Sanderson, heavily influenced by his experience of US 
examples of FOA agreements according to Bassett, used three arguments in favour of 
FOA, though presumably not all were used to win over employers to FOA:
. Resolving disputes in this way is less costly than through industrial action.
. It is ’recession-proof in that the decision is based not on ’economic factors’ 
but on the soundness of the argument presented.
. It is fairer than the strike because it settles disputes on the basis of natural 
justice rather than on a trial of strength.
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Other union leaders have been quite anti-FOA (John Edmonds of the GMB in 
particular, Bassett 1986: 147) so it would seem reasonable to argue that the role of the 
electricians’ union and Sanderson is crucial in any explanation of the incidence of 
FOA agreements. However, there is undoubtedly also some room for a management 
prerogative explanation in that not all the EETPU’s agreements are FOA and not all 
the FOA agreements involve the EETPU, indeed the GMB has signed a number of 
FOA agreements, according to existing reports, despite Edmonds’s avowed opposition. 
Moreover the EETPU model agreement used by local officials when negotiating a new 
collective agreement provides for a choice of impasse procedure: FOA; conventional 
arbitration and; withdrawal of labour. The relevant section of the model agreement is 
reproduced in Appendix C. It could be that the local officials have particularly 
advocated FOA but nevertheless the decision concerning the choice of impasse 
procedure is likely to be jointly made, by the company and union representatives.
3. Evidence on FOA incidence from the primary research instruments
Final-offer arbitration procedures exist in 27 (38%) of the 72 workplaces in the 
sample with ’new style’ industrial arrangements which recognise trade unions. These 
plants comprise 50 per cent of the 54 plants in the sample with some form of formal 
dispute procedure in their collective agreement. Note that the type of FOA procedures 
in place differ across agreements in two main ways: whether or not they provide for 
pre-arbitration stages in the dispute procedure such as conciliation and/or mediation; 
and whether or not the reference to arbitration mechanism is compulsory, unilateral or 
joint, voluntary. Variations within the FOA format are explored further in section 5.
Cross tabulations with the sample confirm and reveal that FOA impasse 
procedures are more likely to exist in workplaces: which are UK or Japanese owned; 
where the EETPU is the recognised union; which are located in the South East; where 
the impasse procedure was introduced between 1980 and 1986; in medium sized 
workplaces; and where union density is above 25%.
The likelihood of a workplace having an FOA procedure was analysed more 
formally by a logit regression using the sub-sample of plants which have some sort of 
procedure (Table 2.3). The dependent variable is classified as one if an FOA
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agreement and zero otherwise. Therefore the non-FOA category includes both 
conventional arbitration and non arbitration procedures. Only three variables are 
significantly associated with the incidence of FOA agreements. These are the date 
when the impasse procedure was introduced, whether or not the EETPU has sole 
recognition at the plant and whether or not the workplace is located in the South East 
region. The probability of the workplace having an FOA agreement is significantly 
much higher where the collective agreement incorporating FOA was signed in the 
period 1980 to 1986, has the EETPU as co-signatory or if it is in the South East1. 
Variables which were associated in cross tabulations but were found to be non­
significant in the regression are those on ownership (UK and Japan), union density and 
workplace size.
This statistical result concerning the year the disputes procedure was introduced 
and the role of the EETPU can be brought to life by discussing a personality involved. 
Between 1980 and 1986 the electricians union National Officer for Engineering was 
Roy Sanderson. He was (and remains) a tireless advocate of new style industrial 
relations in general and FOA in particular. The EETPU model agreement, the basis 
for many of their new style deals allows a choice of FOA, conventional arbitration or 
industrial action as the ultimate stage in the collective grievances procedure (see 
Appendix C). So there is certainly some scope for local EETPU officials and 
management to independently choose their preferred final stage when negotiating the 
terms of the collective agreement. Yet a substantial majority chose FOA. The 
empirical analysis suggests that Roy Sanderson’s influence may have been paramount 
in the signing of FOA agreements in the first six years of the 1980s in both EETPU 
and non-EETPU plants.
Another potential explanation for this time-based result concerns the attitudes of 
managers towards FOA. First, as FOA is designed to be a dispute deterrent we might 
expect the incidence of FOA procedures signed to decline as the threat of costly 
disputes diminishes. In the early 1980s the memory of extensive industrial action in 
UK industry during the 1970s was still a pertinent reminder of the potentiality of 
industrial disputes. A disputes procedure which could, in theory, deter such disputes 
by encouraging responsible collective bargaining must have seemed very attractive to 
employers. However, in the later part of the 1980s the threat of costly industrial
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action was much less imminent in most plants judging by the aggregate figures 
(Metcalf and Milner 1993), hence the need for any collective dispute procedure in 
particular the novelty of FOA was much less attractive. Combining this with the role 
of Roy Sanderson suggested above, one could argue that whilst Sanderson sowed the 
seeds of FOA, the fear of costly disputes (which diminished markedly in the second 
half of the 1980s) provided the fertile ground for this seed. This explanation for the 
incidence of FOA is compatible with the assumptions regarding dispute procedure 
development suggested by the joint cost theory of strikes, outlined above.
The interviews were only conducted at plants with FOA procedures which is 
not the ideal sub-sample from which to distinguish why particular plants signed FOA 
agreements when others did not - because there is no sense of ’why not FOA?\ 
Despite this caveat the results do provide some support for the respective explanations 
outlined above. There is quite strong support from the bargaining histories of the 
plants before FOA was introduced for the desire-to-deter-costly-disputes explanation.
Two of the eight deals were on greenfield sites, Shotton Paper at Deeside 
(signed in 1985) and Sanyo at Newton Aycliffe (1988), and therefore involved no 
bargaining history. Interestingly, however, the Director of Human Resources at 
Shotton Paper, Mr John Shield, did explain that both the Managing Director and 
himself had individual ’bargaining histories’ in the paper industry of Merseyside.
Their experiences of union militancy, frequent industrial action and firefighting 
management had been paramount in their determination to have a completely different 
arrangement at the new site, hence the new style deal and FOA. This highlights that it 
is worth being aware that even at a greenfield sites it is unlikely that the parties and 
their bargaining agents are ’green’ themselves. The key difference between greenfield 
and brownfield sites is the lack of an existing agreement in the former which has to be 
discarded or altered in the latter to implement new elements.
Of the six non-greenfield sites, in two of the plants there had been little 
previous collective bargaining since the new agreement corresponded with a 
decentralisation of bargaining from company to workplace level (ABB Capacitors and 
Anonco). Of the four more conventionally brownfield sites, all the interviewees 
indicated that industrial relations had been something of a problem before the new 
agreement incorporating FOA was signed. All had experienced industrial action and
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very interestingly three stated that previous industrial relations procedures had 
exacerbated problems rather than alleviated them. In one the previous agreement had 
included conventional arbitration as the final stage in a dispute procedure, and 
problems with this were cited as a reason for adopting FOA. Therefore the bargaining 
histories of the parties strongly suggest that the need for a dispute deterrent was a 
important impetus for the signing of FOA agreements.
Unfortunately, because of the composition of the interview group, it is not 
possible to confirm or challenge the focal role of Roy Sanderson suggested by some 
other commentators and the results in Table 2.3 by talking to managers in a number of 
plants where he was involved. Only three of the deals, Sanyo (Lowestoft), ABB 
Capacitors and Shotton Paper, involve the engineering section of the EETPU and were 
signed before 1987. In one of the these three plants, the interviewee described 
Sanderson as the ’missionary for pendulum arbitration* but he was not cited in the 
other two cases.
In all the plants, except one, management claimed responsibility for the FOA 
agreement either personally or for one of their managerial predecessors. The 
exception, Anonco, was unique in many respects. In this case, the agreement was 
written by corporate level personnel managers and imposed on the plant from above at 
the time or bargaining decentralisation. Management at the plant had never had to 
deal with industrial relations matters before as all such issues were handled at 
corporate level. The interviewee at Anonco could offer no explanation why the 
corporate personnel managers favoured FOA which had not previously been used in 
the company.
The fact that in general management claimed responsibility for FOA is not 
surprising given that they were the interviewees but the ’Sanderson effect* suggested 
by the postal survey data may not be completely defunct The common response to a 
question about where the idea to try FOA came from was that the manager had ’read 
about it’ or ’heard about other cases of it’. In the case of RHM Foods Mr Bill 
Gormley, then personnel manager, learnt about FOA whilst enroled on a course at 
Salford University and actually introduced FOA into the plant as part of his work for 
the course. This does suggest that the description of Roy Sanderson by one manager 
as a ’missionary for pendulum arbitration* was probably quite apt. The picture of
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FOA incidence is of Sanderson being the apostle for FOA amongst managers and 
academics in the early to mid 1980s and managers becoming the ’evangelisers’ after 
that.
4. The more general incidence of dispute procedures
Given the extent of collective dispute procedures in the UK it seems somewhat 
odd that there has been no study of the incidence of dispute procedures more generally 
to which this analysis of FOA incidence might be complementary. Millward, Stevens, 
Smart and Hawes (1992) record that 65% of British workplaces provide some for third 
party intervention on pay and conditions disputes (compared with 56% in 1980 and 
68% in 1984). There is considerable variation in types of procedure and one might 
presume across type of workplaces, but this variation has never been properly analysed 
either empirically or qualitatively. Moreover, potential explanations for the variety in 
provision have not been put forward except in rather anecdotal comments, with one 
possible exception - the main assumption underlying Reder and Neumann’s (1980) 
joint cost theory of strikes. Although Reder and Neumann state that they ’do not 
attempt to determine which bargaining pairs develop protocols’, they actually set out a 
model which assumes that the process of protocol formation has some order and is 
predictable.
Note that formal dispute procedures are only one type of bargaining protocol as 
defined by Reder and Neumann. Other aspects of the rules of bargaining could 
include the time and location of meetings, the authority of bargaining representatives 
and specification of the circumstances under which an old contract might continue 
post-expiration if a new contract is still under negotiation. However, it seems safe to 
argue that formal dispute procedures, especially arbitration arrangements, are one 
manifestation of a comprehensive bargaining protocol. They key feature of Reder and 
Neumann’s analysis is that they argue that in selecting a protocol, bargainers balance 
up the cost reduction of reduced strike activity against the increased cost of specifying 
a more comprehensive protocol. This analysis leads to two main predictions 
concerning the development of voluntary formal dispute procedures: that more 
experienced bargainers are more likely to have developed such procedures and; that the 
likelihood of dispute procedure development is positively related to the potential joint
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costs of strikes. This all seems reasonably sensible but it is almost completely 
untested. We simply do not know if the potential joint cost of strikes and/or the 
experience of the bargaining parties are the main determinants of the development of 
dispute procedures.
The analysis of FOA development above provides some support for Reder and 
Neumann’s assumption since a number of the plants which adopted FOA stated that 
this was explicitly to prevent disputes and was consequent on the plant’s or industry’s 
problems with industrial action in the past. The example of the role of Roy Sanderson 
in the spread of FOA agreements in the 1980s could be used to add a nuance to joint 
cost theory. Perhaps the threat of costly industrial action is the driving force behind 
the development of general dispute procedures but the specifications of dispute 
procedures may depend on personalities and other contingent factors.
Note that not all anecdotal evidence supports Reder and Neumann’s analysis of 
dispute procedure development. Lowry (1990) argues that arbitration provisions are 
more likely when unions are relatively weak than when they are strong, because only 
in the under the former scenario would unions agree to arbitration arrangements. One 
would imagine that the threat of costly industrial action is more real when unions are 
strong than weak - therefore the assumptions of joint cost theory might predict the 
opposite relationship.
It is not immediately clear what would be the right ’test’ of Reder and 
Neumann’s analysis of dispute procedure development. There seem to be two main 
possibilities. First, an investigation using qualitative (historical and contemporary) 
evidence on the development of industrial, company and workplace dispute procedures 
in the UK attempting to answer the critical question of why some bargaining pairs 
developed procedures for third party intervention in disputes when others did not. 
Second, comparing empirical data on the intensity of industrial action by industry and 
region (to gauge potential joint costs) with information on the provision of formal 
dispute procedures by workplaces, say using the three Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys. If there is a significant statistical link between the provision of dispute 
procedures and previously high intensity of industrial action this would support the 
assumptions of joint cost theory. Note that the general critique that dispute procedures 
are if anything positively related to the incidence of industrial action would not
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invalidate this analysis for two reasons. First, it may be that the intensity of industrial 
action has declined since the introduction of the dispute procedure but that it is still 
high compared to other workplaces. Second, the parties’ expectations that dispute 
procedures help to deter industrial action may be unfounded but it may still be that 
procedures were introduced because of the threat of costly industrial action.
This study of the incidence of FOA in UK new style deals in the 1980s is a 
very narrow analysis of an unusual dispute procedure introduced into one industrial 
relations system in a perhaps peculiar decade. Therefore the findings are probably not 
particularly applicable to other industrial relations systems, time frames or dispute 
procedures. However, the findings do indicate that the whole issue of dispute 
procedure incidence deserves further investigation at least in the UK and possibly in 
comparative work. For instance we know that the legal parameters of industrial 
relations in Australia and Britain were virtually identical in the 1890s but since the 
early 1900s Australia has operated under a legalistic, compulsory arbitration system 
which is anathema to Britain (Macintyre and Mitchell 1989). A thorough investigation 
of how and why these alternative systems of dispute procedure provision developed 
could be very illuminating.
5. The variety of FOA procedures: pure versus adapted FOA
a. Introduction
Sections 2 and 3 above examined the question of FOA incidence in the UK - 
the characteristics of plants, unions and bargaining agents which precipitated the 
inclusion of FOA into some new collective agreements in the 1980s. The ’dependent 
variable’ in both the quantitative and qualitative analyses is a simple measure of the 
existence of a dispute procedure which includes FOA. However, a striking feature of 
this small sample is the great variety of dispute procedure specifications within the 54 
plants and even within the 27 FOA plants in terms of pre-arbitration configurations 
and different means of triggering arbitration. This variety is examined in terms of its 
effect on one outcome (dispute deterrence) in chapter 3. Regardless of its effect on 
dispute deterrence, however, the development of this range of different specifications 
of FOA in the UK is intrinsically interesting in itself. The central theme of this 
section is to investigate the fact that in general UK examples of FOA are considerably
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adapted from the simple, theoretical model. This model would be defined as one with 
a compulsory reference procedure, a bare minimum of in-house negotiation procedures 
and no pre-arbitration third party stages such as conciliation and/or mediation.
The issue of pure versus adapted FOA has been addressed by some US 
commentators and in the UK by Wilkinson (1986). Criteria of what constitutes ’pure 
FOA’ vary greatly across these studies, but Wilkinson’s is the most relevant here. He 
argues that the key distinguishing feature between pure and adapted FOA agreements 
is whether or not pre-arbitration stages of conciliation and/or mediation exist. This 
seems to be too narrow a distinction, however. A broader means of judging the purity 
of an FOA procedure must surely include the type of reference to arbitration 
mechanism, and might also include the number of in-house stages in the dispute 
procedure. In the next section this broader means of distinction is employed. To an 
extent this is only a disagreement over semantics, since the main issue is what factors 
have influenced the development of the variety of FOA procedures rather than 
discerning where each agreement sits on a purity scale. However, it does mean that 
this study, also partly because it comes five years after Wilkinson’s, cannot conclude 
as he did that most UK agreements are ’pure FOA’.
The distinction between pure and adapted FOA is inevitably interlinked with 
questions of FOA effectiveness and in particular with the consequences of FOA usage 
which are addressed in following chapters. Here the concern is to distinguish what has 
influenced the development of FOA into the varied procedures evident in the survey.
b. The variety of procedures
Using responses from the postal survey, Table 2.4 provides a statistical 
breakdown of the variety of FOA procedures based on the configuration of pre- 
arbitration procedures, the reference to arbitration mechanism and the means of 
selecting the arbitrator. This table uses the sub-sample of plants in the postal survey 
with FOA agreements. The full specifications of all the dispute procedures in the 
whole sample are provided in chapter 3 (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1). Table 2.4 reveals 
that just over half the FOA plants do not provide for pre-arbitration third party stages, 
around 40 per cent have a joint, voluntary procedure for referring disputes to 
arbitration, i.e. both sides must agree to refer any dispute to this final and binding
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stage, and the majority stipulate that in the event of arbitration ACAS will select an 
arbitrator. These statistics can be augmented further by reference to Appendix C 
which provides extracts from the dispute procedure in the collective agreements of 
eight new style deals which all include FOA. Some of these follow a sim ilar format to 
that found in the EETPU model agreement (also Appendix C) but others are quite 
different.
What is striking about these agreements is that each has distinctive features 
which discern it from the others. Characteristic ingredients include: the number of in- 
house stages - while some have five or six well defined in-house stages others appear 
to have none at all; whether or not the procedure covers individual and collective 
grievances; the description of what constitutes final-offer arbitration; restrictions on the 
terms of reference; and whether or not the arbitrator is allowed to make 
recommendations or other observations with his/her award. These are in addition to 
the well documented differences in pre-arbitration third party procedures and the 
means of referring an issue to arbitration. It does appear that the more complicated 
procedures are the ones signed later in the 1980s whereas the Toshiba, Cadbury’s and 
Sanyo (Lowestoft) deals signed in 1981 and 1982 are more straightforward with very 
few obstacles between an in-house dispute and FOA. The starkest procedure appears 
to be that at Sanyo (Lowestoft) which provides no in-house dispute procedure and no 
third party stage other than arbitration. In contrast the agreements at Iveco Ford, RHM 
Foods and Shotton Paper include up to six in-house dispute procedure stages. 
Interestingly though, two of these (Iveco Ford and Shotton Paper) do not provide for 
either conciliation or mediation before FOA.
In addition to what might be termed the procedural hurdles before arbitration 
are the different means of referring disputes to arbitration once these hurdles are 
jumped. Although the EETPU Model Agreement advocates the use of unilateral 
reference to arbitration ("either side can proceed to arbitration"), this has not been 
replicated in all agreements in practice. The earliest FOA agreement at Toshiba 
provides for compulsory reference to arbitration if a dispute could not be settled in- 
house, and this is also the case in the more recently signed agreement at Shotton 
Paper. Most of the agreements cited in Appendix C provide for joint, voluntary 
reference to arbitration, however there are some quirks which mean that the labels
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’unilateral’, ’compulsory’ or ’joint voluntary’ are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, the Nissan agreement provides for compulsory reference of disputes to ACAS 
but stipulates that resolution may be by conciliation or arbitration depending on the 
issue. Similarly difficult to categorise is the Yuasa Batteries agreement which states 
that the usual means of reference will be on a joint basis, but that either party can 
unilaterally refer an issue (after 10 working days) if no joint agreement to progress is 
reached.
Another distinguishing feature is the fact that some dispute procedures 
specifically cover both individual and collective disputes (Shotton Paper, Iveco Ford 
and Nissan), some either specify separate procedures for individual and collective 
disputes (Yuasa Batteries and Toshiba) or preserve the third party procedures for 
collective disputes only (RHM Foods) and the remainder do not distinguish this either 
way (Sanyo and Cadbury’s).
Turning to the description of what constitutes FOA and notes about its usage. 
Some agreements employ the straightforward jargon ’Pendulum Arbitration* (Iveco 
Ford and Yuasa Batteries) but most spell out exactly what this means. Perhaps the 
most definitive of these is in the Cadbury’s agreement:
"... the arbitrator will then be required to decide which case has the 
greater merit. He would decide for one case or the other, cannot split 
the difference nor make further recommendations or observations."
Some agreements either in the preamble or note to the dispute procedure stipulate the 
grave consequences of using arbitration. For example, the RHM Foods agreement 
states that:
"Many grievances are escalated through disputes procedures because of 
an initial lack of understanding ... Every attempt should be made to 
resolve matters in [an] informal way ..."
Furthermore some agreements such as the Shotton Paper one note that the final stage 
of their procedures (arbitration) are to be avoided at all costs. This particular 
agreement goes even further by stating that:
"In particular there is mutual trust that neither side will progress issues 
[to arbitration] which will be detrimental to the other or both."
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Finally one of these agreements provides a permanent term of reference for arbitration, 
whereas most of the others state that terms of reference will be determined on the 
basis of the individual dispute. The Cadbury’s agreement states that:
"In making his [the arbitrator] decision his criterion would be to select 
the case which will improve the long term prosperity of the company 
and its Chirk employees in cases of ’interest’. ... These terms of 
reference are subject to confirmation and variation by mutual 
agreement"
This proviso is akin to Meade’s proposals concerning ’Not Quite Compulsory 
Arbitration’ or NQCA, in which he suggests that one element in an FOA package 
could be that the arbitrator’s objective in making a decision would be to maximise the 
level of employment in the industry (Meade 1982, and see Dolton and Treble 1985 for 
further discussion of the NQCA principle and its link to the FOA debate).
Overall the variety of FOA procedures in the UK can be seen as on some 
imaginary scale starting with ’pure FOA’ and moving away from this in degrees of 
adaptation. The purest form of FOA among the eight agreements recorded in 
Appendix C would seem to be that at Sanyo (Lowestoft) which has no specified in- 
house procedures and no pre-arbitration stage, although the fact that it has a joint 
reference clause means that is cannot be classed as pure FOA. All the other 
agreements have adapted the simple FOA principle further by erecting significantly 
more hurdles before arbitration is reached. This adaptation of pure FOA in part 
mirrors developments in the US, where some legislatures have actually gone much 
further by amending the core of the mechanism itself such that labelling the resulting 
procedure as ’FOA’ is misleading. Some of these amendments are outlined below 
after a discussion of explanations for the variety of FOA procedures found thus far in 
the UK.
c. Explanations for the variety of procedures
The case study interviews revealed that as far as the parties were concerned the 
important distinguishing features of their procedure from others were the existence or 
non-existence of pre-arbitration stages and the reference procedure. The number of in- 
house stages before a dispute reached a third party intervention stage was not thought
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to be particularly important. Their view therefore falls somewhere between the 
Wilkinson and Milner interpretations of how to judge the purity of FOA agreements.
So there are two phenomena which particularly need to be explained, why some 
procedures include pre-arbitration stages and why some provide for joint voluntary 
reference to arbitration. Other features highlighted above such as the terminology used 
for describing FOA or permanent terms of reference are not examined.
i) Provision o f conciliation and/or mediation before FOA: Turning first to the issue of 
pre-arbitration provision for conciliation and/or mediation, it has already been noted 
that Wilkinson (1986) is the only previous author to examine this issue. He provides a 
relatively simple explanation based on the role of Roy Sanderson and the importance 
of learning from experience. It is readily apparent from previous sections that 
Sanderson played the pivotal role in first introducing FOA to the UK in the 1980s with 
the Toshiba deal (see Trevor 1988 for more details). Wilkinson argues that when this 
deal was signed the possibility of providing conciliation and/or mediation was not 
considered:
"The union admits that when pendulum arbitration was written into the 
Toshiba agreement, it was unaware of the modifications and refinements 
which had been made to the system in the USA." (Wilkinson 1986: 15, 
quoting personal interview with unnamed EETPU official on 22.7.86)
He then goes on to argue that subsequent modifications to FOA procedures to include 
these pre-arbitration stages came about as a result of problems with the use of this 
purer form of FOA. The most important case in this instance was that at Sanyo in 
1985 when the EETPU proposed ad hoc use of mediation before arbitration even 
though the dispute procedure did not provide for mediation, mainly because they 
wanted to prolong negotiations. (Chapter 5 provides more details on this case of FOA 
in action and only certain aspects of that are salient here.) Wilkinson argues that the 
EETPU regretted the simplicity of tne Sanyo procedure at the time, and with hindsight, 
since it prevented any further movement between the sides after impasse and before 
arbitration. In other words pure FOA was seen as too absolute and needed mollifying 
with a less stringent procedural stage. Subsequent to the dispute, the EETPU proposed 
that mediation be formerly introduced into the dispute procedure but this was rejected 
by the employees in a ballot (with management support).
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As a consequence of this dispute and that at Bowman Webber in 1986, the 
EETPU organised a conference of the signatories to their existing agreements at the 
end of 1985 with a proposal to modify all their FOA agreements to include pre- 
arbitration stages. However, this proposal was rejected by employers who believed 
that the pure system ’held forth the promise of responsible bargaining and regarded 
tampering with the procedure as having detrimental effects on negotiations’ (Wilkinson 
1986: 24). However, Wilkinson argues that since the EETPU was the prime mover 
over the new style deals, that from 1985 new agreements were more likely to ’follow 
the pattern of the Yuasa agreement which includes conciliation prior to pendulum 
arbitration’ (Wilkinson 1986: 24). In summary, Wilkinson argued that FOA 
agreements signed later in the 1980s were more likely to have pre-arbitration stages 
especially after 1985, because of the EETPU’s experience with FOA in action.
Wilkinson made his observations when FOA was still in its relative infancy in 
the UK and other observers would probably have concluded similarly on this issue at 
the time. The benefits of quantitative data about FOA plants, of more detailed 
questioning of managers about their agreement and of hindsight reveal that a more 
credible explanation must also take account of the role of tradition and beliefs about 
the purpose of FOA as well as problems of previous usage.
Statistical analysis of this issue can only be of a very limited nature since the 
survey only contains data for 27 FOA plants. However, Table 2.5 provides two-way 
analysis of the relationship between certain variables and whether or not conciliation 
and/or mediation are included in the procedure. No distinction is made between the 
’conciliation only’ and ’conciliation and mediation’ categories for the sake of 
simplicity. Table 2.5 reveals that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between FOA deals signed in the early 1980s (up to and including 1985) and the 
provision of conciliation and/or mediation. There is also no suggestion of a link 
between the EETPU and purer forms of FOA - which might be expected given the 
change of policy on this around the mid-1980s. However, two factors are significantly 
related to the provision of pre-arbitration stages: whether or not the new style 
agreement was signed on a greenfield site and whether or not the plant is UK owned. 
Greenfield site agreements (defined here as a plant established on its current site in the 
same year that dispute procedure was introduced) are significantly more likely not to
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have pre-arbitration stages, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
In addition UK owned plants are more likely to have pre-arbitration stages in their 
FOA procedures, although with less significance (P=0.072). Note that other 
specifications of procedure introduction dates were used but were also found to be 
insignificant. Possible explanations for these significant associations are discemable 
from some previous case studies of FOA introduction and from the eight case study 
interviews.
The statistical results indicate that the role of tradition and convention is an 
important explanation for variation. Traditionally dispute procedures in the UK which 
provide for arbitration also provide for conciliation, usually both by ACAS. Millward 
and Stevens (1986: 180) report that of the workplaces with provision for third-party 
intervention for disputes over pay and conditions involving ACAS, 71 per cent in 1980 
and 64 per cent in 1984 provided for both services. For 1990, Millward et al (1992: 
209) report that ’where ACAS was mentioned over half of procedures [for pay and 
conditions disputes] referred to the possibility of both conciliation and arbitration’.
Note that in fact these figures although reasonably high are do not provide quite the 
right comparison. The true comparison is the extent of provision for conciliation 
and/or mediation in agreements which provide for arbitration, rather that the provision 
for both across the sub-sample with provision for any ACAS service. These figures of 
87 per cent for 1980 and 82 per cent for 19842 (figure for 1990 not calculable from 
text) show the true extent of the usual practice of providing pre-arbitration stages in 
UK dispute procedures. This also indicates how comparatively low the extent of 
provision for pre-arbitration stages is among new style deal plants with FOA (52%).
A priori, it might be expected that the type of plants most likely to diverge 
from convention would be greenfield sites and foreign owned plants since they are 
likely to be less aware of and less constrained by convention. This is exactly what the 
data indicate. The traditional institutions associated with dispute resolution may also 
have played a role here. In its 1984 annual report the Central Arbitration Committee 
(CAC 1984) expressed some misgivings about FOA and suggested that at the very 
least it should be accompanied by a mediation or conciliation stage. The influence of 
convention, particularly associated with ACAS, is cited by Wickens (1987) as the main 
reason for the provision for conciliation in the dispute procedure at Nissan, although
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this is somewhat anomalous with the general picture since Nissan was a greenfield site 
and is foreign owned. When discussing the motivation behind the Nissan dispute 
procedure, Wickens states:
"... we felt it important that as ACAS would be involved in the 
procedure then the ACAS views should be taken into account. Clearly 
ACAS has a strong preference for conciliation before arbitration ... In 
providing for conciliation it was a major concern of all parties that 
neither the company nor the union should ’keep something up its sleeve 
for conciliation*.1' (Wickens 1987: 150)
There is also evidence that arbitrators who have become involved in FOA cases have 
indicated to the parties that they would have preferred conventional arbitration and 
failing that some form of mediation before the arbitration hearing (Kessler 1987, Lewis 
1990).
A second explanation based on the different conceptions about the purpose of 
FOA mainly transpired from the interviews. Asked about why their original agreement 
provided for pre-arbitration some of the relevant interviewees stated that these stages 
were vital to prevent the parties reaching an arbitration hearing with bargaining 
positions still poles apart. These procedures were also seen as a means of clarifying 
bargaining positions before arbitration to prevent confusion at the final stage. In 
contrast when other interviewees were asked why their agreements did not provide for 
conciliation or mediation, the usual response was because this would have defeated the 
object of FOA by providing a means for compromise outside of in-house bargaining. 
For the first set of plants, FOA is probably best viewed as a dispute resolution 
mechanism whereas for the second group it is seen as a dispute deterrence mechanism. 
Therefore whilst the former are anxious about the consequences if FOA is reached, the 
latter do not want to muddy its deterrent power with pre-arbitration stages.
ii) Provision o f joint, voluntary reference mechanisms: Lewis (1990) is the only other 
UK commentator to discuss the different means of referring disputes to arbitration in 
the context of FOA. He concentrates on the implications of the different mechanisms 
for whether or not these deals should properly be termed ’no-strike deals’. Although 
he highlights that some FOA plants have adopted a compulsory reference mechanism
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and some a joint, voluntary he does not suggest any possible reasons for the variation. 
Presumably, as with the provision of pre-arbitration stages there must be some role for 
convention here. This is implicitly suggested by Lewis (1990: 42), however, there 
may be another explanation. Since a joint, voluntary reference procedure means that 
either party can prevent the use of FOA, it seems sensible to argue that such 
procedures are more likely to exist in plants where there is (or was) a relatively low 
level of trust between the parties. Concern for having the ability to block FOA if 
necessary must be more important than making the deterrent potential of FOA as 
powerful as possible with the use of a compulsory reference procedure.
The level of trust in each plant is not discemable from the postal survey but the 
data were examined to establish whether or not they could provide any evidence which 
might support the proposition outlined. Table 2.6 shows two-way tables on the 
incidence of joint, voluntary procedures and certain independent characteristics. The 
only characteristic which is associated with the nature of the reference mechanism is 
whether or not the EETPU has sole recognition at the plant (P=0.000). Of the 18 FOA 
plants where the EETPU has sole recognition only 3 (16.7%) have a joint, voluntary 
reference mechanism compared to 8 (88.9%) of the 9 other FOA plants. Therefore it 
seems safe to argue that the key role is that of the EETPU. This association may 
either result from a proactive relationship or a reactive one. In other words, it is either 
because the EETPU itself favours compulsory reference procedures and is therefore 
advocating them when deals are struck, whereas other unions are less keen, or it 
derives from the fact that management is less wary about the EETPU than other unions 
and therefore is prepared to concede a compulsory, mechanism more readily. Another 
feature may be that in 1988 the TUC proscribed mandatory, joint reference to 
arbitration (i.e compulsory) in new recognition agreements (Lewis 1990: 43), at a time 
when the EETPU was expelled (or about to be expelled) from the TUC.
The interviews revealed some association between low trust industrial relations 
environments and the existence of joint, voluntary mechanisms. At one plant with this 
type of procedure, the interviewee stated that the mechanism provided a means for 
management ’to keep their options open’, so that they could not be forced to 
arbitration on an issue that they did not want a third party to have control over. In 
this particular case, in a dispute arising from the annual pay negotiations three years
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after the use of FOA, management refused the unions access to FOA and preferred to 
take a strike (seven weeks) over the issue than allow an arbitrator to decide the issue. 
In total three of the eight interviewees stated that management in their plants would 
not allow an arbitrator to determine their labour costs. This suggests that two strands 
of FOA have developed in the UK: one as a dispute avoidance mechanism where the 
threat of FOA is real; and the other where FOA is just a dispute resolution mechanism 
which management would block the use of over a high, stakes dispute such as over a 
pay settlement. Management in the latter cases does not see FOA as an alternative for 
the ’right to strike’ at all, and might be prepared to take a strike over pay than see it 
go to arbitration. A joint, voluntary reference procedure is very much integral to this. 
The mechanism allows management to veto arbitration over pay.
Since the EETPU has been at the forefront of the move towards new style deals 
it might be supposed that higher levels of trust would exist in an EETPU plant than a 
non-EETPU unionised plant. In summary, it is probably the confluence between non- 
EETPU unions, convention and relatively low trust industrial relations environments 
which best explains the incidence of joint, voluntary reference procedures in FOA 
plants.
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Footnotes
1. The South East and EETPU variables are only significant at the 10% level. All other 
regional variables were included in alternative versions of the logit equation but none were 
significant. Combining the South East with other regions to produce a South of England 
variable also failed to provide a significant result.
2. These figures are approximations calculated from the text on page 190 of Millward and 
Stevens (1986). The simple calculations are shown in the table below. Unfortunately 
Millward et al (1992) do not provide comparative figures for 1990 in their text.
Survey Year % of agreements referring to ACAS
Conciliation and 
arbitration 
(1)
Arbitration
only
(2)
% with arbitration also 
including conciliation 
(1)/(1) + (2)
1980 71 11 87
1984 64 14 82
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Table 2.1
Characteristics of 101 new style deal plants from secondary sources
CHARACTERISTICS N % CHARACTERISTICS N %
1. INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 2. COUNTRY OF COMPANY HQ
Metal Manufacturing 3 3.95 UK 24 41.38
Non-metal mineral products 1 1.32 Japan 22 37.93
Chemicals 1 1.32 US 6 10.34
Metal Goods 5 6.58 EEC 2 3.45
Mechanical Engineering 5 6.58 Europe Non-EEC 4 6.90
Office Machinery 4 5.26
Electrical and Electronic Eng. 29 38.16 Not known 43 -
Motor Vehicles 4 5.26
Other Transport Manufacture 1 1.32 3. DATE PLANT ESTABLISHED
Instrument Engineering 4 5.26 Upto 1969 15 29.4
Food, Drink and Tobacco 7 9.21 1970-1979 8 15.7
Paper and Publishing 3 3.95 1980-1988 28 54.9
Rubber and Plastics 3 3.95
Other Manufacturing 1 1.32 Not Known 50 -
Repair of Goods 1 1.32
Railways 1 1.32 4. TRADE UNION RECOGNISED
Other Transport 1 1.32 EETPU/EESA 55 54.46
Business Services 1 1.32 AEU 20 19.80
Recreational Services 1 1.32 GMB 10 9.90
TGWU 10 9.90
Not Known 26 - MSF 2 1.98
ISTC 1 0.99
More than 1 union 3 2.97
Sources:
(i) Company reports data: Dunn and Bradstreet (1990), ICC Business Ratio Reports 
(various issues), ICC Financial Survey and Company Directory (various issues), Infotech 
Financial Comparison and Market Directory (various issues), Jordans (various issues), 
World Electronic Company File (1991). See bibliography for details.
(ii) Industrial relations studies: IRS Employment Trends (1990), Industrial Relations 
Review and Report (1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1987a, 1987c)
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Table 2.2
Characteristics of plants with FOA agreements from secondary sources
CHARACTERISTICS N % CHARACTERISTICS N %
1. INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 3. DATE PLANT ESTABLISHED
Metal Manufacturing 2 7.70 Upto 1969 4 20.00
Mechanical Engineering 2 7.70 1970-1979 1 5.00
Electrical and Electronic Eng. 19 73.10 1980-1988 15 75.00
Food, Drink and Tobacco 3 11.50
No. of FOA plants 20 100.00
No. of FOA plants recorded 26 100.00
4. TRADE UNION RECOGNISED
2. COUNTRY OF COMPANY HQ EETPU/EESA 20 62.50
UK 8 32.00 AEU 3 9.40
Japan 11 44.00 GMB 5 15.60
US 3 12.00 TGWU 1 3.10
EEC 1 4.00 MSF 1 3.10
Europe Non-EEC 2 8.00 ISTC - -
More than 1 union 2 6.30
No. of FOA plants recorded 25 100.00
No. of FOA plants 32 100.00
Sources:
(i) As Table 2.1 plus - IDS (1987), JRRR (1989), TUC (1988)
Notes:
(i) Proportions given are percentage of FOA agreement plants for which such 
characteristics are recorded.
(ii) Trade union recognised: Some agreements are recorded in different reports to involve 
different unions. For this table such cases are recorded twice, hence 32 FOA agreements 
recorded.
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Table 2.3
The incidence of FOA in new style deals
Independent variables Logit
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Ownership
UK 1.156 1.177
Japan 0.130 1.287
Union recognized
EETPU 2.349 * 1.276
Time procedure introduced
1980-86 5.022 *** 1.681
Interaction: EETPU, 1980-86 -2.880 2.064
Region
South East 2.008 * 1.097
Workplace size
Less than 100 -0.893 1.582
100-499 -0.819 1.120
Union density %
0-24 0.379 1.928
25-74 0.416 1.234
Constant -3.067 ** 1.475
Sample size 54
Chi-squared (df) 30.21 (10)
Pseudo R2 0.404
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Notes: (i) Sample = 54 plants with some form of dispute procedure.
(ii) Dependent variable: FOA procedure available in workplace agreement, Yes
(1) No (0), Mean = 0.5.
(iii) The defaults (excluded components) are: Non-UK or Japanese owned; 
EETPU not recognized; procedure introduced before 1980 or after 1986;
rest of UK; plant size of 500 or more employees; and 75-100% union density.
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Table 2.4 
The variety of FOA procedures
Specifications of procedures n %
1. Pre-arbitration stages
None 13 48.1
Conciliation only 11 40.7
Both conciliation and mediation 3 11.1
2. Reference to arbitration mechanism
Unilateral 6 22.2
Compulsory 10 37.0
Joint, voluntary 11 40.7
3. Method of choosing the arbitrator
ACAS decides 20 74.1
Standing arbitrator 1 3.7
No fixed method 6 22.2
Total number of FOA plants 27 100.0
Source: LSE New Style Industrial Relations Survey, see chapter one.
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Table 2.5
The incidence of conciliation and/or mediation in FOA procedures
Characteristics Provision of conciliation
and/or mediation
No Yes Total
FOA procedure 
introduced 1980-85
No 7
41.18
53.85
10
58.82
71.43
17
100.00
62.96
Yes 6
60.00
46.15
4
40.00
28.57
10
100.00
37.04
Total 13
48.15
100.00
Pearson chi2
14
51.85
100.00
(1) = 0.8936 Pr = 0.345
27
100.00
100.00
EETPU has sole 
recognition
No 3
33.33
23.08
6
66.67
42.86
9
100.00
33.33
Yes 10
55.56
76.92
8
44.44
57.14
18
100.00
66.67
Total 13
48.15
100.00
Pearson chi2
14
51.85
100.00
(1) = 1.1868 Pr = 0.276
27
100.00
100.00
Greenfield site 
when FOA 
procedure signed
No 4
28.57
30.77
10
71.43
71.43
14
100.00
51.85
Yes 9
69.23
69.23
4
30.77
28.57
13
100.00
48.15
Total 13
48.15
100.00
14
51.85
100.00
27
100.00
100.00
Pearson chi2 (1) = 4.4636 Pr = 0.035
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Table 2.5 continued
Characteristics Provision of conciliation 
and/or mediation
No Yes Total
UK company No 10 6 16
62.50 37.50 100.00
76.92 42.86 59.26
Yes 3 8 11
27.27 72.73 100.00
23.08 57.14 40.74
Total 13 14 27
48.15 51.85 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2 (1) = 3.2401 Pr = 0.072
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Table 2.6
The incidence of joint, voluntary reference mechanisms in FOA procedures
Characteristics Provision of a joint, voluntary 
reference mechanism
No Yes Total
FOA procedure No 10 7 17
introduced 1980-85 58.82 41.18 100.00
62.50 63.64 62.96
Yes 6 4 10
60.00 40.00 100.00
37.50 36.36 37.04
Total 16 11 27
59.26 40.74 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2 (1) = 0.0036 Pr = 0.952
EETPU has sole No 1 8 9
recognition 11.11 88.89 100.00
6.25 72.73 33.33
Yes 15 3 18
83.33 16.67 100.00
93.75 27.27 66.67
Total 16 11 27
59.26 40.74 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2 (1) = 12.9631 Pr == 0.000
Greenfield site No 8 6 14
when FOA 57.14 42.86 100.00
procedure signed 50.00 54.55 51.85
Yes 8 5 13
61.54 38.46 100.00
50.00 45.45 48.15
Total 16 11 27
59.26 40.74 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2 (1) = 0.0539 Pr = 0.816
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Table 2.6 continued
Characteristics Provision of a joint, voluntary 
reference mechanism
No Yes Total
UK company No 11 5 16
68.75 31.25 100.00
68.75 45.45 59.26
Yes 5 6 11
45.45 54.55 100.00
31.25 54.55 40.74
Total 16 11 27
59.26 40.74 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2 (1) = 1.4652 Pr = 0.226
Chapter 3
Final-offer arbitration and dispute deterrence
1. Introduction
Final-offer arbitration (FOA) is a disputes procedure which compels an 
arbitrator to decide wholly for one side or the other in a dispute. By definition there is 
no compromise option, in direct contrast to conventional arbitration where the decision 
criteria of the arbitrator are not so constrained. FOA is specifically designed to 
counter the so-called ’chilling effect’ of conventional arbitration, a propensity to 
encourage its own use. Stevens (1966) first set out the theory associated with FOA, 
arguing that as conventional arbitration encouraged disputes, FOA would promote 
more genuine bargaining and would specifically deter disputes. The theory behind 
Stevens argument and critiques of it are discussed in section 2 of this chapter.
The theoretical and practical debate about the relative merits of FOA compared 
to conventional arbitration has been conducted primarily in the US where, in the public 
sector, there is considerable experience with such procedures. The North American 
evidence on the effectiveness of different types of arbitration is summarised and 
assessed in section 3. Although there have been many empirical studies using ’real 
world’ data, as a whole they are rather disappointing and inconclusive because 
variation in procedure provision is primarily at State or Province level rather than 
within individual States or Provinces. The extent of inter-State heterogeneity in 
politics, bargaining structures, bargaining history and the like mean that adequate 
controls for inter-State comparisons are hard to determine and quantify. As a result of 
this fairly intransigent problem, researchers have increasingly turned to the laboratory 
to compare different arbitration systems. Evidence from these studies is also examined 
in section 3. Doubts about the external validity of such studies, however, mean that 
despite the sophisticated techniques involved there is little evidence to suggest that the 
results would be supported in the real world of collective bargaining.
During the 1980s a number of UK private sector plants signed new collective 
agreements which included FOA. Data from over 200 bargaining rounds in these, and 
comparison plants with conventional procedures, drawn from the postal survey of new 
style deals detailed in chapter one provide the first UK evidence on the issue of FOA
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and dispute deterrence. The results of logit regressions on a number of different 
measures of bargaining breakdown suggest that overall there is no support for the 
argument that FOA deters disputes any more effectively than conventional arbitration. 
The only exception concerns bargaining in workplaces with multi-stage impasse 
procedures. In such rounds FOA appears to deter disputes more effectively than 
conventional arbitration. However, the more general picture is of FOA failing to 
produce the significant reduction in disputes which some theories and its proponents 
might predict.
The critical question of why FOA has not lived up to its billing as a dispute 
deterrent was addressed partly with the postal survey data but primarily with anecdotal 
evidence from the eight interviews in section 5. The case studies revealed that the 
main reasons for FOA usage were principal-agent problems and over optimistic 
bargainers.
Industrial action data from the postal survey are analysed in section 6. The 
relative paucity of action, intrinsically interesting in itself, means that the analysis of 
dispute procedures and industrial action does not deserve a separate chapter. However, 
the small amount of UK and North American evidence on industrial action and dispute 
procedures is contrasted with the incidence of action found in the sample. Moreover, 
some possible implications for the role of ACAS with respect to industrial action are 
also drawn out.
Concluding remarks are provided in section 7. The possible ramifications of 
these results for the UK public sector were FOA to be provided for essential services 
negotiations, as a quid pro quo for the legal prohibition of industrial action are also 
assessed.
2. Theory
a. Introduction
The theory behind FOA has evolved primarily in North America, mainly 
stemming from arguments in favour of FOA in a seminal article by Stevens (1966).
At its most basic the theory runs that because the parties are uncertain about the 
arbitrator’s behaviour under FOA if the dispute goes to arbitration, a contract zone of 
more favourable (and negotiatable) solutions to the dispute is created. This incentive
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effect was directly contrasted by Stevens to the ’chilling effect’ of conventional 
arbitration: Because the parties believe that the arbitrator will compromise between 
the two final offers, they always have an incentive to maintain an extreme position in 
the face of arbitration, actually increasing the probability of arbitration taking place.
A negotiated outcome is said to be Pareto-superior to an arbitrated settlement 
for three reasons: because it is assumed that the parties are bargaining over the 
distribution of a fixed pie and that the costs of arbitration reduce the size of the 
divided pie (Farber and Katz 1979); because agents are more likely to know about 
their own and each other’s preferences than the arbitrator does (Crawford 1979); and it 
is more likely that agents will accept a negotiated settlement and make it work 
(Crawford 1979). A repeated reliance on arbitrated decisions (known as the ’narcotic 
effect’, or recurring chilling) is also said to undermine stable bargaining relationships 
(Anderson and Kochan 1977). Geare (1978), in his critique of FOA, is somewhat of a 
lone, dissenting voice in suggesting that conventionally arbitrated settlements may be 
superior to setttlements determined through collective bargaining. Clearly any case for 
FOA requires adherence to the more widely accepted principle that negotiated 
settlements are superior to arbitrated ones.
b. Costs of disagreement and uncertainty
The debate regarding the relative merits of FOA and conventional arbitration 
has moved on considerably since 1966. Essentially it now revolves around two central 
questions: what factors determine the probability of disagreement in bargaining?; 
and what impact, if any, do alternative forms of arbitration have on these factors?
Starting from first principles, the probability of disagreement is said to depend 
upon the potential costs of disagreement which has two elements - direct costs and 
potential costs of losing. Direct costs include arbitrator’s and lawyers’ fees (in the 
US) and costs incurred because of a delayed settlement. Bloom (1981) particularly 
emphasises the role of these costs, to argue that there may be substantial negotiation 
costs which actually encourage arbitrated settlements. Direct costs do not have a 
significant bearing on the FOA versus conventional arbitration debate, however, since 
there is no reason to expect these costs to differ across type of procedure.
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More central to the FOA versus conventional arbitration debate is the role of 
potential costs of losing which is determined by the uncertainty surrounding the 
award which would result if the parties go to arbitration. This is the key element in 
Stevens’s argument Farber and Katz (1979) assert that uncertainty is the crucial 
element for the deterrence of disputes. What FOA does is make the potential cost of 
uncertainty greater because of the either-or mechanism.
Their argument has been criticised, however, on a number of levels. First, 
there are circumstances in which conventional arbitration can induce the same level of 
uncertainty and potential cost as FOA - if the variance of past arbitrator decisions is 
makes the prospect of losing as potentially costly as final-offer arbitrator (Ashenfelter 
et al 1992). Restated this suggests that if conventional arbitrators have produced 
awards in the past sufficiently far removed from the split-the-difference notion, and 
parties are aware of this, then conventional arbitration can produce the same potential 
costs of losing incentive as FOA.
Crawford (1979) has a more fundamental objection to the Farber-Katz model, 
by arguing that in fact uncertainty is minimal for most arbitration regimes because 
parties learn about arbitrator preferences over time. One of the key assumptions of his 
model is that parties are certain about what the arbitrator’s decision will be before 
arbitration takes place.
Crawford’s objection seems unrealistic unless parties have had considerable 
experience of arbitration and arbitrators are interchangeable. Certainly in the UK 
where there is relatively little experience with arbitration compared to North America, 
it would be difficult to support his objection. The Ashenfelter et al (1992) caveat 
seems plausible - challenging the split-the-difference assumption of Stevens’s theory. 
However, their argument also rests on some unrealistic assumptions - that conventional 
arbitrators behave as if they were final-offer arbitrators and that parties are fully 
informed about past arbitrator behaviour. Although there is some evidence from the 
UK of conventional arbitrators on occasion acting as final-offer arbitrators (Brown 
1986), this concerns only a minority of awards. In the UK, it would be surprising to 
find that parties had full or even partial knowledge of past arbitrator behaviour because 
ACAS arbitration awards are unpublished and unavailable except with the consent of 
both parties. When an arbitrator is suggested to disputants by ACAS, the parties are
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not provided with a list of past decisions by that arbitrator, so it would be very 
difficult for the parties to acquire such information. Therefore on potential costs of 
disagreement, FOA does score better than conventional arbitration and consequently it 
should be associated with a lower probability of disagreement.
c. Countervailing factors
Another strand of the debate focuses on the issue of whether uncertainty and 
high potential costs of disagreement are sufficient to prevent disputes. Five possible 
explanations have been offered for why disputes might occur even if the costs of 
disagreement are high.
If the parties have unrealistic and optimistic expectations or differing beliefs 
regarding arbitrator behaviour then disputes could arise (Stevens 1966, Farber 1980, 
Farber and Bazerman 1989). This argument rests on the idea that even though in 
theory FOA produces more uncertainty, parties estimation of the level of uncertainty 
may be flawed, they have a ’false certainty’. Another way of describing this is to state 
that the parties may be over optimistic about their chances of winning the award and 
therefore do not compromise beyond a certain point, preventing the establishment of a 
contract zone.
Second, Crawford (1979) has argued that a contract zone may not exist because 
negotiators commit themselves to irreversible positions in order to appear tough in 
bargaining. If the positions are close enough then a negotiated solution may be 
possible, but if they are irreconcilable then a dispute will occur. Even if a dispute is 
imminent, parties may not want to undermine the credibility of their toughness in 
bargaining because the exercise will be repeated in succeeding rounds. Bloom and 
Cavanagh (1987) support Crawford’s argument and suggest that commitment to 
irreconcilable bargaining positions may occur because of the principal-agent 
relationship.
The latter explanation has been considered more fully by McCall (1990), who 
argues that especially on the union side, principal-agent problems may nullify the 
incentives FOA creates to avoid disputes. McCall provides a similar explanation, 
though with a slight twist, for the use of arbitration as Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) 
proposed for the occurrence of strikes. Assuming that the union negotiator is more
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informed about the ability to pay of the employer than the members, and the members 
believe that their agent has been shirking in negotiations, then the members may audit 
the negotiator by forcing the latter to take a pay claim to arbitration. Although McCall 
does not consider this, principal-agent problems could in theory also occur on the side 
of management, especially in multi-establishment firms. A plant manager may be 
under pressure to commit themselves to a low offer, which will probably entail the 
need for arbitration, in order to appear tough to higher level management and to prove 
that they are not selling themselves short in negotiations.
Overall it is important to be aware of the signals which bargaining positions 
create, both to a negotiator’s ’opponent’ and to their constituency. Signalling 
credibility or toughness may be more important than achieving a solution without an 
impasse even in the uncertain environment of FOA.
Farber and Katz (1979) argue that even when the potential costs of 
disagreement are prohibitive, if the parties are risk neutral or risk loving then 
disagreements will occur. This possible explanation for FOA failure has also been 
suggested by Minford and Peel (1983). Even if the parties do not believe that their 
offer has a greater chance of selection than the other side’s, they may prefer the 
uncertainty of winning a potentially higher arbitration award to the relative certainty of 
a negotiated settlement despite the potential costs of losing.
Finally, DeNisi and Dworkin (1981) drawing on some comments by Grodin 
(1972) suggest that if the parties are relatively naive negotiators then they may not 
fully comprehend the uncertainty and potential costs of losing under FOA. Minford 
and Peel (1983) express a related argument, that under the first few years of an FOA 
procedure parties may be more likely to experience the problem of over optimistic 
expectations.
Stevens’s original theory in favour of FOA has therefore, been criticised on a 
number of levels. Firstly on the central question of whether or not FOA does entail 
more uncertainty than conventional arbitration. However, a more significant line of 
argument has been that even if the potential costs of disagreement are high there are a 
range of reasons why FOA may still get invoked. The crucial issue then becomes 
whether or not the ’potential cost of losing’ effect (if it exists) can and does outweigh 
the countervailing effects. Is FOA a strong enough incentive mechanism to counteract
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the other causes of disputes more effectively than conventional arbitration? Despite 
the fact that there is a substantial body of empirical work in the US on dispute 
procedure effectiveness, so far no study using non-experimental data has tackled this 
fundamental question.
3. North American evidence
a. Introduction
Although both FOA and conventional arbitration are fairly widespread in the 
US public sector, no US or Canadian study has so far been able to properly compare 
the impact of these alternative procedures using evidence from the real world. This is 
partly because there are no examples of legislated procedures which provide for 
conventional arbitration for one section of public employees and FOA for another 
within the same state1. But there have also been very few interstate comparison 
studies, and none which attempt to control for other state level effects. On the whole 
the non-experimental studies of dispute deterrence and arbitration mechanisms are 
therefore disappointing. In general they only examine the experience of one 
jurisdiction, have little or no comparative element, cover too few bargaining rounds 
and make inadequate attempts to control for other possible influences on the impasse 
rate. However, what they do at least provide is some basic evidence on the outcomes 
from bargaining under FOA and conventional arbitration and perhaps more importantly 
examples of different means of measuring the chilling effect.
As an alternative to interstate comparisons researchers have increasingly turned 
to the social science laboratory, using students as negotiators, to test impasse procedure 
effectiveness. This is partly because even if rigorous interstate comparisons were 
possible, i.e. controlling for tangible factors such as structural and economic factors, it 
would be very difficult to control for factors such as risk aversity or over optimistic 
bargainers, singled out as important in the theoretical literature. Results from these 
studies are analysed later in this section.
b. Empirical studies using field data
Twenty-one separate studies on the dispute deterrence effectiveness of different 
arbitration and dispute procedures are summarised in Table 3.2. Details recorded
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cover the sample (time frame, number of observations and jurisdiction), the type of 
arbitration and the comparison made (where applicable), the dependent variable(s), the 
control variables used and the main findings. Anderson (1981a) provides a less up to 
date summary of North American studies on arbitration, however, his survey does 
include some studies which were not accessible in the UK. More recent summaries of 
the public sector labour markets literature which therefore cover the dispute deterrence 
debate include Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983), Kearney (1984) and Freeman (1986).
Researchers have considered two themes on the issue of dispute deterrence - 
the impasse or usage rate and the degree of chilling. The most common test of the 
chilling effect is the basic usage rate - the proportion of negotiations reaching impasse 
and/or being settled by an arbitration award. Less commonly used tests attempt to 
discern degrees of chilling on the basis of three measures: the number of issues left 
unsettled at each stage of a procedure; the stage reached in a multi-stage procedure; 
and compromising behaviour before arbitration. The latter measures are concerned 
with differentiating the intensity of disputes once they reach impasse. FOA is classed 
as more effective than conventional arbitration if: Fewer issues remain unsettled when 
it is invoked; or if a greater proportion of disputes are settled during pre-arbitration 
stages; or if the parties have moved more in negotiations; or their final offers are 
closer together.
i. The impasse rate: The great majority of the empirical studies which have measured 
the impasse rate provide no comparison with an alternative procedure. Of these, five 
concern FOA, five conventional arbitration and one a choice of arbitration (Lester 
1989). The results are summarised in Table 3.1. The proportion of negotiations 
reaching impasse is not noticeably different between the arbitration types (note that 
where a range of percentages is indicated, these are the range over a number of 
bargaining rounds). However, there does appear to be a somewhat lower rate of 
arbitration awards under FOA than conventional arbitration (other than the Long and 
Feuille (1974) study, which was only based on six negotiations).
Of seven studies which provide some sort of comparison of impasse rates, only 
one (Somers 1977) looks at FOA (compared to the previous factfinding2 procedure). 
Two compare conventional arbitration with factfinding (Wheeler 1975, Kochan and
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Baderschneider 1978) and four compare conventional arbitration with a right to strike 
(Anderson and Kochan 1977, Anderson 1981b, Currie and McConnell 1991, Ponak and 
Wheeler 1980). Somers found that the impasse rate doubled from 26% to 53% when 
the final stage in Massachusetts law for police and firefighter negotiations was changed 
from factfinding to FOA in 1975/6. Studies of the change from factfinding to 
conventional arbitration also found an increase in the impasse rate, ranging from a 
16% (Kochan and Baderschneider 1978) to a 73.5% rise (Wheeler 1975). In both 
cases these figures are percentage rise rather than percentage point rise in the 
impasse rate. Note that the Kochan and Baderschneider result is probably the most 
reliable result of these three, because they control for a range of other factors including 
economic, political and structural factors.
The conventional arbitration versus right to strike studies, using Canadian 
federal service data, indicate a higher settlement rate under the right to strike 
procedure than the arbitration route (the system allows union negotiators to choose a 
procedural route ending in either a right to strike or compulsory arbitration before 
negotiations begin).
ii. Other tests o f arbitration effectiveness: Although there have only been three studies 
which assess the number of issues left unsettled at impasse as a measure of procedural 
effectiveness, all three concern FOA and have consistent results. Stem’s (1974) study 
is the weakest in that he only has data from two bargaining rounds, one under 
factfinding and one under FOA. He provides no statistical results about the number of 
issues but rather states that there is ’some evidence’ of a reduction in the number of 
issues unsettled under FOA compared to factfinding.
Somers (1977) finds that the mean number of issues unsettled under factfinding, 
as the final stage in the procedure, was 14.7 compared to only 4.8 under FOA, from 
Massachusetts data. Delaney and Feuille (1984) compare FOA and conventional 
arbitration using evidence from 343 police arbitration awards in 16 states over a seven 
year period (1975-82), finding that the number of unsettled issues at arbitration is 
lower under FOA by package compared to both FOA by issue and conventional 
arbitration. Note that they do not control for any other potentially influential factors.
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Evidence on the stage reached in particular procedures has actually been used 
more to test the effectiveness of pre-arbitration procedures than arbitration itself. 
However, the results also provide a further measure of the degree of chilling different 
types of arbitration encourage.
The effectiveness of mediation in different arbitration environments is striking. 
Four studies measure the ’mediation settlement rate’, the proportion of disputes which 
reach impasse but are then settled in mediation (the first stage in the impasse 
procedure in all four cases). Of the two concerned with conventional arbitration, one 
compares mediation under conventional arbitration and factfinding over the period 
including a change in the law governing New York state police and firefighter 
negotiations (Kochan and Jick 1978) and one looks at arbitration alone in fifty-one 
Hawaiian public employee negotiations (Klauser 1977). They find comparable 
mediation settlement rates of 31% and 26% for conventional arbitration respectively. 
Kochan and Jick also calculate a 13-18% greater probability of mediation settlement, 
all else equal, under arbitration compared to factfinding.
Two studies on mediation settlement under FOA, though note that both are 
from the same jurisdiction, show much higher settlement rates. Gallagher and 
Pegnetter (1979), using two rounds of Iowan public sector negotiations (tri-offer issue 
arbitration3 as the last stage), found a settlement rate of about 73% in both rounds. 
Using an extended series from these negotiations (seven rounds), Hoh (1984) reports a 
mediation settlement rate increasing from 72% in the early rounds to 89% in the later 
years. Hoh reports these data as evidence of the success of mediation in the Iowan 
case, but it could equally well used as an indication of the success of FOA, especially 
when compared to the much lower mediation settlement rates for conventional 
arbitration. However, this hypothesis must be qualified by the caveat that there are no 
doubt considerable differences in the political, economic and structural factors between 
public sector negotiations in Iowa, New York State and Hawaii. It is possible that the 
mediation settlement rate in Iowa would have been just as high under a conventional 
arbitration regime.
Only three empirical studies have looked at compromising behaviour as a test 
of arbitration procedure effectiveness. Two tests have been used: the movement from 
initial to final negotiating position; and the gap between the parties’ final positions at
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arbitration. The two measures in fact complement each other and on their own are 
more difficult to interpret. If the parties had not moved much during negotiations this 
could be because either they had very reasonable starting positions and therefore there 
was not much scope for movement or negotiations had chilled in the face of 
arbitration. Information on the gap between final positions is necessary to determine 
which of these explanations is appropriate.
Wheeler’s (1978) study is in fact the only one to report movement and gap 
between final positions, and the only study to provide a comparison - between 
factfinding and conventional arbitration - using data from a range of US cities. He 
finds that management moves more under a factfinding procedure than under 
conventional arbitration and that the gap between final positions is smaller under 
factfinding relative to arbitration. This result, therefore, provides prima facie support 
for the conventional arbitration chilling effect.
The two other studies are concerned with FOA but again provide no yardstick 
to compare results. Gallagher and Pegnetter (1979) found that the parties’ positions 
converged considerably between the mediation and factfinding stage of the Iowan 
procedure but not between factfinding and the arbitration stage. This is not actually 
that surprising given the peculiar tri-offer Iowan system where the arbitrator can 
choose either one of the parties’ final offers or the factfinder’s recommendation. This 
provides little incentive for either party to compromise since the compromise option is 
available anyway for the arbitrator (assuming the factfinder’s recommendation is 
between the final offers) and arbitration is also on an issue by issue basis.
Data from salary negotiations in professional baseball, analysed by Dworkin 
(1986), show a reduction in compromising behaviour over time. In the 1984-5 round 
the mean difference between final offers was 40% of average salaries, compared to just 
20% in the 1974-5 round.
iii. Theories o f disagreement: Finally, one study which is not ostensibly concerned 
with measuring the chilling effect is of particular interest because it is probably the 
only one which attempts to test alternative theories of disagreement using the one 
dataset (even the experimental studies are usually confined to testing only one theory). 
Currie (1989) using data from teacher negotiations in British Columbia which are
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covered by a compulsory conventional arbitration statute, sets out to assess the relative 
merits of the following theories:
. ’Attitudes towards risk’ - Currie interprets the Farber and Katz (1979) theory 
as that over time parties will become less risk averse about using a disputes procedure 
because the uncertainty surrounding it will decline with experience. This theory is 
therefore tested on the prediction that parties which have more experience with a 
procedure would be more likely to have an impasse.
. ’Differing beliefs’ - This hypothesis of why disputes occur despite the 
uncertainty of arbitration, is tested in two ways by Currie. She argues that beliefs are 
more likely to differ in times of economic uncertainty, and therefore includes the 
volatility of macroeconomic variables in the model. Further, she argues that parties 
may be less likely to make mistakes when such mistakes are costly. If the direct costs 
of arbitration are relatively fixed, the per capita cost of arbitration decreases with the 
size of the bargaining unit (assuming similar union density across units). So 
arbitration should be more common in larger units.
. ’Principal-agent models’ - Currie tests the McCall (1990) hypothesis 
concerning agents being forced to go to arbitration by the principal to check that the 
agent is not ’shirking’ in negotiations. She argues that an agent is more likely to be 
’audited’ in this way if there has been a string of relatively low settlements (union 
side) or high settlements (management side) in the past. Therefore relative wages in 
the two previous bargaining periods are included in the Currie model to test the 
McCall theory.
The results of Currie’s work are somewhat less interesting, because there is no 
comparison of conventional arbitration to FOA, than the variables she uses to test these 
alternative theories. For the record she finds that none of the theories provide a 
particularly satisfactory explanation for the incidence of arbitration, rather it appears 
that state dependence, or the narcotic effect, is the crucial factor. A bargaining unit 
that had used arbitration in one period was at least 10 per cent more likely to use 
arbitration in the following round than one that had not. Currie’s study can not tell us 
anything about whether or not FOA would have produced similar results but at the 
very least it provides examples of how to test for the various factors which might 
affect the impasse rate other than the dispute procedure itself.
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iv. Conclusions: In summary, the empirical studies which report results concerning the 
chilling effect provide tentative support for a number of hypotheses:
. Conventional arbitration chills negotiations to a greater extent than 
FOA on a arbitration award rate measure;
. FOA (except if issue by issue) encourages fewer issues to be taken to 
arbitration than conventional arbitration;
. If a dispute reaches impasse it is more likely to be settled in mediation 
if the final stage is FOA than if it is conventional arbitration;
. In cases which actually reach arbitration FOA may not have 
encouraged greater convergence of positions before arbitration, nor will 
the gap between final claims necessarily be smaller, than under 
conventional arbitration.
However, all four of these conclusions are neither particularly reliable nor robust 
because of the general absence of comparisons and/or controls in the studies and the 
considerable problem of comparing results across different studies. There has not yet 
been an authoritative empirical study of the relative effectiveness of FOA and 
conventional arbitration in the US using evidence from actual bargaining rounds.
Olson (1993) similarly concludes that:
’... in my opinion existing research using field data has not been very useful in 
evaluating the relative efficacy of different arbitration systems.’
Therefore the UK sample provides the first opportunity to correctly test FOA against 
conventional arbitration, i.e. within the same ’jurisdiction’ or legal framework, in 
similar workplaces and with the inclusion of control variables, using real world data.
c. Experimental studies
i. Introduction: Researchers in North America have turned increasingly to the 
laboratory and bargaining experiments to determine the effectiveness of impasse 
procedures. The laboratory situation permits the exclusion of possibly confounding 
variables and allows for the manipulation of factors that are considered to be 
theoretically important for the effectiveness of arbitration. Eight studies are 
summarised in Table 3.3 with details of the experiment used, the comparisons made, 
the dependent variables and the results of the experiments.
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However there are problems of external validity and therefore applicability over 
experimental results. It is by no means clear that we would expect students of 
industrial relations and especially those studying dispute resolution (or even students in 
general) to be good substitutes for real world negotiators. Experimenters do attempt to 
replicate the threats and incentives of the real world through performance related cash 
or grade point bonuses, but these are probably insufficient to replicate the social and 
non-pecuniary incentives which exist in the real world.
Furthermore the students usually only bargain over one issue and are usually 
quite heavily time constrained. While ease of play is no doubt important for the 
’success’ of these experiments, in terms of getting a sufficient number of results to 
analyse with given resources, as the conditions become further removed from reality 
the results must increasingly lose relevance.
ii. Conventional versus final-offer arbitration: The classic test of effectiveness 
between conventional and final-offer arbitration has been conducted in five such 
studies. They have somewhat contradictory findings, two support FOA over 
conventional arbitration quite strongly, one is equivocal, and two find results against 
greater FOA effectiveness.
Of the two finding significant differences in favour of FOA, one uses a range 
of tests (Neale and Bazerman 1983) and finds that units negotiating under the threat of 
FOA have a significantly lower impasse rate, resolve more issues before impasse if it’s 
reached and move more in negotiations than units under conventional arbitration. Notz 
and Starke (1978) measured the average difference between final bids and found that 
units under FOA were much closer at arbitration (the difference averaging 5.73 
percentage points) than those under conventional arbitration (averaging 13.40). Note 
though that the Notz and Starke study is somewhat peculiar in that only three out of 
ninety bargaining pairs actually negotiated a settlement, which represents a much 
higher impasse rate than any other study.
The equivocal study by Magenau (1983) is actually more concerned about the 
impact of different types of FOA but he also provides results on FOA versus 
conventional arbitration. On the impasse rate test he finds no significant difference 
between the procedures but on the gap between final bids measure FOA performs
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better than conventional arbitration. So although the level of disputes is not 
significantly lower the parties had made more concessions in bargaining under FOA. 
Furthermore Magenau finds a negative narcotic effect for FOA from results on two 
rounds of bargaining. Pairs which used conventional arbitration in round one were no 
more or less likely to use it than previous non-users in round two, but those who used 
FOA in round one were significantly more likely to negotiate a settlement in round 
two than their counterpart non-users.
Of the two studies which find that FOA is not more effective than conventional 
arbitration, Subbarao’s (1978) is the least interesting. The author only looked at the 
experience of eleven bargaining pairs under each arbitration treatment (four different 
forms of arbitration were used, including two varieties of FOA). On two tests, 
proximity of final bids and concessions made in negotiations, there were no significant 
differences recorded across the four treatments.
Ashenfelter et al’s (1992) study is much more interesting in that it is the only 
study to consider FOA against a variety of conventional arbitration treatments, it has 
the largest number of bargaining units of all the studies (141) and the parties bargained 
over twenty rounds for five-and-a-half minutes each round, though such brief 
negotiation periods can hardly be said to replicate the real world. For the first ten 
rounds all the units negotiated without the threat of arbitration, they lost everything if 
an agreement was not reached. For the second ten rounds one group of ten units 
carried on bargaining without any arbitration, 79 had conventional arbitration (three 
varieties), 26 had FOA and 26 had tri-offer arbitration.
The three varieties of conventional arbitration were generated on the basis of 
different levels of variance in expected arbitrator behaviour. The units were given one 
of three lists of previous arbitrator decisions in the field, which were compiled by 
random draws from fixed distributions each with the same mean but with low, medium 
or high variance. The authors argued that in previous experiments subjects had been 
unable to generate expectations about arbitrator behaviour that were consistent with 
arbitrator behaviour in the field.
In terms of disputes rates across the different mechanisms, every treatment 
group had a lower dispute rate in the first ten rounds when disagreement meant the 
whole pie was lost, then in the second ten rounds where the pie was divided by an
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arbitrator. The dispute rates for the five arbitration treatments for the first ten rounds 
were not significantly different from each other, therefore results from the second ten 
rounds should provide meaningful information about how different arbitration 
mechanisms affect dispute rates.
Whilst FOA did not perform significantly better or worse than low or medium 
variance conventional arbitration in the second ten rounds, it had a significantly higher 
dispute rate than the high variance group, 38.1% compared to 28.4%. The FOA group 
also had a higher dispute rate than the tri-offer group, but this was not statistically 
significant. A major drawback of this otherwise very thorough experiment is that the 
information about previous arbitrator behaviour is hypothetical and computer 
generated. The authors do analyse the variance in actual arbitrators behaviour under 
conventional arbitration to determine which of the low, medium or high variance 
treatments best describes the real world of arbitrators.
Two studies have compared the effectiveness of different types of FOA. 
Subbaroa (1978) contrasted FOA by issue and FOA by package in his small scale 
study. Evidence from the experiment showed that the final bids of the parties were 
closer to each other under the FOA by package treatment than under FOA by issue, 
but the result was not statistical significant However, the study showed no difference 
in concessions made during negotiations between the two FOA types. But the size of 
the groups under each treatment in this study deter drawing too many conclusions from 
it.
Varying the criteria of what constitutes a final offer is examined by Magenau 
(1983), in an experiment using 120 student negotiators. In one FOA treatment the 
parties were allowed to change their final bids after impasse was reached (FOA1) but 
in the other the final negotiating positions were put to the arbitrator (FOA2). Magenau 
predicted that parties negotiating under the FOA2 condition would have a lower 
impasse rate and would have closer final positions than those under FOAl. He argues 
that a problem with FOA is that it can lose its deterrent potential if the parties 
anticipate that they can conduct post-impasse bargaining, therefore if this is prevented 
the parties should have a greater incentive to reach agreement. In fact the data show 
no significant difference either in dispute rates or the gap between last offers in 
negotiations between FOA2 and FOAl, directly contrary to the predicted result.
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Furthermore, the mean gap between final submissions to the arbitrator was 
significantly lower in FOAl than FOA2, so the post impasse final offer treatment 
seemed to be more, rather than less, effective at promoting compromise,
iii. Countervailing factors: Aside from testing conventional arbitration versus FOA 
and comparing varieties of FOA, the experimenters have examined the influence of 
various countervailing factors, cited in the theoretical literature (section 2), on impasse 
procedure effectiveness.
DeNisi and Dworkin (1981) find that the naive negotiator hypothesis has 
validity in a test using 90 students where some were fully informed about the FOA 
mechanism and its implications and others were given scant information. The initial 
negotiating positions of the naive negotiators were further apart than those of the FOA 
plus experience group. The parties’ final positions were closer and the parties had 
made more concessions during negotiations, under the first treatment. The only non 
significant result was that on the number of issues unresolved at impasse but as there 
were only three issues under negotiation, there was a restriction of range problem for 
attaining significant results. These results are fine as far as they go, but the lack of a 
second bargaining round in the experiment means that it is not possible to determine 
how quickly negotiators learn about FOA. It is not clear how long one might expect a 
naivety problem to last.
Other studies of this ilk include Neale and Bazerman’s (1983) study of the 
importance of ’Perspective Taking Ability’ (PTA) on bargaining outcomes under FOA 
and conventional arbitration. PTA is defined as the ability to take an opponent’s 
perspective in negotiations, i.e. to correctly predict their reservation price. The results 
of the study suggest, not unsurprisingly, that where parties have high PTA disputes are 
less likely irrespective of arbitration procedure.
Farber, Neale and Bazerman (1990) examine the influence of different levels of 
negotiator risk preferences but only in a conventional arbitration environment. The 
pay-off schedules for the student negotiators to outcomes were constructed in such a 
way as to create a risk neutral situation, and two increasing categories of risk aversion. 
The authors predicted that higher degrees of risk aversion especially for both parties 
should increase the likelihood of settlement. Results from the experiment on dispute 
rates were in the correct direction but were not strongly significant.
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Finally, the Babcock et al (1991) study examines the role of differing beliefs in 
the probability of disputes using data from a non-collective bargaining game 
environment. Their experiment involved student subjects acting the role of plaintiff or 
defendant in a personal injury claim after a traffic accident. The authors sought to 
measure the extent of bias in negotiators’ expectations of a fair outcome to the case, 
then to assess the influence of any self-serving bias on the outcomes of pre-trial 
negotiations. In the first experiment, involving 160 students, both sides were assigned 
their role and given identical material describing the accident, the extent of injuries 
and precendents on damages in similar cases. Before negotiations began they were 
instructed to record their estimation of a fair settlement and what judge would award if 
the dispute went to court.
Even with exactly the same information the parties had significantly different 
interpretations of what a fair and a judge settlement would be from each other. The 
mean plaintiff assessment was 62% higher than the mean defendant settlement on the 
fair settlement, and 52% higher on the judge settlement. The study also showed that 
the pairs with the largest combined differences were significantly less likely to settle 
the dispute in pre-trial negotiations compared to those pairs with smaller biases. Of 
the pairs who negotiated a settlement, the outcome was more likely to be skewed 
towards the most biased party if that party was the defendant than if the plaintiff.
In the second experiment, involving a different group of 76 students, twenty 
subject pairs were instructed to record their assessments of fair and judge settlements 
before being told their roles in the game and eighteen pairs after being told their roles. 
Those pairs who did not know their roles before assessing the case did not have 
significantly different assessments from one another, but those with prior knowledge of 
their roles showed similar biases to pairs from the first experiment. Impasse rates 
were also disproportionately higher for pairs with prior knowledge and biased 
assessments. A further test in the second experiment involved dividing the 30 minute 
bargaining period into five six minute sessions with extra costs incurred for each 
successive round without agreement. On average pairs who did not know their roles 
before assessing the case settled in 2.1 rounds, whereas those who knew their roles 
settled in 3.5 rounds.
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Although there may be some worries about the general applicability of this 
experiment to the real world, the results seem to be intuitively valuable. Even if there 
is symmetrical information (which is probably rare), negotiators may have optimistic 
assessments of what a judge or arbitrator will award should the dispute reach court or 
arbitration. This explanation for arbitration usage seems just as plausible for FOA as 
conventional arbitration. FOA may not deter its own use if one or both parties are 
over optimistic about their chance of winning. Unfortunately, the question of how 
long over optimism might persist is not addressed by Babcock and her colleagues since 
the experiments only involved one round of bargaining. Therefore we cannot say what 
the effect of using arbitration (or going to trial) has on the future level of optimism. It 
seems sensible to suggest that the level of self-serving bias may decline over time as 
parties develop greater awareness of what is a reasonable settlement.
iv. Conclusions: The most disappointing aspect of the experimental work is that the 
authors of each separate study have sought to test only a single theory of disagreement 
in bargaining - usually their own theory. Therefore as well as worrying over the 
external validity of the results, further caution must be attached to the findings. For 
example, the DeNisi and Dworkin (1981) study may have elicited very different 
findings concerning naive negotiators had they also found some way of introducing a 
principal-agent situation for some bargainers. The results of the studies can say very 
little about the relative importance or significance of the factors they test for in a real 
world bargaining situation.
4. UK evidence from the postal survey
a. Dispute procedures
The postal survey provides information on 72 workplaces with new style 
procedures. Of these 54 have some form of impasse procedure. These are set out in 
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1. It is readily apparent that the voluntary nature of the British 
new style agreements have thrown up a rich array of configurations of pre-arbitration 
conciliation and mediation stages and types of arbitration. There is further 
heterogeneity in the reference to arbitration mechanism, but the arrangements for 
selecting the arbitrator are more standardised.
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Of the 54 workplaces with impasse procedures half have FOA, and of these 27 
plants, just over half also have provision for either conciliation alone (11) or both 
mediation and conciliation (3) before a dispute is referred to arbitration, but 13 of the 
agreements provide for a move straight from failure to agree to arbitration. These two 
types of FOA agreement reflect the debate about whether it is better to have FOA 
unaccompanied by pre-arbitration procedures, to deter disputes (Feuille 1975), or to 
have pre-arbitration procedures, to prevent a large gap between final offers and 
therefore an unworkable award if FOA is reached (Gallagher and Pegnetter 1979). 
Interestingly the very first no-strike deal (at Toshiba) was pure FOA with no pre- 
arbitration procedures. Subsequently this purity has decayed as detailed and analysed 
in chapter 2.
A greater proportion of the conventional arbitration agreements have provision 
for pre-arbitration stages (77%). Finally, there are ten agreements which, whilst not 
having any arbitration stage, instead have mediation only (2), conciliation only (5) or 
both conciliation and mediation (3).
A substantial majority of all workplaces with arbitration and especially the 
FOA plants allow ACAS to chose the arbitrator. The fact that UK FOA agreements 
do not in general provide for any more elaborate means of choosing the arbitrator, 
unlike in North America (Lester 1984), is probably because ACAS is the generally 
accepted body for resolving industrial disputes. It is no doubt also a function of the 
fact that FOA is still quite novel in the UK. The topic of arbitrator behaviour and 
therefore alternative means of choosing the arbitrator has simply not arisen.
b. Impasse rate models
The taxonomy of procedures (represented in Figure 3.1) is repeated in flow 
chart form for impasse rates in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 shows that of the 212 wage 
rounds where a dispute procedure was available4, 27 went to impasse, an overall 
impasse rate of 12.7%. This compares with national private sector impasse rates of 
12%, 17%, for 1980 and 1984 respectively, for pay and conditions disputes (Millward 
and Stevens 1986: Table 7.5)5. Unfortunately, the usage rates of dispute procedures 
provided for pay and conditions disputes is not reported in the accompanying volume 
to 1990 WIRS (Millward et al 1992: chapter 6).
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Figure 3.2 also illustrates the complexity within the impasse rate measure. Of 
the 27 impasses, 10 involved rounds where there was no provision for arbitration (box 
h), 6 where there was no provision for mediation/conciliation (box g), and 11 where 
there was provision for both (box f). Of these 11, only four involved the use of 
arbitration (box j) as the other 7 were settled either during or after pre-arbitration 
meetings (box i). This complexity provides five different impasse rate models on 
which to test the impact of FOA:
A. Overall impasse rate: Using all 212 rounds and not distinguishing 
the degree of impasse (Table 3.5).
B. Overall impasse rate within arbitration available rounds: A sub­
sample of 170 rounds (b), looking at all 17 impasses in these rounds 
(f+g) (Table 3.6).
C. The use of arbitration within arbitration available rounds: The
same sub-sample as (Model B), but looking at the 10 impasses involving 
the use of arbitration (g+j) (Table 3.7).
D. Overall impasse rate in the mediation/conciliation available 
rounds: Sub-sample of 144 rounds (c+d), looking at all 21 impasses 
(f+h) (Table 3.8).
E. Use of mediation/conciliation only: Sub-sample of 140 rounds, i.e. 
same as (Model D) but excluding the 4 rounds where arbitration is also 
used, and looking at remaining 17 impasses (h+i) (Table 3.9).
The hypothesis tested for each model is that bargaining rounds where FOA is available 
should be associated with a lower impasse rate, all else equal.
c. The controls
Following the example of Currie’s (1989) study (see section 3) a number of 
control variables were included in the regression to test for other factors which have 
been suggested as causes of disagreement in bargaining.
To recap, one theory holds that the parties must be risk averse about using 
their dispute procedure. The risk aversity level of the parties was included through 
two ’experience’ measures; whether or not the plant was established before 1980 and; 
how long (in years) the parties had had their current dispute procedure6. The
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hypothesis concerning these variables suggests that as parties become more familiar 
with each other and their dispute procedure, their risk aversity concerning disputes will 
decline. Therefore both variables should be positively associated with the impasse 
rate.
The risk-aversity factor was also tested through the multi-unionism variable 
with the hypothesis that groups may be more likely to take risks, because they can 
defer blame for losses to other members of the group. The multi-unionism variable 
was also included in light of recent UK evidence showing a positive association 
between multi-unionism and strike incidence, when those unions bargain separately 
(Metcalf et al 1993, Machin et al 1993). Further, a UK owned variable was included 
on the basis that UK firms may have more experience with ACAS intervention in 
disputes and therefore may be less risk averse about the use of ACAS.
Two alternative theories suggest that in fact experience will induce fewer rather 
than more disputes. The naive negotiators hypothesis of DeNisi and Dworkin (1981) 
suggests that more experienced bargainers will be less likely to reach impasse than the 
less experienced because they are more fully aware of the consequences of their 
actions. The over optimistic or differing beliefs hypothesis might also predict a 
similar result to the naive negotiator hypothesis. As parties become more familiar with 
each other and the dispute procedure, they may be less likely to make mistakes 
concerning the expected outcome of a dispute. Therefore it is not clear in which, if 
any, direction the experience variables might be expected to function.
The differing beliefs hypothesis was further tested by Currie using the volatility 
of macroeconomic variables (the coefficient of variation of the Consumer Price Index 
in her study). For the UK sample only the year of the settlement (not the month) is 
known, therefore year dummies were included in some equations as a crude 
approximation of macroeconomic factors.
Bargaining unit size was included to test the hypothesis that the costs per union 
member of impasses might be a factor. There is somewhat of a worry here though 
because impasses are not generally that expensive in the UK as ACAS services are 
free and lawyers’ fees do not feature to anything like the same extent as in North 
America. So even if a size effect is apparent it is not clear that this would support the 
direct cost of impasse hypothesis.
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The principal-agent hypothesis is tested using two variables, the previous real 
pay settlement (following the Currie example) and whether or not the workplace is part 
of a larger enterprise. These two variables should provide evidence of principal-agent 
problems on either side. If lower previous settlements are associated with an increase 
in the incidence of impasse the following round this might suggest a principal-agent 
problem on the union side. On the other hand if non-independent plants are associated 
with a higher incidence of disputes, this might suggest that plant management feels 
forced to go to impasse to indicate that they are not shirking in negotiations to 
enterprise level management.
d. Results on final-offer arbitration and dispute deterrence
Different specifications of models A to E are shown in Tables 3.5 to 3.9. For 
each model the coefficient and t statistic of the FOA variable is shown at the top of 
every column. For all other variables the significance, or non-significance, and the 
sign on the coefficient are indicated. The tables provide six specifications of each 
model: (I) including FOA and variables designed to control for risk aversity:
(II) involves the substitution of the alternative experience variable (number of years 
with procedure) for the establishment date dummy; (ID) adds year dummies to test for 
macroeconomic factors which might influence the probability of differing beliefs; (IV) 
removes year dummies and includes the two variables designed to test for principal- 
agent problems; (V) removes the latter and includes plant size dummies to test for any 
impact of the costs of disputes; and (VI) including virtually all variables covering 
differing beliefs, principal-agent problems and the costs of disputes.
The impact of FOA on ’the overall impasse rate’ (Model A) is shown in Table 
3.5. The sample consists of all 212 rounds with some form of dispute procedure and 
the dependent variable records any failure to agree (the use of any form of third party 
intervention) as an impasse. Therefore the model does not differentiate the degree of 
dispute. FOA has a negative coefficient in half of the equations and is positive in the 
others, but in none is it significant. Therefore using the crudest measure of impasse 
rate, FOA does not out perform conventional procedures in deterring disputes, holding 
all else equal.
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The sample is narrowed down in Table 3.6 (Model B) to exclude the 42 rounds 
where there is no provision for arbitration. Therefore if rounds are not covered by 
FOA then conventional arbitration is the final stage in the procedure. The dependent 
variable remains any failure to agree. Again FOA rounds are not associated with a 
significantly different probability of impasse compared to conventional arbitration 
rounds.
In Table 3.7 the sample used is the same as for Table 3.6, but the dependent 
variable is the use of arbitration (Model C) - which is probably the most important test 
of FOA theory - rather than any failure to agree. FOA is specifically advocated to 
deter the use of and reliance on arbitration, which is where conventional arbitration is 
held to be at fault. The results do not support the hypothesis that FOA is more 
effective at deterring its own use than conventional arbitration. In fact in all equations 
the FOA coefficient is positive, although in none is the coefficient significant.
When the sample is recast to concentrate on rounds with mediation and/or 
conciliation (i.e. boxes c and d in Figure 3.2), there seems to be some evidence in 
support of the deterrent power of FOA. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that the availability 
of FOA is associated with a significantly lower impasse rate in rounds where 
mediation and/or conciliation is provided (models D and E). The only difference 
between the two tables is that the sample in Table 3.9 excludes the four rounds where 
arbitration as well as pre-arbitration procedure was used. So whereas the equations in 
Table 3.8 measure any failure to agree as an impasse, those in Table 3.9 just count the 
use of non-arbitration procedures.
It is not surprising that FOA deters disputes more effectively compared to 
where no arbitration provision exists (in 42 of the comparative rounds, i.e. comparing 
box d to box c of Figure 3.2). But it must be emphasised that it is FOA which is the 
key element here, because it performs better than other measures of arbitration.
Table 3.10 shows results when models D and E are re-estimated using all 
arbitration and conventional arbitration instead of FOA (the FOA estimations are 
reproduced for ease of comparison). Of the three arbitration variables, only FOA is 
significant in both models.
The results suggest that it is the interaction of FOA with mediation and/or 
conciliation that deters disputes. This does not mean that an FOA procedure not 
accompanied by pre-arbitration stages will be made more effective by the inclusion of
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pre-arbitration stages, but rather that an unaccompanied mediation/conciliation 
procedure will be made more effective through the addition of FOA than of 
conventional arbitration. This can be concluded because using only the 114 rounds 
where FOA was available (not reported in Tables) did not indicate that either 
mediation and/or conciliation had any impact on the impasse rate. It seems safe to 
conclude therefore that in this sample the existence of FOA in a multi-stage procedure 
deters impasses more effectively than conventional arbitration.
Of the other dispute procedure variables, mediation was significantly 
associated with a higher incidence of disputes and conciliation with a lower incidence 
in some models, which is somewhat against expectations. One possible explanation 
may be that under mediation at least the parties know that a possible solution to the 
dispute will be suggested by the third party and may prefer this to the continuance of 
negotiations under a conciliator. So it may not be that conciliation deters disputes but 
rather that it is more likely to be available in plants with low dispute rates anyway. 
Perhaps mediation and arbitration feature in the procedures of plants which are 
potentially more likely to have disputes because the parties prefer procedures which 
have more bite.
e. Results of other theories
Acknowledging the caveat that small sample sizes make it unlikely that all 
influential variables will prove statistically significant, the results concerning the 
alternative theories of disputes deserve some comment. Most striking is the fact that 
the variables estimating levels of risk aversity perform better than all three other 
theories tested. Plants established before 1980, those UK owned and those with more 
than one union, are more likely to have reached impasse than their respective 
counterparts (though not significantly so in every model). The number of years with a 
dispute procedure is not significant, however, which implies that the Farber and Katz 
(1979) explanation of why risk aversity may be lower in some bargaining units is not 
correct for this sample.
The plant vintage result suggests that it is the parties’ experience of bargaining 
with each other, rather than under a particular disputes procedure which reduces risk 
aversity. An alternative explanation of this particular result could, be that it is related
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to the life cycle of the product, older plants may have more disputes because their 
profit rate is declining compared to newer plants.
The multi-union finding is the most consistently significant result in the various 
models and supports previous findings about the importance of multi-unionism in 
estimations of strike incidence.
Of the other theories tested only the per capita costs of disputes shows any 
indication of being significant, smaller plants are significantly less likely to reach 
impasse than larger ones. However, it is not clear that this variable is necessarily 
supporting that particular theory - it could also be interpreted as providing support for 
the risk aversity hypothesis, if larger groups are more likely to take risks because they 
can spread the consequences of losing over a larger constituency.
The naive negotiator, differing beliefs and principal-agent theories are not 
supported by the results, although again the variables employed may not provide the 
best means of estimating these effects. For instance the year dummies, used as an 
approximation of the volatility of macroeconomic factors and the differing beliefs 
theory, are probably too imprecise to capture the essence of the theory. Furthermore 
analysis of the principal-agent theory was hampered by the absence of data on the 
pay settlement at t-1 for a large proportion of rounds which cut the sample sizes 
considerably. Therefore the results concerning these models must be treated with some 
caution. The impact of the plant being part of a larger enterprise was tested separately 
from the previous pay settlement variable on the full sample, but was found to be non­
significant.
f. Summary
The postal survey data therefore provide a fairly extensive body of information 
about the impact of FOA and other dispute procedures on impasse rates, as well as 
results concerning other theories of impasse. Overall it does appear that even after 
controlling for other potential causes of impasses, FOA does not in general deter 
disputes more effectively than conventional arbitration - except in the case of multi­
stage dispute procedures. However, the survey cannot answer the crucial question of 
why FOA has not deterred disputes particularly effectively in the UK. This lower than 
expected impasse deterrence effect of FOA was investigated in the interview stage of 
the research and is reported in the following section.
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5. Evidence from the interviews
a. Introduction
The interview panel consisted of eight plants whose details are provided in 
chapter one. To recap, they are workplaces with FOA based dispute procedures, which 
experienced at least one impasse over the five years covered by the survey and agreed 
to become a case study in order to provide supplementary informations to the postal 
survey. Chapter 5 examines a range of other issues based on these interviews 
particularly concerned with the practicalities of FOA in action. This section contains 
evidence from them relevant to dispute deterrence. The information analysed is both 
substantive and attitudinal, and provides some extra depth of analysis to that provided 
by the survey.
b. Was FOA adopted to deter disputes?
One possible explanation for the relative ’failure’ of FOA is that parties signing 
agreements incorporating FOA have not done so with the intention of deterring 
disputes, but instead just view FOA as a novel way of resolving disputes. In theory 
even if parties did sign FOA agreements with the latter intent, there is no reason to 
suspect that this would necessarily undermine the deterrent power of FOA. However, 
in the early years of bargaining under FOA one might expect that this attitude towards 
FOA would encourage its use, perhaps for the novelty value.
In fact when asked what attracted them to FOA, the majority of interviewees 
produced answers which are very much in line with FOA theory. Responses included 
the following:
’it [FOA] really makes you consider your position’,
’it makes you try harder in negotiations’,
’it makes people more reasonable and it means that you are more in 
control’,
’the fact of potentially going to pendulum arbitration will often lead to 
the resolution of disputes’.
In a couple of cases the interviewees specifically contrasted the merits of FOA with 
conventional arbitration by saying that the latter allowed the parties to ’get off the 
hook’ at the end of negotiations and that ’splitting the difference is too easy for the
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arbitrators’. This second point illustrates an important adjunct to the argument that 
because arbitrators usually do not split the difference, then conventional arbitration has 
been unfairly characterised in the arguments in favour of FOA (Kessler 1987, Lewis 
1990). In fact the crucial issue is not what the arbitrators actually do but rather what 
the parties expect the arbitrator to do. If they anticipate the arbitrator will split the 
difference then negotiations are likely to chill.
Some of the interviewees’ justifications for the FOA procedure, however, do 
not have a similar academic rationale. These include the ’finality’ of the process, its 
’straightforwardness and formality’, and its role as a ’final court of appeal’ for a 
dispute. All three of these arguments could equally be used concerning a conventional 
arbitration procedure. In general the parties’ explanations of the anticipated merits of 
FOA at the time the deal fall into two camps: those which accord reasonably closely 
with the academic arguments; and those who regard FOA as a novel dispute resolution 
procedure. The implications of these different beliefs about the purpose of FOA is 
explored more fully in chapters 2 and 5.
b. Other substantive evidence
Section 3 detailed North American studies of the chilling effect and one 
component of these is the range of different substantive measures of dispute deterrence 
employed. The postal survey recorded the most important outcomes, the impasse rate 
and the arbitration award rate, and the interviews were partly used to examine some of 
the less typical measures of chilling. A scientific analysis of the other two measures 
examined in the interviews, convergence of positions and the gap between final 
positions, is unfortunately not feasible because of the lack of comparative data and the 
considerable heterogeneity of the disputes, but some points are worth noting.
i. Convergence o f positions: Most of the disputes were described as being well 
defined from the beginning such that there was no scope for movement by either side. 
For example in the RHM 1987 case the parties, having not moved positions in 
negotiations, skipped the conciliation stage of their procedure to go straight to 
arbitration, because there was ’no scope for compromise’, in a dispute over payment 
for lunch breaks for one group of workers.
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However, there were some notable cases of compromise activity, particularly by 
unions in the face of arbitration. The Iveco Ford case where the union amended its 
claim from two years’ cushioning pay for loss of shift premia to one year before 
arbitration, is well documented (IDS 1988, Lewis 1990). In another case, ABB 
Capacitors, the union claimed ’substantially more’ than management’s offer of 7.25% 
in negotiations then pitched its claim at 7.7% just before arbitration. In both cases this 
could be cited as evidence of the effectiveness of FOA to promote compromising 
activity, but the fact that compromise did not occur earlier in negotiations suggests that 
the change in positions was an attempt to ’win’ in arbitration rather than achieve a 
settlement.
This evidence does not mean that FOA is ineffective at promoting compromise 
in general, but rather that in cases where it is used there is evidence of ’chilling’. The 
parties become aware early on that the dispute will go to arbitration and therefore may 
change their position in order to ’win’ but not with the intention of settling.
ii. The gap between final positions: The majority of the interviewees indicated that the 
financial value of the gap between each side’s final positions was not significant.
Most of the disputes covered only a small proportion of the workforce, seven 
employees in the case of the 1991 IBC grading case for instance. The only case were 
there was a substantial difference between the two sides, Anonco, was settled in 
conciliation perhaps because both sides realised the implications of losing at 
arbitration. This evidence is, prima facie, supportive of the effectiveness of FOA, 
suggesting that potentially very costly disputes are settled without recourse to 
arbitration. However, as there is no information available about the ’gaps’ in similar 
conventional arbitration cases, this can only be a tentative conclusion.
c. Examining explanations for FOA failure
For each dispute the interviewees were asked why the dispute was allowed by 
both sides to get to arbitration rather than settled in-house. Virtually all the responses 
fit into one or more of four alternative explanations of why disagreements in 
bargaining may occur despite the uncertainty of FOA.
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i. Naive negotiators: Naivety did figure in the explanation for some of the disputes 
but not naivety about the process of FOA itself, as hypothesised by DeNisi and 
Dworkin (1981). In one instance naivety about each other and simply how to bargain 
caused the failure to settle in-house (although the dispute was resolved in conciliation). 
In another naivety, or perhaps confusion, caused the dispute to be referred to a third 
party - the 1985 mediated settlement at Sanyo (see chapter 5 for details). However, 
the confusion in this case actually arose over a preliminary stage in the procedure 
rather, than the final-offer mechanism itself. Other than these two disputes it seems 
quite clear that the parties knew what they were doing and what FOA entailed.
In one interview the personnel manager stated that there were some ’problems’ 
at first with FOA because the employees considered adopting a policy of always going 
to arbitration on the basis that at the very least they would get management’s final 
offer and might possibly get their claim. The employees recognised the incentive FOA 
creates to ’cheat’ in the sense of allowing the other side to bargain with the intention 
of settling the dispute whilst yourself holding on for arbitration. Management 
persuaded the employees that this would be a myopic tactic in that the following year 
management would also have an incentive to chill, therefore undermining the whole 
procedure. The employees were in some sense naive regarding the notion of 
bargaining under FOA as a repeated rather than a one-off game. Having said this 
there was no evidence in this plant of FOA being invoked because of such naivety.
ii. Differing beliefs: To recap, this explanation rests on how realistic the parties’ 
different expectations of winning the arbitration hearing are. If they have sufficiently 
divergent expectations then they will prefer to take the dispute to arbitration, because 
both sides are sure that they will win, than negotiate a settlement.
The interviews revealed two cases of FOA being invoked when management 
was sure it would win in arbitration and yet it lost. In one case the interviewees (the 
Managing Director and personnel manager were both interviewed) stated that they had 
three reasons for believing their case was cast-iron safe: their rates were competitive in 
the local labour market; and compared to their previous parent company’s rates for the 
same jobs; and that the low employee turnover indicated satisfaction with the rate.
They were ’very, very confident’ that their final offer would be selected and that the 
arbitration award would reinforce management’s prerogative on pay.
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In the another dispute management similarly felt that it was bound to win the 
hearing such that even if the dispute had involved more employees, and therefore had 
been for higher stakes, they would still have allowed the dispute to go to arbitration 
because they were so sure of winning.
These two cases seem to provide strong support for the differing beliefs 
explanation of ’FOA failure’. However, there is something of a problem here because 
we do not know how ’reasonable’ the arbitrator’s choice of final offer was. In other 
words, there needs to be some evidence that the arbitrator’s choice would have been 
made by the ’average’ arbitrator. Bearing in mind this caveat, the fact that in other 
cases the interviewees did not suggest that they were completely sure of winning at 
arbitration provides some justification for the differing beliefs explanation for these 
two cases.
iii. Risk loving parties: In some senses, whenever parties allow a dispute to get to 
arbitration under FOA, they are committing the act of a risk loving party. They are 
preferring the risk of a possibly better arbitrated outcome to the certainty of a 
negotiated settlement. However, in only one case did management indicate that they 
thought this was the explanation for the dispute reaching arbitration.
The interviewee argued that management knew that it would win the award and 
that the union side probably knew that it would lose but that they [the union] ’took a 
long shot’. The union took the slim chance of possibly winning in arbitration rather 
than reduce their claim in negotiations, and achieve a possibly better outcome.
iv. Principal-agent problems: A negotiator may take a dispute as far as arbitration, 
knowing they will lose, because of pressure from their constituents - other managers in 
the case of management negotiators and union members in the case of union 
negotiators. There were two cases of FOA use and one of near-use which could be 
explained in terms of principal-agent problems.
In one case the ’problem’ was on management side. A new Managing Director 
was determined to be tough in negotiations because his predecessor had been and he 
wanted to impress senior management at the company’s headquarters. Therefore he 
refused to compromise on a low offer to the employees even though he and the rest of
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the plant’s management knew that they would lose at arbitration with such a low offer. 
The personnel manager at this plant stated that management did not even want to win 
at arbitration because they would have lost in the long run due to subsequent staff 
turnover problems. This is a clear case of a party going to arbitration with a high 
expectation of losing the hearing despite the reality of FOA because of pressure from 
their constituents.
In two cases the principal-agent difficulty was on the union side, although in 
one the dispute was settled before arbitration. In one case, the union regional official 
gave up pursuing the workers’ claim early on in negotiations, because it went directly 
against the official national union policy. However, because the members at the plant 
threatened the union’s position by inviting a rival union to recruit outside the factory 
gates, a national official of the incumbent union was compelled to take up the case 
once more. Having done this the official was virtually bound to take the dispute ’all
the way’ to arbitration in order to show the union’s commitment to its members in the
\
plant. So considerations of the likelihood of winning were of secondary importance to 
being seen to be pursuing the claim to the hilt. The union lost the resultant award.
In the second case, the union negotiator was very inexperienced and having 
promised too much to the members was not able to back down in negotiations for fear 
of ’losing face’, according to the personnel manager. This dispute was actually settled 
in conciliation mainly through the role of the national union official who ’imposed 
some reality’ on the union position.
The most apposite of the four explanations for ’FOA failure’ in these cases are 
therefore differing beliefs and principal-agent problems. Negotiators did not seem to 
be naive about FOA itself, although they may have been naive about each other, nor 
did they seem to be particularly risk loving gamblers.
These findings are therefore somewhat at odds with the explanations suggested 
by the data - that low risk aversity is the main explanation for the incidence of 
impasses despite the presence of FOA. However the results may be consistent because 
essentially the interviews measure very different factors from the survey. The 
interviews provide qualitative, attitudinal data which is subject to the interviewer’s 
interpretation, and therefore it would be surprising to see these data mirroring the 
quantitative information from the postal survey. For instance, concerning principal-
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agent theory, the variables used to measure it in the empirical analysis (previous pay 
settlement and part of larger enterprise) may not have registered the three cases for 
which it seems to be relevant from the interviews. Even in the case where a plant 
manager pursued a dispute to arbitration because of perceived pressure from higher 
level management, an important factor, other than the multi-establishment enterprise, 
was the previous manager’s reputation which could not have been captured using the 
survey data.
Furthermore, analysis of the survey concentrates on differences between plants 
which are associated with different levels of disputes, whereas the case studies 
highlight contingent factors which caused (or failed to prevent disputes) within a 
particular plant or bargaining round.
6. Industrial action and dispute procedures
a. Introduction
Disputes, strikes and industrial action are synonymous and often confused in 
public parlance. One of the raisons d’etre behind this research is to investigate, 
delineate and differentiate some of the distinctions and concepts between these 
different phenomena. The issue of dispute procedures and industrial action is covered 
as the final part of this chapter on bargaining impasses, however, for two main 
reasons: because it provides a counterweight to the rather damning indictment of 
FOA’s (in)ability to prevent bargaining impasses found in the UK survey; and because 
there is so little investigation of this issue in North America and the incidence of 
industrial action in the UK sample is so small, that the analysis does not warrant a 
separate chapter.
This section covers the following issues: the small amount of theory and 
empirical evidence from North America; existing UK evidence, both micro and macro, 
on the impact of dispute procedure availability on strikes; evidence from the postal 
survey and interviews; and some consideration of potential for future research on this 
issue in the UK.
97
b. North American theory and evidence
Public sector strikes are, with very few exceptions, legally prohibited in North 
America. However, illegal strikes do occur. Compulsory arbitration, whether 
conventional or FOA, has been introduced in some jurisdictions, not only as a quid pro 
quo for the absence of a right to strike, but also in order to help prevent illegal strikes. 
Strike theories (see chapter 7) concentrate almost wholly on contract strikes in the US 
private sector. By contrast, most of the few studies on public sector strikes are 
empirical and deductive, with scant theoretical foundation. An exception is Olson 
(1986), who provides some intuitive reasoning for an hypothesis that compulsory 
arbitration laws should be associated with a lower incidence of strikes in those states 
compared to states with no such laws. His argument has two stages.
First, assuming that under arbitration statutes, unions chose whether to pursue a 
dispute through illegal strike action or by arbitration and that their selection is made on 
the basis of selecting the procedure with the highest expected outcome. Following the 
use of either procedure the union can invoke the procedure which was not initially 
chosen in an attempt to obtain a better outcome. In contrast, unions operating under 
laws prohibiting strikes and with no compulsory arbitration statute only make the 
choice between illegal strike or negotiated (or imposed) settlement. Under these 
conditions, arbitration should result in fewer strikes if unions select the arbitration 
route most frequently and seldom strike because of an unfavourable award. The first 
condition would be met if expected arbitration awards were comparable to expected 
strike settlements and the direct costs of arbitration are less that strike costs.
Second, strikes as a result of unfavourable awards can also be expected to be 
few and far between for two reasons. First, because only a small proportion of 
settlements are arbitrated, and of these one would imagine that some will be 
favourable, therefore in only a small minority of bargaining rounds is there an 
opportunity to strike. Second, the politics of public sector dispute procedure provision 
are such that frequent strikes in the presence of dispute procedures would probably 
increase the likelihood of the relevant legislation being repealed. Unions, especially 
the leaders, may be more anxious to retain the arbitration procedure than risk its repeal 
because of illegal strikes. These political considerations may be even more immediate 
in jurisdictions which require periodic renewal of arbitration statutes.
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Olson does not consider any potential influence of FOA compared to 
conventional arbitration on industrial action. Developing his analysis it seems that 
there could be theoretical support for both forms of arbitration being more effective at 
preventing industrial action. One way of thinking about this is a reconsideration of the 
asymmetric information theory of strikes. These predict that strikes are more likely 
when there are asymmetries of information between the parties about bargaining 
positions and strengths (Kennan 1986). One consequence of the chilling effect of 
conventional arbitration may be that information is withheld, in contrast to FOA’s 
promotion of genuine negotiations, which should engender an open information 
approach. If asymmetries of information are greater under conventional arbitration 
than FOA, then industrial action may also be more likely under the latter than the 
former.
The converse conclusion might be drawn by those critics who argue that FOA’s 
single greatest drawback is that when invoked it produces unworkable awards (see 
chapter 5). Given Olson’s assessment that most strikes under arbitration statutes occur 
after an unfavourable award it may be more likely that an unfavourable award under 
FOA generates strike action than one under conventional arbitration. It seems 
conceivable that when framing an award under conventional arbitration an arbitrator 
when favouring the employer may also seek to satisfice the union side sufficiently to 
prevent industrial action. This option may not be available to the FOA arbitrator. 
Unfortunately, having said this none of the North American studies discussed below 
investigate any differential impact between conventional and final-offer arbitration.
There are three North American studies of particular note on the impact of 
collective bargaining laws, particularly arbitration, on the incidence of public sector 
strikes. Whilst there have been other studies of public sector strikes, the most well 
known and comprehensive being Burton and Krider’s (1975) analysis, more recent 
studies by Ichniowski (1982), Olson (1986) and Currie and McConnell (1991) consider 
more carefully and specifically the role of arbitration. The details of their studies are 
summarised in Table 3.11 for ease of comparison.
All three studies using very different samples, time frames and comparators 
find that compulsory arbitration statutes reduce (significantly in most cases) the 
probability of strike action in a given jurisdiction, holding other factors constant. Note
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that whilst the main test used by Ichniowski and Olson is no right to strike/no 
arbitration compared to no right to strike/compulsory arbitration. However, because of 
the wider provision of the right to strike in the Canadian public sector, Currie and 
McConnell also compare the impact of right to strike laws with no right to 
strike/compulsory arbitration laws as well. Olson’s intuitive reasoning might predict 
that we would expect much greater disparity of strike probabilities under the latter 
comparison than the former. In fact Currie and McConnell’s results are smaller and 
less well determined than the other two studies. One potential explanation for this, not 
explored by the authors, is that the threat of strike action under a right to strike law 
may be sufficient to extract higher outcomes compared to similar threats of illegal 
action under compulsory arbitration laws.
c. Existing UK evidence
There have only been two empirical studies of strike incidence in the UK 
which have included the provision of a formal dispute procedure in their estimations. 
Based respectively on successive Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 1980 
(WIRS1) and 1984 (WIRS2), Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) and Booth and Cressy 
(1990) find that the provision of procedures is positively associated with the incidence 
of strikes. Only the earlier study based on WIRS1 finds a significant association, but 
the non-significant result in the Booth and Cressy study may be a result of the smaller 
sample they employ. Note that in neither of these UK studies is the dispute procedure 
result broken down by type of procedure, therefore they are not strictly results on 
arbitration and strikes. These results seem prima facie directly contradictory to the 
North American evidence where arbitration availability is negatively associated with 
strike incidence.
The endogeneity problem is a crucial factor here. The cross-section basis of 
the WIRS data do not allow a before and after test. It seems probable that dispute 
procedures are more likely to be developed in workplaces or industries with histories 
of industrial action problems - this is certainly the case for some of the new style deal 
plants (see chapter 2) - although, as noted in that chapter, this has never been 
investigated more widely in the UK. Therefore although the incidence of strikes may 
still be higher in plants with dispute procedures, all else equal, the level may be lower 
than it would otherwise be without the procedure.
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An interesting adjunct to this are aggregate data on the number of stoppages 
and the number of conciliation requests received by ACAS over the last two decades. 
Figure 3.3, taken from ACAS (1991), provides a picture of the movements in these 
series from 1970 to 1987. Particularly notable is the leap in conciliation requests in 
the three year period around the establishment of ACAS in September 1974 from 
around 800 a year to over 3000, and simultaneously a drop in stoppages from around 
2,800 to nearer 2,000. Moreover, once these series crossed in 1975 the number of 
collective conciliation requests has remained above the number of stoppages in every 
year since. ACAS themselves claim that this is evidence that they help to prevent 
strikes since
’... in about 90 per cent of cases the request for conciliation comes 
before industrial action.’ (ACAS 1991: 104).
This seems to be a plausible deduction, but the impact of ACAS on disputes and 
industrial action outcomes deserves further investigation before such conclusions can 
be verified.
d. Evidence from the new style deals data
The incidence of any form of industrial action across the sample is very low at 
1.68%, (5 out of 297 bargaining rounds). Such a low incidence of industrial action, 
whilst very interesting in terms of comparisons with national figures, unfortunately 
provides little scope for any empirical analysis of the role of different impasse 
procedures in the determination of the level of industrial action or even a gauge to 
how satisfied parties are with particular impasse procedures.
The workplaces experiencing the action, two strikes and three overtime bans, 
comprise two without any impasse procedure, two with FOA alone and one with 
provision for conciliation, mediation and conventional arbitration. Other notable 
characteristics of these plants is that only one is multi-union, all five have a workforce 
greater than 100 employees (three have over 500), three were established before 1980 
and four have union density levels of 75 to 100%.
A perhaps surprising finding is that three of the plants report having a 
collective agreement which includes a ’no-strike’ clause, which is actually a higher 
proportion of the plants which experienced industrial action (60%) than of the total 
sample (50%)!
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The national annual average of 4.6% (1985-1989) for industrial action at 
bargaining group level over annual pay negotiations from the CBI data (see chapter 6), 
is more than double the industrial conflict rate of the new style deals sample. The 
questions on industrial action in the postal survey were framed to cover only industrial 
action over pay settlements (see Appendix B) to match the CBI data, so this should be 
a comparison of like with like. This suggests that the new style deals and their 
impasse procedures have been successfully associated with a low level of industrial 
action. It may, however, be that characteristics of the sample, other than the provision 
of particular impasse procedures, explain the low rate of incidence. However, apart 
from the level of multi-unionism, characteristics associated with a low level of strikes 
do not predominate in the sample:
i. Workplace size: Strike incidence is generally found to be higher in larger plants 
than smaller ones (Prais 1978, Blanchflower and Cubbin 1986). Consequently if our 
low strike incidence result were attributable to workplace size, the sample might be 
expected to have a relatively high proportion of small plants. In fact the sample is not 
skewed towards small plants, rather the opposite. Over 87% of the plants in our 
sample have more than 99 employees compared to only 65% of establishments in the 
WIRS (1984) sample (Millward and Stevens 1986), the sample used in the 
Blanchflower and Cubbin study.
Furthermore, considering the evidence Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth (1993) 
present regarding the link between larger bargaining groups and strike incidence, it 
could be that relatively small bargaining group size is an explanation for the low strike 
incidence in our sample. Given the low level of multi-unionism in the sample, 
discussed below, suggesting that most of the workplaces have a single bargaining unit, 
it does seem suitable to compare bargaining group size from the CBI data with 
workplace size in the sample. Only 55% of bargaining groups in the CBI sample have 
more than 100 employees, compared to the 87% of workplaces in the new style deals 
sample having more than 99 employees. So small bargaining groups or workplaces 
does not appear to be an explanation for the low level of industrial action among the 
new style deal plants
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ii. Multi-unionism: Results from the CBI data indicate a significant, positive effect of 
multi-unionism on strike incidence and this effect was also found by Blanchflower and 
Cubbin (1986) and Machin et al (1993), when those unions bargain separately, using 
WIRS data. The new style deals sample has a much lower rate of multi-unionism 
(5.6%) than the national level of 35% in 1984 (Millward and Stevens 1986: Table 3.7). 
This is probably the most significant contrast between the sample and the national 
picture in explaining the relatively low rate of industrial action.
iii. Particular unions: It could be that individual unions disproportionately represented 
in the sample are less likely to be involved in industrial action than other less well 
represented unions. The most obvious example of this is the EETPU which has openly 
espoused a cooperative rather than conflictual attitude to management in its new 
agreements, although it is not as cooperative in all the industries in which it operates. 
Distinguishing between any independent union-attitude effect and particular impasse 
procedures is not feasible, however, because the union-attitude may also be a 
determinant of the implementation of an impasse procedure. In fact it could be argued 
that the impasse procedure is a proxy measure of a union’s attitude towards industrial 
conflict.
iii. Multi-plant firms: Two of the empirical studies of strikes in the UK (Blanchflower 
and Cubbin 1986, Ingram et al 1993) find an association between workplaces or 
bargaining groups in multi-plant firms and higher striker incidence. In fact the new 
style deals sample has a slightly higher proportion of subsidiaries (86.1%) compared to 
both the samples used in these studies (78.8% and 79% respectively) so there would 
appear to be no possible negative effect from this aspect of the plants involved in these 
deals.
iv. Industry: Industry level data for the whole of the 1980s indicates that the 
industries in which the sample is primarily located experienced higher than the mean 
annual average industrial action rates (Table 7.1). For example, in the electronics 
sector, an average of 7.5% of pay settlements on an annual basis (1985-1989) involved 
some industrial action. So the sample is not made up of plants which are in low 
industrial conflict industries.
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v. Region: It must be acknowledged that the Wales region, where nearly 40% of the 
surveyed plants are sited, had the second lowest annual average industrial action rate 
compared to other regions over the whole 1980s (Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth 
1991: Table 2). However, the three next most populated regions (in the sample) 
included two of the more conflict prone areas, the South East and the North West.
vi. Workplace vintage: Two-thirds of the workplaces in the sample were established in 
the 1980s and are therefore quite ’young’ workplaces. Unfortunately none of the UK 
studies of strike incidence have been able to analyse the potential impact of workplace 
vintage on strike probability, so it is impossible to state whether or not the age 
composition of the sample may explain part of the low level of strike action. In 
theory it could work either way: A higher level of strikes in younger plants because 
asymmetries of information about worker militancy and employer profits may be 
greater; or a lower strike probability because a ’them and us’ adversarial culture may 
not be ingrained (Guest and Rosenthal 1993).
Because of these related factors it does seem reasonable to argue that new style 
deals have been very successful at preventing industrial action. Given the fact that the 
deals have not resulted in a significantly low impasse rate, it seems safe to assume that 
some of the disputes that might otherwise have resulted in industrial action instead 
were resolved by the impasse procedure. The obvious adjunct to this conclusion is the 
question of what the strike level would have been in these plants without the 
procedure. This question was explored in the interview stage, by asking about 
workplace strike activity before FOA was introduced.
Some of the plants where interviews took place were brownfield sites when the 
FOA agreement was signed. In all these the managers stated that there had been 
problems with industrial action at the plant before the agreement was signed.
However, not all interviewees stated that the FOA procedure was the crucial element 
in the decline or lack of industrial action. Only two managers categorically claimed 
that had FOA not been available and used, there would have been a strike over the 
issue in dispute. Other managers said that either the dispute which involved FOA was 
not sufficiently important to have resulted in industrial action or that other aspects of 
their industrial relations arrangements were more important explanations, than the FOA
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procedure, for the lack of industrial action. Most often cited explanation was 
management’s consensual style of operations, but other factors included the no-strike 
clause and the impact of the law on industrial action.
7. Concluding remarks
Final-offer arbitration does not therefore appear to have achieved its prime 
design objective of deterring disputes in the peculiar UK environment of private sector, 
new style cooperative agreements. Although the deals as a whole appear to have 
performed very well in deterring or suppressing industrial action, FOA does not appear 
to have been especially influential towards this end. An important and difficult 
supplementary question concerns the applicability of this evidence to other industrial 
relations environments, in particular the UK public sector. What can this evidence on 
a small number of relatively unusual private sector plants reveal about the potential 
impact of FOA on bargaining disputes in the public sector?
The experience of the new style deals suggest that even in a supposedly 
cooperative environment disputes arise and persist despite FOA, often because of what 
Olson (1993) calls ’political factors’ - the parties want someone else to blame for an 
unpalatable outcome. Public sector negotiations are far more politically conditioned 
and motivated than those in the private sector so one would imagine that FOA would 
have an even harder time deterring its own use there. However, if arbitration is 
intended to deter industrial action then evidence from the US public sector and the 
new style deals is more encouraging. A more pressing concern for the Treasury and 
public sector managers may, however, be the impact of FOA on arbitrated and 
negotiated pay settlements as well as the influence on disputes and industrial action. It 
is to this important issue which we now turn.
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Footnotes
1. Note that in some states, Minnesota and New Jersey (Freeman 1986), there are laws which 
allow the parties to choose, at the time of impasse, to use either conventional or final-offer 
arbitration. However, the parties do not know which procedure will be used prior to or during 
negotiations, therefore these statutes do not permit a proper test of the relative deterrent power 
of FOA.
2. Factfinding involves a third party (other than the arbitrator) investigating the dispute and 
suggesting a solution, and is therefore analogous to mediation in the UK. To confuse matters 
further, mediation in the US is very similar to conciliation in the UK - a third party provides 
a means of communication between both sides in an effort to resolve the dispute.
3. Arbitration follows fact-finding and the arbitrator has a choice of either one of the parties’ 
final offers or the fact-finder’s recommendation, hence ’tri-offer arbitration’. In the Iowan 
case the arbitrator also chooses separately on each indiviudal issue between the three 
positions.
4. In other words 85 bargaining rounds are in plants with no dispute procedure in their 
collective agreement. Note that this does not necessarily mean that they did not reach 
impasse. There may have been ad hoc referral of disputes to third parties. Data from a 
survey of ACAS arbitrations for the period 1988-89 reveal that about 20% of cases occurred 
in plants with no provision for ACAS intervention in their collective agreement (Brown 
1989).
5. However, the two measures are not quite compatible since the national figures include 
interventions which would not figure in our sample, for example by senior management. Also 
our sample covers just manufacturing plants whereas the WIRS figures include the private 
service sector.
6. For those plants indicating that their current dispute procedure had been introduced ’Before 
1980’ or ’ 1980-1985’ (see questionnaire, Appendix B, question D.2) the experience with 
dispute procedure in each year of bargaining surveyed was calculated on the basis of 1976 
and 1982 respectively. These are arbitrary points. As the variable never reached significance 
in any model, other specifications were not tested.
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Table 3.1
Summary of usage rate results from eleven North American studies
Author(s) Type of arbitration Impasse rate % Award rate %
Loewenberg (1970) Conventional - 35
Thompson and 
Caimie (1973)
Conventional - 27.2
Klauser (1977) Conventional 45.1 11.8
Anderson and 
Kochan (1977)
Conventional - 23.1 to 82.9
Currie and 
McConnell (1991)
Conventional 52 27
Stern (1974) Final-offer 34 9
Long and Feuille 
(1974)
Final-offer 83.3 50.0
Holden (1976)1 Final-offer 143 14
Gallagher and 
Pegnetter (1979)
Final-offer 44.7 to 61.4 3.6 to 3.9
Dworkin (1986) Final-offer 29 to 49 8
Lester (1989)2 Choice - 10.7 to 14.7
Notes:
1. No indication of sample size.
2. Does not provide usage rate by different arbitration types because the procedure 
allows the parties to chose the type of arbitration only once impasse is reached and 
hence there can be no measure of the potential number of cases under each type.
3. means impasse rate not stated.
Table 3.2
Summary of studies on dispute deterrence
Author(s) Sample Type of arbitration 
and comparison
Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
Loewenberg (1970) 143 Penn, police & 
firef’r negns. 1968
Conventional 
No comparison
% arb’d settlements None 35% arb’d
Thompson and Caimie 
(1973)
B.C. teacher negns. 
1938-73
Conventional 
No comparison
% arb’d settlements None Incr’ing use of arbn. 
in later decades 
1938-46: 5.6% 
1947-59: 11.1% 
1960-73: 27.2%
Stem (1974) 173 Wise, police & 
firef’r negns. 1973
FOA
No comparison
% impasse & % arb’d 
No. of issues to arbn
None 34% impasse (high) 
9% arb’d (low) 
Some evidence of 
redn. in no of issues
Long and Feuille 
(1974)
6 Eugene (Oreg.) 
public negns. 1971-3
FOA
No comparison
% arb’d settlements None 5 to impasse 
3 arb’d
Wheeler (1975) Cities in 24 US States 
with barg. law for 
firef’rs, no dates
Compul’ry arbn. (CA) 
cf f’finding (FF) cf 
voluntary arbn. (VA)
% impasse, % awards None Initiated: Awards: 
CA 37.3% 26.8% 
FF 21.5% 12.9% 
VA 2.1% 2.1%
Holden (1976) 143 impasses, Mass. 
police & firef r negns. 
1974-5
FOA
No comparison
% referred to arbn. & 
% arb’d settlements
None 25/143 impasses ref’d 
to arbn., 14 awards.
Table 3.2 continued
Author(s) Sample Type of arbitration 
and comparison
Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
Somers (1977) 33 Mass. police & 
firef’r negns. 1975-6
FOA cf previous FF 
law
% impasse 
No. of issues
None Impasses up: from 26 
to 53%
Issues - mean no.: 
14.7 FF, 4.8 FOA
Klauser (1977) 51 Haw. public negns. 
1971-6
Conventional or right 
to strike after 
exhausting procedures 
& 60 day cooling off
Stages reached None 23 imp’s, 6 med’d, 1 
FF, 6 refs to arbn, 6 
sett’d in cool’g off 
period, 1 strike
Anderson and Kochan 
(1977)
50 Canadian fed. 
service barg. units, 
1968-75
Conventional cf right 
to strike (choice of 
proc. pre-negns.)
% impasse & arb’d 
Narcotic effect 
1/2 life effect
Inflation
Demand for labour 
Unit size
Occupation dummies
Trend away from 
neg’d settmnts, 82.9% 
t, 23.1% t+3.
Strg. evidence of chill. 
& narc. effects
Wheeler (1978) 140 US cities, firef’r 
negns. 1972
Conventional cf FF Movement in negns. 
Gap at impasse
None Mgt. moves more 
under FF than arb. 
Gap: less FF cf arb.
Kochan and Jick 
(1978)
130 NY State med’n 
cases, 1972-6 
(Interviews)
Mediation under FF cf 
under arbn.
Effectiveness of 
mediation
Med’r experience, 
quality, strategy. 
Dispute intensity 
Ability to pay
Mediation less 
effective under arbn 
than FF
Kochan and 
Baderschneider (1978)
NY State, 121 police 
& 130 firef’r negns. 
1972-76 (Interviews)
Conventional cf 
previous FF law
% impasses 
Repeated use
City population 
Cost of living 
Negotiator charac’s
Arbn. sig. +ve assoc 
with impasses 
Evid. of narc. effect
Table 3.2 continued
Author(s) Sample Type of arbitration 
and comparison
Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
Gallagher and 
Pegnetter (1979)
338 Iowa public 
negns. 1975-77 
2 rounds, R1 & R2
Tri-offer, issue by 
issue FOA 
No comparison
% impasse & % arb’d 
Movement in negns. 
Narcotic
None Impasse: R 1=61.4%, 
R2=44.7%
Arb’d: Rl=3.6%, 
R2=3.9%
Movement: FF aids 
convergence, little 
mvmnt FF to FOA 
Narcotic: no re-use of 
FOA
Ponak and Wheeler 
(1980)
c. 3000 negns. from 
Can. fed. serv., B.C., 
Minn. & Wise. 
1967-79
Choice of procedure 
before negns., arbn. or 
right to strike
% impasse None Higher impasse rate 
under arbn. route than 
right to strike route
Anderson (1981b) 
update of Anderson 
and Kochan (1977)
8 rounds of barg’g in 
Can. fed. serv.
Choice of procedure % impasse 
Narcotic effect
None Continued decline in 
neg’d settmnts, strg 
evid. of narc. effect
Delaney and Feuille 
(1984)
343 police arbn 
awards in 16 US 
States 1975-82
FOA by package cf 
FOA by issue cf 
conventional
No. of issues arb’d None Fewer issues under 
FOA by package cf 
both the others
Hoh (1984) 421-826 Iowa barg. 
units 1976-83
Tri-offer arbn., 
interested in role of 
mediation
Stage of settlement None % impasses sett’d at 
med’n: 72-89%, 
higher than Wise, 
Mich. & NY
Table 3.2 continued
Author(s) Sample Type of arbitration 
and comparison
Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
Dworkin (1986) US baseball player 
negns. 1974-85
FOA
No comparison
% impasse & % arb’d 
Compromising activity
None Inr’g impasse rate: 
29% 1974-85, 49% 
1980-5, c 8% arb’d 
Comp. act. down
Lester (1989) 40 NJ practitioners 
interviewed re. 
experience 1978-87
Compulsory arbn., 
parties chose type at 
impasse
% impasse
Type of arbn chosen
None Impasse rate: 
declining over period 
Choices: FOA by 
package most popular
Currie (1989) 35 B.C. barg. units 
1947-81
Conventional 
No comparison
% impasse 
Testing theories of 
impasse
Previous impasses 
Relative wages 
Year dummies 
Employment 
Inflation
Strongest effect is 
narcotic (state 
dependence), no other 
theory fits evidence
Currie and McConnell 
(1991)
3985 Can. public 
negns. 1964-87, 427 
barg. units, avg. 9 
contracts each
Range of procs., incl.: 
compulsory arbn, right 
to strike, duty to 
bargain, no bargaining 
rights
Dispute rates (% arb’d 
+ % strike)
Region dummies 
Occupation dummies 
City dummies 
Previous disputes 
Year dummies
Overall: dispute rates 
lowest under right to 
strike, higher under 
arbn. than no barg. 
rights
Table 3.3
Summary of experimental studies on dispute deterrence
Author(s) Experiment sample Comparisons Depdendent variable(s) Findings
Subbarao (1978) 88 students, collective 
bargaining (CB) game, 2 
issues, 30 minutes
FOA by package cf FOA 
by issue cf conventionala 
arbitration
Proximity of final bids 
Concessions made
Final bids: closer FOA by package cf 
FOA by issue & conventional 
Concessions: no sig result
Notz and Starke 
(1978)
180 students, CB game, 1 
issue, 15 minutes
FOA cf conventional cf no 
arbitration
Expectations of outcome 
Gap between final bids
Exps: lower FOA cf conv 
Avg. gap final bids: FOA=5.73, 
Conv=13.4
DeNisi and 
Dworkin (1981)
90 students, CB game, 3 
issues, 45 minutes
FOA with naive (FOA1) & 
’experienced’ negotiators 
(FOA2)
Initial & final positions 
Concessions made 
No. of issues unsettled
Initial & final posns. closer FOA2 cf 
FOA1
Concessions: Sig. more FOA2 cf 
FOA1
Unresolved issues: no sig. result
Magenau (1983) 120 students, CB game, 1 
issues, 2x10 minutes
Conventional cf FOA1 (can 
change bid post impasse) cf 
FOA2 (last barg. bid) cf 
strike threat
% impasse
Gap between final bids 
Narcotic effect
Impasse: no sig. result except all arb 
> strike
Gap: closer FOA1 cf conventional but 
not cf FOA2
Narcotic: sig. drop in % impasses tl- 
t2 under FOA1
Neale and 
Bazerman 
(1983)
240 students, CB game, 5 
issues, 20 minutes
FOA cf conventional under 
high or low PTA 
(Perspective Taking 
Ability)
% impasse
Movement in negotiations 
No. of unresolved issues
FOA leads to more % settlments, 
more issues resolved & movement 
than conventional, PTA levels affect 
outcomes
Table 3.3 continued
Author(s) Experiment sample Comparisons Depdendent variable(s) Findings
Farber, Neal and
Bazerman
(1990)
114 students, CB game, 1 
issue, 3x15 minutes
Conventional, 3 levels of 
arb costs, 3 levels of risk 
aversion
% impasse Higher arb costs sig assoc with 
settlement rates
Risk aversion only weakly related to 
sett’t rates
Babcock et al 
(1991)
Exp 1: 160 students, legal 
case game, 1 issue, 30 min 
Exp 2: 76 students, legal 
case game, 1 issue, 6x5 
minutes
Exp 1: different levels of 
bias
Exp 2: roles known cf not 
known
% settlement Exp 1: Strong evid. of bias even with 
identical info. Pairs with largest 
combined bias less likely to settle. 
Exp 2: If pairs know roles & had bias 
less likely to settle than if did not 
know roles when assessing fair 
settlement pre negns.
Ashenfelter et al 
(1992)
141 student barg. pairs, CB 
game, 1 issue, 20x5.5 mins, 
no treatment Rl-10, 
treatment Rll-20.
No arb cf FOA cf tri-offer 
FOA cf conventional with 
3 levels of variance in 
prev. arb’r behaviour; High 
(HV), medium (MV), low 
(LV)
% dispute rate (DR) All prs sig. lower DR Rl-10 cf Rll-  
20. LV conv. sig. higher DR cf HV. 
DR under FOA significantly higher 
than HV conventional.
N.B. Pair heterogneity significant 
(bargaining history)
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Table 3.4
Configurations of impasse procedures
BASE MECHANISM
Final-offer Conventional Mediation Conciliation TOTAL
arbitration arbitration
Alone 13 4 2 5 24
With conciliation 
only
11 7 3 - 21
With both 
mediation and 
conciliation
3 6 - - 9
TOTAL 27 17 5 5 54
Source: LSE New Style Industrial Relations Survey (see chapter 1).
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Figure 3.1
Dispute procedures in 72 new style agreements
FINAL-OFFER
MEDIATION
CONVENTIONAL
CONCILIATION ARBITRATION
IN-HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS
FAILURE TO AGREE
NO DISPUTE 
PROCEDURE 
SPECIFIED
Source: LSE New Style Deals Survey 1991
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Figure 3.2 
Impasses per bargaining round
PROVISIONS 212 
ROUNDS 
WITH PROCEDURE
IMPASSES
ARB
NOPRE
ARB
WENT ON
TO ARB
NON-ARB
PRE-ARB
NOT GO ON
TO ARB
' 102 
WITH MED/CONC 
AVAILABLE
) 170
ROUNDS WITH
ARBITRATION
AVAILABLE
ROUNDS WITH 
ONLY MED/CONC 
AVAILABLE
Source: LSE New Style Deals Survey 1991
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Table 3.5 
Model A: The overall impasse rate
________________ EQUATIONS
m rm am uvi m  rvp
1. DISPUTE PROCEDURE
FOA available -0.211 -0.004 -0.179 0.156 0.083 0.125
t (0.396) (0.006) (0.330) (0.216) (0.014) (0.197)
Conciliation available -ve * 0 -ve * 0 0 0
Mediation available +ve * +ve ** +ve * 0 +ve ** +ve **
2. RISK AVERSION
Plant established pre 1980 +ve* - +ve ** +ve ** 0 0
Number of years with - 0 - - - -
UK owned plant 0 0 0 0 +ve * +ve *
Multi-unionism +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** 0 +ve * +ve *
3. DIFFERING BELIEFS
Year dummies 1987 - - 0 - - 0
1988 - - 0 - - 0
1989 - - 0 - - 0
1990 - - 0 - - 0
4. PRINCIPAL-AGENT
Part of larger enterprise - - - 0 - 0
Real pay settlement at t-1 - - - 0 - -
5. COSTS OF DISPUTES
Plant size dummies
100-249 employees - - - - _yg **
250-499 employees - - - - 0 0
500+ employees - - - - 0 0
CONSTANT _yg *** _yg *** _yg *** 0 _yg ** 0
Impasse rate 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.134 0.127 0.127
Sample size 212 212 212 127 212 212
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.155 0.187 0.139 0.199 0.222
Chi-squared 27.0 25.1 30.3 13.9 32.2 35.9
Degrees of freedom 6 6 10 8 9 14
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Notes to Table 3.5:
i. Dependent variable: Any failure to agree, Yes (1) No (0).
ii. Sample: All 212 rounds with impasse procedure,
iii. Default variables:
Year dummies = 1986 
Size dummies = 25-99 employees
iv. Equation IV has only 127 cases because for 85 observations the previous 
round’s settlement is not recorded,
v. ’0’ indicates that variable was included in equation but was not significant, 
vi. indicates that variable was not included in equation.
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Table 3.6
Model B: The overall impasse rate in the arbitration available rounds
________________ EQUATIONS_________
m rm uni nvi m  rvn
1. DISPUTE PROCEDURE
FOA available -0.004 0.056 0.063 1.099 -1.101 0.460
t (0.005) (0.078) (0.086) (0.766) (0.127) (0.493)
Conciliation available 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mediation available 0 0 0 0 0 +ve *
2. RISK AVERSION
Plant established pre 1980 0 - 0 0 0 0
Number of years with - 0 - - - -
UK owned plant 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multi-unionism +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** - +ve ** +ve **
3. DIFFERING BELIEFS
Year dummies 1987 - - 0 - - 0
1988 - - 0 - - 0
1989 - - 0 - - 0
1990 - - 0 - - 0
4. PRINCIPAL-AGENT
Part of larger enterprise - - - 0 - 0
Real pay settlement at t-1 - - - 0 - -
5. COSTS OF DISPUTES
Plant size dummies
100-249 employees - - - - 0 0
250-499 employees - - - - 0 0
500+ employees - - - - 0 0
CONSTANT _yg *** _yg *** _yg *** 0 0 0
Impasse rate 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.105 0.100 0.100
Sample size 170 170 170 95 170 170
Pseudo R2 0.149 0.132 0.173 0.131 0.193 0.242
Chi-squared 16.5 15.0 19.1 8.4 21.3 26.8
Degrees of freedom 6 6 10 7 9 14
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Notes to Table 3.6:
i. Dependent variable: Any failure to agree, Yes (1) No (0).
ii. Sample: All 170 rounds with arbitration available.
iii. Default variables:
Year dummies = 1986
Size dummies = 25-99 employees
iv. Equation IV has only 95 cases because for 75 observations the previous round’s 
settlement is not recorded.
v. ’0’ indicates that variable was included in equation but was not significant.
vi. indicates that variable was not included in equation.
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Table 3.7
Model C: The arbitration rate in the arbitration available rounds 
_____________EQUATIONS__________
ro up am  av) m
1. DISPUTE PROCEDURE
FOA available 0.999 1.487 1.070 0.869 0.919
t (0.005) (0.078) (0.858) (0.629) (1.395)
Conciliation available 0 0 _yg ** -ve ** _yg **
Mediation available 0 0 0 0 0
2. RISK AVERSION
Plant established pre 1980 0 - 0 0 0
Number of years with - 0 - - -
UK owned plant 0 0 0 0 0
Multi-unionism +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** _yg **
3. DIFFERING BELIEFS
Year dummies 1987 - - 0 - -
1988 - - 0 - 0
1990 - - 0 - 0
5. COSTS OF DISPUTES
Plant size dummies
250-499 employees - - - 0 0
500+ employees - - - 0 0
CONSTANT _yg *** _yg *** _yg *** _yg *** _yg ***
Impasse rate 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
Sample size 170 170 170 170 170
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.271 0.299 0.275 0.303
Chi-squared (d.f.) 19.8 20.4 22.7 20.9 23.1
Degrees of freedom 6 6 9 8 10
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Notes to Table 3.7:
i. Dependent variable: Use of arbitration, Yes (1) No (0).
ii. Sample: All 170 rounds with arbitration available.
iii. Default variables:
Year dummies = 1986 and 1989 
Size dummies = 25-249 employees
iv. ’0’ indicates that variable was included in equation but was not significant.
v. indicates that variable was not included in equation.
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Table 3.8
Model D: The overall impasse rate in the rounds with conciliation 
and/or mediation available
__________________EQUATIONS__________
m ( m  am av) m  ( v n
1. DISPUTE PROCEDURE
FOA available -1.750 -1.170 -1.871 -2.364 -1.844 -1.919
t (1.875)* (1.281) (1.936)* (1.658)* (1.710)* (1.704)*
Mediation available 0 +ve ** 0 0 +ve ** +ve *
2. RISK AVERSION
Plant established pre 1980 +ve ** - +ve ** +ve * 0 0
Number of years with - 0 - - - -
UK owned plant +ve ** +ve * +ve ** 0 -fyg *** -fyg ***
Multi-unionism +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** +ve **
3. DIFFERING BELIEFS
Year dummies 1987 - - 0 - - 0
1988 - - 0 - - 0
1989 - - 0 - - 0
1990 - - 0 - - 0
4. PRINCIPAL-AGENT
Part of larger enterprise - - - 0 - 0
Real pay settlement at t-1 - - - 0 - -
5. COSTS OF DISPUTES
Plant size dummies
100-249 employees - - - - _yg ** _yg **
250-499 employees - - - - 0 0
500+ employees - - - - 0 0
CONSTANT _yg *** _yg *** _yg ** 0 0
Impasse rate 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.160 0.149 0.149
Sample size 144 144 144 83 144 144
Pseudo R2 0.222 0.195 0.248 0.226 0.323 0.349
Chi-squared 26.6 23.4 29.7 16.3 38.7 41.7
Degrees of freedom 5 5 9 7 8 13
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Notes to Table 3.8:
i. Dependent variable: Any failure to agree, Yes (1) No (0).
ii. Sample: All 144 rounds with conciliation and/or mediation available.
iii. Default variables:
Year dummies = 1986
Size dummies = 25-99 employees
iv. Equation IV has only 83 cases because for 61 observations the previous round’s 
settlement is not recorded.
v. ’0’ indicates that variable was included in equation but was not significant,
vi. indicates that variable was not included in equation.
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Table 3.9
Model E: The non-arbitration impasse rate in the rounds with conciliation
and/or mediation available
__________________EQUATIONS_____________
m ( m  urn uvi m  rvu
1. DISPUTE PROCEDURE
FOA available -1.768 -1.195 -1.916 -2.395 -2.194 -2.252
t (1.917)* (1.322) (1.988)* (1.802)* (1.883)* (1.855)*
Mediation available 0 +ve * 0 0 0 0
2. RISK AVERSION
Plant established pre 1980 +ve ** - +ve ** +ve * 0 0
Number of years with - 0 - - - -
UK owned plant +ve ** +ve * +ve ** 0 -f-yg *** ■j_yg ***
Multi-unionism 0 0 0 0 0 0
3. DIFFERING BELIEFS
Year dummies 1987 - - 0 - - 0
1988 - - 0 - - 0
1989 - - 0 - - 0
1990 - - 0 - - 0
4. PRINCIPAL-AGENT
Part of larger enterprise - - - 0 - 0
Real pay settlement at t-1 - - - 0 - -
5. COSTS OF DISPUTES
Plant size dummies
100-249 employees - - - - _yg *** -ve **
250-499 employees - - - - 0 0
500+ employees - - - - 0 0
CONSTANT _yg *** _yg *** _yg *** _yg ** 0 0
Impasse rate 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.140 0.121 0.121
Sample size 140 140 140 91 140 140
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.129 0.188 0.169 0.311 0.346
Chi-squared 16.2 13.3 19.5 10.9 32.2 35.8
Degrees of freedom 5 5 9 7 8 13
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Notes to Table 3.9:
i. Dependent variable: Use of conciliation and/or mediation, Yes (1) No (0).
ii. Sample: All 140 rounds with conciliation and/or mediation available where 
arbitration was not used.
iii. Default variables:
Year dummies = 1986
Size dummies = 25-99 employees
iv. Equation IV has only 81 cases because for 59 observations the previous round’s 
settlement is not recorded.
v. ’0’ indicates that variable was included in equation but was not significant,
vi. indicates that variable was not included in equation.
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Table 3.10
Impasse rate in the rounds with conciliation and/or mediation 
available using different arbitration variables
__________________EQUATIONS_________________
All arbitration Conventional Final-offer
(I) (II) (in) (IV) (V) (VI)
1. DISPUTE PROCEDURE
Arbitration coefficient -1.249 -1.292 0.008 0.298 -1.844 -2.194
t (1.543) (1.504) (0.009) (0.323) (1.710)* (1.883)*
Mediation available +ve ** +ve * +ve ** +ve * +ve ** 0
2. RISK AVERSION
Plant established pre 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK owned plant +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** +ve ** _|_yg *** +ve ***
Multi-unionism +ve ** 0 +ve * 0 0 0
5. COSTS OF DISPUTES
Plant size dummies
100-249 employees _Y£ ♦♦ _yg _yg ** _yg ** _yg ** _yg ***
250-499 employees 0 0 0 0 0 0
500+ employees 0 0 0 0 0 0
CONSTANT 0 0 _yg ** _yg ** 0 0
Impasse rate 0.149 0.121 0.149 0.121 0.149 0.121
Sample size 144 140 144 140 144 140
Pseudo R2 0.315 0.291 0.295 0.269 0.323 0.311
Chi-squared 37.7 30.1 35.3 27.9 38.7 32.2
Degrees of freedom 8 8 8 8 8 13
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Notes to Table 3.10:
i. Dependent variables:
Columns I, III and V - Any failure to agree, Yes (1) No (0).
Columns n, IV and VI - Use of conciliation and/or mediation, Yes (1) 
No (0).
ii. Samples:
Columns I, III and V - All 144 rounds with conciliation and/or 
mediation available.
Columns n, IV and VI - All 140 rounds with conciliation and/or 
mediation available where arbitration was not used.
iii. Default variables:
Year dummies = 1986
Size dummies = 25-99 employees
iv. ’O’ indicates that variable was included in equation but was not significant.
v. indicates that variable was not included in equation.
Table 3.11
Summary of North American studies on strikes and arbitration
Author(s) Sample Arbitration measure 
and comparisons
Dependent
variable
Controls Findings
Icnhiowski (1982) Police negns. in 
206 US cities 1972-73 
862 US cities 1972-78
Compulsory arbn. cf 
duty to bargain cf 
bargaining permitted 
cf no barg. law
Strike City charac’tics 
Police salaries 
Government, 
region & year 
dummies
Arbn. laws sig. -ve assoc. 
Strike probs: Arb=.0025, 
Duty to barg=.027, barg. 
perm=.0089, no law=0.37.
Olson (1986) 1. 575 city police & 
firef r negns in 6 
states, 1973-76
2. Aggregate state level 
police & firef r strikes 
in 6 states 1958-80
Compulsory arbn. cf 
no arbn.
Strike 1. City charac’tics 
Union membership
2. State dummies 
No. of public strikes 
in other 44 states 
Macroeconomic vars.
1. Police: -ve assoc, but 
just n.s.
Firef rs: sig -ve assoc. 
Strike prob: arbn=.0012 cf 
no arbn=.0506
2. Passage of arbn statute 
leads to c.1.5 less strikes 
(no mean of dep var 
provided)
Currie and 
McConnell (1991)
3985 Can. public 
negns. 1964-86, 427 
barg. units, avg 9 
contracts each
Compulsory arbn cf 
right to strike, duty 
to bargain, no 
bargaining rights
Strike Region, occupation, 
city and year 
dummies.
Previous disputes
Strike prob. c.5% lower 
under arbn cf right to 
strike & c.1% lower cf no 
bargaining rights
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Figure 3.3
Work stoppages and conciliation requests 1970-87
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Chapter 4
Dispute procedures and pay outcomes
1. Introduction
The impact of compulsory interest arbitration on pay has emerged as to be of 
primary interest in the 1980s, almost to surpass the issue of dispute deterrence. This 
interest has been partly stoked by the failure to be able to properly test the dispute 
deterrence effect of FOA compared to conventional procedures in the US as detailed in 
chapter 3. However, it is also one example of the increased interest in industrial 
relations in measuring the impact of certain labour market institutions on substantive 
outcomes. Measuring the union mark-up on pay and the effect of national bargaining 
structure on the unemployment/inflation trade-off are other prime examples. Whether 
or not FOA deters its own use more effectively than conventional arbitration is 
important if the direct and/or indirect costs of disputes are significant but policy 
makers may be more interested in the impact that alternative procedures have on pay 
settlements, both those arbitrated and those negotiated under the threat of arbitration.
Until a seminal article by Farber and Katz (1979), there were two ’popular 
theories’ about arbitration and settlements (not distinguishing the type of arbitration):
". The use of arbitration results in excessive wage increases.
. The availability or threat of arbitration has an upward influence on 
negotiated pay settlements." (Somers 1977: 200, author’s emphasis)
Gunderson (1983) cites four reasons why many people claimed that arbitrated 
settlements exhibit an upward bias: arbitrators are not ultimately responsible to the 
voting public, who must pay the bill; competitive pressures and the need to recruit, 
ensure a floor for the settlement and may lead employers to pay above it; arbitrators 
tend to ignore market forces that might otherwise contain wage increases and; the 
comparability techniques and surveys that arbitrators use often have an upward bias. 
The effect of availability on negotiated settlements was a suggested spillover from the 
upward bias of arbitrated settlements over negotiated ones. It was argued that an 
employer would settle for a higher negotiated settlement under arbitration availability 
than non-availability in order to avoid an arbitrator imposing an even higher award.
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There were a few empirical studies in the 1970s which attempted to test these 
popular theories. All three examined the difference between arbitrated and negotiated 
settlements (Loewenberg 1970, Thompson and Caimie 1973 and Somers 1977) and 
one also addressed the issue of settlements and arbitration availability (Somers 1977). 
However, all these studies were non-rigorous, in that they did not control for other 
influences on pay settlements. Therefore any conclusions which they drew on the 
impact of arbitration on settlements should be treated with a great deal of caution. 
Consequently, at the end of the 1970s although these rather under developed popular 
theories may still have held some credence, there was no reliable evidence to support 
or reject them.
The popular theories were subject to more formalised (i.e. econometric) 
analysis by Farber and Katz (1979) on conventional arbitration and Farber (1980) on 
FOA. The resultant theory of bargaining under the threat of arbitration has been the 
benchmark for most subsequent North American theoretical and empirical work in the 
1980s and 1990s. This theory and some of the criticisms levelled at it are explained in 
section 2 alongside the relevant empirical evidence from the US and Canada. The 
debate’s main concepts and features are outlined in a non-mathematical format.
Section 3 includes an assessment of the relevance of some of the issues in the 
North American debates to the UK private sector and an analysis of data from the UK 
postal survey of new style deal plants to examine the pertinent issues. Note that some 
of the nuances in the North American debate are either irrelevant to the UK because of 
contextual differences or require very detailed data on bargaining and arbitration 
awards from a long time period to be properly tested, data which are simply not 
available for the UK. Finally, some consideration of the possible implications of the 
debate and findings for the UK public sector, with particular reference to Pay Review 
Bodies, is set out in section 4.
2. North American theory and evidence
a. Introduction
There are a range of potential comparisons that can be made between pay 
outcomes under different dispute procedure conditions. Possible permutations include 
comparisons between negotiated and arbitrated settlements under each separate dispute
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procedure, comparisons of negotiated or arbitrated settlements under different 
procedures and of negotiated settlements between the availability of each different 
procedure and a no procedure environment. So for instance negotiated settlements 
under FOA could be compared to arbitrated settlements under FOA, negotiated 
settlements under conventional procedures and negotiated settlements under no dispute 
procedure. However, no bargaining model could predict comparative expected 
outcomes under each possible scenario and it is not clear that every possible 
comparison is particularly relevant or interesting.
To date theoreticians have concentrated on two main areas. First, comparing 
negotiated and arbitrated settlements under FOA and under conventional arbitration 
respectively. The second area of interest, and possibly of more concern to policy 
makers, is the comparison of negotiated settlements under arbitration availability 
compared to non-availability, again usually assessing the two main types of arbitration 
independently. These two areas are inevitably linked but are probably best treated 
separately since most of the empirical work has concentrated on one of the two issues.
Note that as for the bulk of the North American work on dispute deterrence, the 
context of theoretical and empirical work is quite different from that in the UK. These 
differences mean that whilst the main issue at the heart of each debate is usually just 
as relevant to the UK as North America, the peripheral issues (some of which have 
been afforded more attention in empirical studies than the core questions) are of little 
significance to the UK. Important contextual differences include the publication of 
arbitration decisions in North America such that arbitrator behaviour is recorded and 
known by other parties contemplating arbitration (and therefore selection of an 
arbitrator) whereas in the UK arbitration decisions are private. There is a burgeoning 
debate in the US and Canada about how arbitrators should behave in order to 
encourage future selection1 as a consequence of the public nature of arbitration 
hearings and awards, which has little bearing on debates about arbitration in the UK. 
Therefore whilst acknowledging and commentating on some of the wider debates 
around the core issues, the emphasis within this section is to determine which of the 
main tests concerning arbitration and settlements are of interest to a study of the UK 
experience with FOA.
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b. Negotiated and arbitrated settlements under conventional and final-offer arbitration
Without doubt the most influential work on the first of these areas is that of 
Farber (1980) on FOA and on conventional arbitration with Katz (1979). Providing 
the first mathematical consideration of the impact of arbitration on pay settlements 
they radically changed the whole tenor of this debate. Consequently their analysis 
deserves detailed consideration, even though it has been criticised subsequently and 
there are also some doubts about its applicability to the UK.
Farber and Katz make certain assumptions in building their model which have 
been criticised for either being untested or unrealistic. The assumptions include: the 
arbitrator has a predetermined view of a fair award (their preferred award) in each case 
determined by the ’facts’ of the case; the parties do not know this preferred award and 
neither their actions during negotiations nor their final positions affect the arbitrator’s 
preferences; the parties have some belief about the arbitrator’s preferred award but are 
also uncertain about it and; the parties have a normal distribution of beliefs regarding 
this preferred award. In other words the parties are trying to second guess the 
arbitrator. Union and management beliefs about what an arbitrator considers an 
appropriate award are described by normal distributions centred on WM and Wm for 
union and management respectively. The variances of these distributions describe each 
side’s uncertainty about the arbitrator’s preferred award. Settlement outcomes then 
depend on the level of uncertainty and the relative risk preferences of the parties.
Farber and Katz argue that a risk-averse party will concede to a wage beyond 
the expected arbitration award (W^ and Wmc) to avoid the possibility of an 
unfavourable award from the arbitrator (see Figure 4.1a). The utility of these 
outcomes equals the expected utility of the uncertain arbitration award. If the parties’ 
expectations about what an arbitrator will award converges to a common distribution 
[f(W*)], a positive contract zone defined by W“c and W"10 is created, providing risk- 
aversion dominates (see Figure 4.1b).
This contract zone widens as the risk aversion of each side grows, if the parties 
are uncertain about what an arbitrator will do. More risk-averse parties will be willing 
to avoid arbitration more as the variance in f(W*) increases. Thus, uncertainty about 
the arbitrator’s decision and risk aversion provide an incentive for the parties to reach 
their own agreement with the most risk-averse party conceding more to avoid 
arbitration.
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This theory generates a number of predictions: if parties are equally risk-averse 
the mean of their final offers if they fail to settle should equal the expected award 
E(W*) (Farber 1981); arbitrated and negotiated settlements will be closely correlated 
because negotiated settlements will shadow arbitrated settlements rather than vice 
versa; as uncertainty increases, negotiated settlements will be biased against the more 
risk-averse party.
This analysis is extended by Farber (1980) to bargaining under FOA where he 
shows that the contract zone and the offers the parties make under FOA continue to be 
guided by risk aversion and uncertainty about what an arbitrator will do. He develops 
three key results. First, the more risk-averse party will submit a more reasonable final 
offer. Therefore disparities in win-loss rates under FOA may just reflect that one side 
is submitting more reasonable final offers than the other. This has been confirmed by 
empirical study (Ashenfelter and Bloom 1983). Second, the final offers which the 
parties present to an arbitrator will be outside the contract zone, or more extreme than 
the parties would be willing to accept to avoid arbitration. Third, the advantage of 
FOA over conventional arbitration is clouded. Although under FOA, the parties can 
influence the final award and therefore reduce the risk of an unfavourable one by 
presenting reasonable offers, an option not available under conventional arbitration, the 
incentive to bargain in both models still depends on uncertainty and risk-aversity. 
Therefore under Farber and Katz’s analysis it is not clear that FOA should be any 
better at deterring disputes than conventional arbitration.
One element of the Farber and Katz model which is rarely highlighted is the 
comparison of expected negotiated settlements under FOA and conventional arbitration. 
A principal conclusion of these analyses is that both conventional arbitration and FOA 
generate negotiated settlements that favour the less risk-averse bargainer, but that in 
FOA this bias is likely to be more severe than in conventional arbitration (Crawford 
1981). This prediction of the theory has received no empirical attention in the US or 
Canada since proper comparisons would be extremely difficult because there are no 
within jurisdiction variations in arbitration provision (Olson 1993). However, this 
particular comparison is of interest in the UK where such variation does exist and most 
settlements are negotiated rather than arbitrated (see chapter 3).
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Most of the criticisms of Farber and Katz are concerned with the assumptions 
of their model rather than any failure to predict real world outcomes. Whilst this in 
part because an economic model must not be judged solely on its predictive 
capabilities, it is also a consequence of the considerable difficulty of properly testing 
their theory’s predictions on the correct sort of data. Problems include the fact that the 
levels of uncertainty and risk-aversity cannot be measured and that arbitrator’s 
preferences are only revealed if an unrestricted conventional arbitration award is made 
so the positioning behaviour of the parties cannot be properly assessed (see Olson 
1988). Hence there has been considerably more interest in criticising and testing the 
assumptions of Farber and Katz’s model. Primary among these critiques concerns the 
assumption that an arbitrator has a predetermined preferred award such that parties’ 
final offers have no influence on his or her award. There has been an increasing 
amount of both theoretical and empirical work on testing the credibility of this 
assumption.
Bloom and Cavanagh (1987) neatly summarise the key issue as whether 
arbitrators are viewed as individuals who either impose on negotiators their 
exogenously determined preferences or seek to learn about disputants’ preferences 
from the relationship between the ’facts’ and their final positions in search of an award 
which maximises the disputants’ welfare. Bloom and Cavanagh argue that Farber and 
Katz’s assumption of the former is too restrictive and that in fact it is more likely that 
some mixture of exogenous factors and final positions determine an arbitrator’s award.
This issue has taken up a disproportionate amount of the debate on dispute 
procedures and settlement outcomes. Olson (1993) provides a thorough, up to date 
review of the debate and discusses some of the relevant studies in the area 
(Ashenfelter 1987, Bazerman and Farber 1985, Farber 1981, Gibbons 1988, Olson and 
Jarley 1991, Schwochau and Feuille 1988, Subbarao 1988). However, in an earlier 
review of the literature Olson states that:
"The empirical work that has been done tests an assumption of the 
[Farber and Katz] models ... While it is important that this assumption is 
tested, other predictions about labour and management behaviour 
implied by the models have been largely ignored." (Olson 1988: 176).
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It seems that this issue has achieved a level of false importance since it has little or no 
implication for assessing the impact of arbitration on pay settlements. Debate has 
concentrated on the process of internal decision making by disputants and arbitrators, 
rather than on the outcomes of their negotiations or decisions. The issue is even less 
significant in the UK where the relatively low use of dispute procedures means that 
examining the decision criteria of arbitrators could only be a side show to the main 
issue of the impact of dispute procedures on pay outcomes.
Crawford (1981, 1982) has suggested a number of other criticisms of the Farber 
and Katz model, however again it is not clear that all are directly relevant to the 
question of dispute procedures and pay in the UK. He stresses that there is no 
theoretical justification for the assumption that the size of the contract zone is 
positively related to the probability of reaching a negotiated settlement. Without the 
assumption of positive correlation, Crawford (1981) argues that many of the model’s 
results concerning dependence on impasse procedures vanish. Crawford also contests 
that Farber and Katz’s assumption that the parties are uncertain about the arbitrator’s 
preferences may not be realistic, especially if the negotiating parties are relatively 
experienced. When the uncertainty assumption is dropped then negotiated and 
arbitrated settlements should be identical. However, Crawford has no real world 
justification for his certainty assumption. In an industrial relations setting it seems 
more reasonable to imagine that just as an arbitrator will consider both the facts of a 
case and the parties final positions, the parties will have different degrees of 
uncertainty about the arbitrator’s decision should they fail to achieve a settlement 
through collective bargaining.
The US debate on negotiated and arbitrated settlements under different forms of 
arbitration has rather stifled on this issue of which econometric model has the most 
realistic assumptions. Empiricists have increasingly turned to the laboratory to try to 
test some of these assumptions. There seems to be a consensus that arbitrators do 
consider both the facts of a case and the parties’ final offers when making an award. 
There is also general agreement that arbitrated and negotiated settlements under both 
FOA and conventional arbitration are not significantly different (see Table 4.1 for a 
summary of the few North American studies which have examined this issue) but there 
is an ongoing debate about why this is so (Gibbons 1988, Olson and Rau 1991).
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However, there has been no proper testing of the more central issue of whether 
negotiated settlements under FOA are more biased against the most risk-averse 
bargainer than those under conventional arbitration.
b. Negotiated settlements and arbitration availability
Whether or not the provision of arbitration as the final stage of settlement for 
pay disputes affects negotiated settlements is of paramount importance to policy 
makers in both North America, the UK and elsewhere. Research on this question has 
been overwhelmingly empirical since the theory is quite straightforward. Most of the 
empirical studies summarised in Table 4.2 do not even bother to discuss the theoretical 
justification for an arbitration availability mark-up which they are testing for. An 
exception is Olson (1980) who provides a succinct summary of the reasoning behind 
that employees covered by an arbitration statute will enjoy an arbitration mark-up over 
similar but non covered employees.
Essentially impasse procedures are viewed as institutional arrangements which 
affect the relative bargaining power of the parties. A party’s bargaining power is 
defined as the cost of agreeing to an opponent’s desired contract terms relative to the 
cost of disagreeing with those terms. In the US public sector, the expected costs of 
disagreeing depend on the cost and probability of an illegal (in most jurisdictions) 
strike and the extent to which by threatening to use the dispute procedure one party 
can either impose its demands and/or force the other side to modify their position.
The prospect of legal sanctions in the event of an illegal strike shifts the union 
resistance curve to the left and therefore reduces wages relative to what they would be 
if strikes were legal. However, where strike penalties are supplemented with impasse 
procedures to resolve disputes, wages will increase if the threat of using the procedure 
causes employers to make additional concessions.
The effect of a given impasse procedure on the relative bargaining power of the 
parties depends on the extent to which that procedure increases the costs of disagreeing 
for each party. Since arbitration is binding rather than merely advisory, an employer 
will make greater concessions in order to avoid arbitration than he/she would to avoid 
a non-binding form of third-party intervention. Note that an essential component of 
this theory is that strikes are illegal. Therefore the arbitration availability pay mark-up
136
involves comparisons with a range of collective bargaining environments from no 
bargaining rights, to bargaining permitted, to duty to bargain, to non-binding impasse 
procedure provisions, all under the umbrella of no legal right to strike. This condition 
does not quite hold true for all US jurisdictions or for Canada where some public 
sector workers do have the legal right to strike. However, the main assumption of the 
theory is no such right and this condition represents a crucially important difference 
between the US and UK which needs to be considered before applying the theory to 
UK private sector bargaining. These are drawn out at the beginning of section 3, after 
a discussion of the relevant North American studies in this area.
There are two important empirical issues concerning the availability mark-up. 
First, to control for the fact that stronger unions, those with relatively more bargaining 
power anyway and therefore more likely to be able to extract higher pay, are also more 
able to lobby legislatures to enact impasse procedure and arbitration statutes. Second, 
to determine the size of the mark-up across a range of jurisdictions. There has been 
no direct comparison of the differential impact of FOA and conventional arbitration 
availability. Some studies are based on data from both FOA and conventional 
arbitration jurisdictions but these are lumped together as a single ’arbitration’ 
condition. There are also some studies just on FOA and some just on conventional 
arbitration.
Nine studies of varying quality are summarised in Table 4.2. Most of the 
studies use pay levels as the dependent variable. The actual measures used include 
minimum, average and/or maximum points for one or more of annual, monthly, weekly 
or hourly pay. Somers (1977) uses the median percentage increase on pay for different 
groups of workers for his rather superficial study of the impact of FOA. Unfortunately 
his is the only study to examine the impact of FOA specifically. Kochan and Wheeler 
(1975) construct a bargaining outcomes index of which average salary is but one 
element. Therefore although the sign of their result (strongly positive association with 
arbitration availability) is consistent with findings from other studies, the scale of the 
effect (at around 35%) cannot be directly compared.
Most of the studies are mindful of the problem of simultaneity, that arbitration 
usually goes hand in hand with a strong union/workforce therefore the latter needs to 
be controlled for before the affect of arbitration availability can be isolated. Typically
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models include controls for some or all of the following: characteristics of the city 
such as political make-up, population size and density, per capita income, the local 
unemployment rate and average private sector wages; regional dummies; time 
dummies; bargaining maturity and human capital dummies.
The overall picture provided by the range of studies is remarkably consistent 
across jurisdictions. Pay outcomes appear to range from highest to lowest by 
bargaining laws in the following ranking: compulsory arbitration or right to strike; duty 
to bargain; bargaining permitted; and no right to bargain. This is exactly what 
bargaining power theories predict. There is only one exception to this general pattern. 
Freeman and Valletta (1988) using average monthly salary data from over 11,000 US 
local government departments with at least duty to bargain laws found that arbitration 
availability was associated with significantly lower salaries than both the duty to 
bargain only and especially the right to strike. Currie and McConnell (1991) suggest 
that this seemingly aberrant result could be related to the fact that so few public sector 
workers have the right to strike in the US. Evidence from the Canadian public sector 
(Currie and McConnell 1991) where a greater proportion of contracts allow a right to 
strike (or an option to give up the right to arbitration in exchange for the right to 
strike) suggests that if anything arbitration availability provides a higher mark-up than 
the right to strike.
As might be expected the size of the arbitration/right to strike mark-up on pay 
outcomes varies across studies dependent on different specifications (dependent 
variable used, control variables, nuances in the legal technicalities). For the US 
studies (apart from Freeman and Valletta) the arbitration mark-up over a no right to 
bargain situation appears to be in the range 8-10%, and compared to bargaining rights 
only laws of about 1-5%. Currie and McConnell’s study finds much lower mark-ups 
from Canadian data of 2.4-4.1% for arbitration compared to duty to bargain or no 
bargaining rights and 1-2% for arbitration compared to provision of a right to strike.
3. Theory and UK evidence
Some of the North American theory and evidence on arbitration and pay 
outcomes is either unapplicable to the UK because of the different legal and 
institutional contexts or is inappropriate because of the considerably lower incidence of
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arbitration provisions in the UK. The relevant theory needs to be pared down to some 
basic predictions which can be tested using pay settlements data from the new style 
deals postal survey.
a. Two predictions
Two relatively simple predictions were tested on the UK data. First that in 
plants with dispute procedures, the use of procedures does not result in significantly 
different outturns than negotiated settlements. This is to test for any possible bias in 
the use of different dispute procedures. Essentially the use of dispute procedures 
should not result in particularly different settlements because the threat effect of 
arbitration (and to a lesser extent conciliation and/or mediation) will also influence 
negotiated settlements.
The second prediction is generated by an adaptation of US theory and evidence 
on pay outcomes under arbitration availability and the differential effects of FOA and 
conventional arbitration. Farber and Katz predict that FOA particular skews negotiated 
settlements against the more risk-averse party compared to settlements under 
conventional arbitration. Further, US and Canadian evidence suggests that provision of 
the right to strike results in roughly similar (or slightly lower) negotiated settlements 
for public sector workers compared to compulsory conventional arbitration. Although 
none of the agreements in our new style deals sample legally prohibit industrial action 
(Lewis 1990), there is some logic in arguing that for those with dispute procedures, 
and especially arbitration, the threat of industrial action is more remote. Assuming 
unions are more risk-averse than employers2, this might suggest a ranking of 
negotiated settlements from highest to lowest of conventional arbitration availability, 
non-arbitration procedures availability, no procedures and final-offer arbitration. Note 
though that there are some qualifications to this rather simplistic analysis which are 
discussed alongside the results.
b. The data
The data on pay outcomes is in the form of pay settlements in order to make 
direct comparisons with results from the CBI Pay Databank. The data were collected 
by means of 4 banded responses to the question ’What was the approximate % pay 
settlement for the largest bargaining group in the following years?’ for each of the five
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years (1986-1990) covered (see Appendix B, question E.l). As not all plants supplied 
(or were able to supply) the full five years data, pay settlements were recorded for 258 
bargaining rounds for the whole sample. Banding of questions was an expediency 
designed to maximise the potential response rate but this does mean that the pay 
variable is less precise than if it had been collected as the actual percentage increase.
In terms of the overall distribution of settlements over the period, there is 
movement from lower to higher band settlements from 1987 to 1990 (Figure 4.2). For 
1986 to 1988 the second pay band (5.0-7.9%) is the modal group, but for 1989 and 
1990 it is the third band (8.0-9.9%). The modal group is consistent with the mean 
national settlement in manufacturing, reported by Ingram (1991: Table 3) using CBI 
Pay Databank data, in the respective year for 1986-1988 and above it for 1989 and 
1990. Ingram presents the distribution of manufacturing settlements for 1988-9 and 
this is contrasted with the distribution of the sample settlements for the same period in 
Table 4.3.
The distribution of settlements in the new style deals sample is skewed away 
from the lowest band and towards the upper bands compared to the national 
distribution. This suggests that the new style deals have either enabled higher pay 
settlements than the average or have occurred in plants or industries with a propensity 
to pay higher than average settlements.
The nominal settlements recorded were converted into estimated real pay 
settlements by taking reasonable points within the response bands and deflating by the 
Retail Price Index. The estimation procedure is detailed in the notes to the figures and 
tables3. The distribution of estimated real pay settlements in all 258 bargaining 
rounds (with range -4.7% to 8.2%) is shown in Figure 4.3.
c. The results
The predictions outlined above are tested by means of regression analysis and 
the results are provided in Tables 4.4 to 4.6. Table 4.4 examines the impact of dispute 
procedure usage on settlements, Table 4.5 analyses settlements negotiated in plants 
with no pay disputes procedure against those negotiated under the different procedural 
alternatives and Table 4.6 examines negotiated settlements within plants with dispute 
procedures available.
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Control variables are workforce characteristics (separate dummies for majority 
male, majority manual and workplaces with over 249 employees), workplace 
characteristics (dummies for Japanese ownership, plant vintage, subsidiary or 
independent status and whether or not the EETPU has sole recognition at the plant) 
and regional, industry and year dummies.
Three individual examples of dispute procedure usage are examined in Table 
4.4 to test the proposition that arbitrated (or quasi arbitrated) settlements should not be 
significantly different from negotiated ones. First, concerning all 176 settlements 
under any form of dispute procedure there is no evidence that the 25 settlements which 
involved the use of procedures are significantly different from negotiated settlements. 
This general picture holds for each of the individual procedural alternatives.
Arbitrated settlements under FOA are not significantly different from those negotiated 
under FOA, although interestingly the result on FOA usage provides the only positive 
usage coefficient. In regressions restricted to conventional (i.e. non-FOA) procedures 
as a whole and conventional arbitration alone (not reported) the coefficients on usage 
are negative but not significant.
Therefore these data on pay settlements in new style deal plants are consistent 
with Farber and Katz’s contention that negotiated and arbitrated settlements even under 
FOA should look very similar. However, the cell sizes are probably too small to argue 
that the data provide strong support for Farber and Katz. Unfortunately it is not 
possible to discern what if any mechanism is at work, or rather to determine whether 
arbitrated are following negotiated settlements or vice versa.
Turning to the issue of dispute procedure availability and negotiated 
settlements, it does appear that the ranking of settlement outcomes broadly fits the 
prediction outlined above. Table 4.5 provides comparisons of different procedures 
against a no procedure environment. When considered independently of one another 
all procedures have a positive but insignificant coefficient (the first three columns), 
though the FOA coefficient is closest to zero. When included in the same model, 
however, although the coefficients remain non-significant, the signs on the coefficients 
fit the predicted ranking. Settlements negotiated under conventional arbitration or non­
arbitration procedures are higher and settlements under FOA are lower than the default 
category of no procedure. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any of the
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procedures on this test, but there at least is a suggestion that the prediction may be 
valid.
Table 4.6 tests what might be termed the opposite ends of this ranking. It 
compares negotiated settlements under FOA with those under other procedures, 
conventional arbitration only and non-arbitration provisions respectively. On the larger 
sample of 149 settlements (of which 77 are from FOA rounds), the coefficient is 
negative and significant. The following two tables confirm that this result is driven by 
the contrast between negotiated settlements under FOA and under conventional 
arbitration, since the coefficient on FOA remains significant when compared just to 
conventional arbitration. On average real wage settlements under FOA are 0.7 
percentage points lower than under conventional arbitration. This result is consistent 
with one prediction of Farber and Katz, that negotiated settlements under FOA are 
skewed more against the most risk-averse party than under conventional arbitration.
Various caveats must be entered as qualifications of this rather straightforward 
conclusion. First, there is some question mark over the risk preferences explanation 
for this result. Crawford (1981) argues that a considerable problem with Farber and 
Katz’s theory is that they treat risk aversity as a factor independent of bargaining 
power, whereas he argues that in fact risk preferences are one component of bargaining 
power. Therefore negotiated settlements are always skewed against the most risk 
averse bargainer irrespective of the procedural environment. This critique is especially 
pertinent when applied to the UK because of the problem of endogeneity of dispute 
procedure incidence. It may well be that in some workplaces weaker unions agree to 
FOA and also negotiate lower pay settlements, whereas unions able to extract higher 
pay settlements are also more likely to be associated with conventional arbitration 
agreements. Therefore the results on FOA compared to conventional arbitration may 
be a union bargaining power effect which is not controlled for by the other 
independent variables.
A second caveat concerns implications for a longer run analysis of dispute 
procedures and pay outcomes. If settlements under FOA continued to be between 0.5- 
1 percentage points below those under conventional arbitration over a number of 
bargaining rounds then the disparities between workplaces would become 
unsustainable. FOA might even sow the seeds of its own destruction, especially in our
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voluntary system, since union leaders would want to abandon, or at least not sign new 
FOA agreements. One possible way to rationalise this result pertains to the fact that 
most North American studies concern pay levels whereas this analysis uses pay 
changes as the dependent variable. Perhaps, the results indicate an ongoing widening 
in differentials between FOA and conventional arbitration plants which may eventually 
stabilize. Unfortunately this proposition cannot be tested with the available data since 
it contains no information on pay levels. Evidence consistent with this analysis would 
indicate that the impact of FOA on pay settlements relative to conventional arbitration 
becomes progressively non-significant over time.
Possibly the most important caveat arises from the fact that, without exception, 
all the managers of FOA plants interviewed in the case studies argued that having 
FOA had no impact on the level of pay settlements. There were two different 
explanations for this view: both sides know that management will block the use of 
arbitration for pay disputes (in cases of joint reference to arbitration) and therefore the 
threat of FOA is nullified4; and other factors within the plant or firm are more 
important determinants of pay settlements. Even though some interviewees stated that 
the threat of arbitration was always in the back of their minds when negotiating, they 
also argued that this did not affect compromising activity and therefore the final 
settlement. The issue was developed further in the interviews by explaining the 
empirical findings from the survey and the rationale based on risk aversity to gauge 
managers’ opinions.
In one case the interviewee did concede after a leading question that FOA may 
make parties more ’reasonable and rational’ in negotiations which was the nearest 
statement consistent with the economic hypothesis. The more common response was 
that other factors were still more important than FOA, including the general style of 
management promoting partnership rather than conflict and single status provisions for 
manual and non-manual employees in the collective agreement5.
Two of the interviewees offered more practical explanations: FOA plants may 
be paying the equivalent of higher pay settlements through remuneration outside the 
remit of the (usually annual) pay review, such as performance bonuses; or alternatively 
the result may be a consequence of the poor level of pay in the consumer electronics 
industry relative to the rest of manufacturing. The latter explanation seems unlikely to
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hold, however, because industry dummies were included as was a dummy for the 
male/female ratio in the workplace (one explanation for, or consequence of, the low 
pay levels and settlements in consumer electronics is the high proportion of women 
workers). Moreover FOA plants are not disproportionately associated with consumer 
electronics within the sample anyway. Forty per cent of FOA plants manufacture 
consumer electronics compared to 44 per cent of the non-FOA plants. The former 
explanation on payments above annual settlements cannot be substantiated with the 
survey data but there is no obvious reason why FOA plants in particular should be 
paying more in such bonuses. Nevertheless the fact that most managers did not 
concord with the evidence on pay settlements suggests that is should be treated with 
caution.
Finally on pay settlements note that in Tables 4.4 to 4.6 that only the sign and 
significance of the control variable coefficients are reported rather than the actual 
coefficients and standard errors themselves. This is partly to emphasise the results on 
dispute procedures but also to make clear that this is not intended to be a generally 
applicable real wage equation. For the record, pay settlements were significantly lower 
(in at least one regression) in plants established before 1980, in plants not owned by a 
Japanese parent company, where the workplace is part of a larger organisation, in 
1986, 1989 and 1990, in Yorkshire and Humberside, the south east and south west.
4. Concluding remarks
Real wage results from the UK data seem to be consistent with one strand of 
Farber and Katz’s now somewhat maligned theory about arbitration and pay 
settlements - the association between different procedural environments and negotiated 
settlements. The results are also consistent with the proposition that negotiated and 
arbitrated settlements will not be significantly different from one another. However, 
the size of the sample and therefore cell sizes in some of the regressions mean that the 
results should be treated with a degree of scepticism. Further data on pay levels rather 
than just changes in different procedural environments, possibly using the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey, would be particularly interesting to illuminate this 
evidence.
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Of special interest is the impact of different bargaining institutions on outcomes 
in the public sector because the problem of the endogeneity of dispute procedure 
incidence is somewhat lessened compared to the private sector, since dispute 
procedures are more likely to be legislated by the government than voluntarily agreed 
to by the parties. One disadvantage of examining the public sector, however, is that as 
in the US and Canada there is likely to be little or no variation in dispute procedure 
provision within jurisdictions or departments.
An interesting postscript concerns public sector Pay Review Bodies (PRBs) set 
up in the 1980s (see Beaumont 1991 for details). PRBs recommend changes in pay as 
a result of a process which involves submissions from employees, management and the 
government. Whilst there are some important definitional problems one stylised way 
of thinking about PRBs is that they represent the provision of compulsory arbitration 
in place of collective bargaining with little or no ability to strike. This analysis 
certainly seems to be true for nurses and could be stretched to include teachers even 
though they have actually taken industrial action on some occasions in the last two 
decades. The theory of and evidence on arbitration availability suggests that 
employees covered by right to arbitration statutes enjoy a pay mark-up over those in 
right to bargain and no right (or ability) to strike environments. Although the evidence 
has not been fully analysed there is some suggestion that workers covered by PRBs 
have done better in pay settlements than their non-covered public sector colleagues in 
the 1980s (Bailey 1989). If this suggestion was confirmed in a more thorough and up 
to date investigation, it would be consistent with what arbitration theory predicts and 
with the body of North American evidence on the issue.
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Footnotes
1. On issues of arbitration selection and interchangeability see Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) 
Ashenfelter, Dow and Gallagher (1986), Bloom and Cavanagh (1986, 1987), Currie (1991), 
Farber and Bazerman (1986), Olson and Jarley (1991), Treble (1985).
2. There is some evidence from the US that unions are in general more risk-averse than public 
sector managers (Ashenfelter and Bloom 1983). In the period of study (1986-1990) it seems 
reasonably safe to argue that following defeat of the Miners’ Strike in 1985, continuing anti­
collective labour laws, the re-election of a Conservative government in 1987 and continuing 
high level of unemployment, inter alia, we would expect unions to be more risk-averse than 
employers.
3. Note that alternative within range points were also used to estimate real settlements which 
were used as dependent variables in repeated versions of the pay equations. Different 
specifications of the estimated real settlements did not significantly affect the main regression 
results.
4. This was a rather unexpected explanation which effectively means that a great deal of the 
theory of arbitration and outcomes is rendered meaningless since any element of threat 
through compulsion is removed.
5. A dummy variable scoring single status arrangements was found to be highly non­
significant in wage equations, so this suggestion is not supported statistically. Unfortunately 
it is not possible to test for the effect of managerial style on pay outcomes.
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Tables and Figures
Notes
I. Estimation of mean national settlements in Fig 4.2
1. 1986-1988: For 1986, the mean annual settlement was calculated by adding 
one quarter of the 1985-86 figure, to three-quarters of the 1986-87 figure from Column
I, Table 3 in Ingram (1991). The same process was used to calculate the 1987 and 
1988 figures.
2. 1989 and 1990: The mean difference (2.04 percentage points) between the 
earnings index and the settlement index for 1986-1988, was subtracted from the 
respective earnings index for 1989 and 1990 to arrive at the estimated settlement index 
in those years. This gap between earnings and settlements may not in fact have 
remained constant over the cycle, but rather could have declined in 1989 and 1990 
because overtime and bonus payments are cut back as the economy slows down. So 
the actual mean national settlements may have been higher than the estimated figures 
given.
II. Estimation procedure for real pay settlements reported in Figure 4.3 and used as 
dependent variable in Tables 4.4 - 4.6
1. The real pay settlement figures were calculated on the basis of a crude 
distribution of nominal pay settlement points within the pay bands:
Estimation of real pay settlements
Example of calculation for 1986
Pay Band Point used RPI Deflated Pay
% % % Settlement %
0-4.9 3 5.5 -2.5
5-7.9 6.5 5.5 1
8-9.9 9 5.5 3.5
10+ 11.5 5.5 6
This is far from an ideal calculation of real pay settlements because the pay 
settlements within each pay band are not necessarily distributed evenly around the 
selected points, and moreover the distribution is likely to vary between the years.
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Figure 4.1
Arbitration availability and settlement outcomes
Figure 4.1 (a)
Farber and Katz’s model where the parties 
have differing beliefs about the award
f(W “)
or
f ( W )
w“ -Urmcrm
Figure 4.1 (b)
Farber and Katz’s model where the parties 
have identical beliefs about the award
E(w*) W*
------------------------------------------------
Positive Contract Zone
Source: Olson (1988).
Table 4.1
Studies of pay outcomes and arbitration usage
Author(s) Sample Arbitration type Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
Loewenberg (1970) 143 Penn, police & 
firef’r negs, 1968
Conventional Salary levels & changes None Levels: lowest for arb’d 
awards.
Settlements: higher 
arb’d cf. neg’d
Thompson and Caimie 
(1973)
74-84 B.C. school 
boards 1969-1973
Conventional % settlement None No sig. difference arb’d 
cf. neg’d
Somers (1977) 33 Mass. police and 
firef’r negns. 1975-76
FOA % settlement None Arb’d awards on avg. 
2% higher than neg’d.
Anderson (1979) 49 Can. federal service 
barg. units 1968-75
Conventional Salary levels & changes Macroeconomic factors 
Barg, unit charac’ics
Levels: sig. -ve arb’d 
cf. neg’d
Changes: no sig. diff.
Delaney (1983) All Iowa’s school 
boards’ negns. 1978-81
Tri-offer FOA Salary levels & changes Workforce charac’ics 
School board charac’ics
No sig. difference arb’d 
cf. neg’d
Dworkin (1986) Baseball negns. 1974- 
85, sample not specified
FOA % settlement None Higher settmts. arb’d cf. 
neg’d
Feuille and Delaney 
(1986)
900 cities’ police negns. 
1971-81
Conventional & FOA 
but no differentiation
Min. & max. salary City characteristics 
Region dummies
No sig. difference arb’d 
cf. non arb’d
Neelin (1987) 75 school boards in 
British Columbia 1961- 
1981.
Conventional Maximum real wage of 
teachers in any of 6 
grades
School characteristics 
Macroeconomic factors
Arbitration dummy not 
significant in real wage 
equation.
-p^oo
Table 4.2
Studies of pay outcomes and arbitration availability
Author(s) Sample Arbitration type & 
comparison
Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
Kochan and Wheeler 
(1975)
121 US cities’ firef’r 
negns. 1972
Compulsory arbn. cf. 
factfinding cf. no 
impasse proc. law
Bargaining outcomes 
index including wages. 
Scale: 0-119
City political charac’ics 
Bargaining maturity
Barg, outcomes c.35% 
higher under arbn. & 
factfinding than no law
Somers (1977) 33 Mass. police and 
firef’r negns. 1975-76
FOA cf. bargaining 
rights but no right to 
strike
% median settlement None Neg’d settmnts under 
FOA avg. 1% point 
higher than other gps
Olson (1980) 72 US cities, firef’r 
negns. 1972-77
Any arbn. cf. no duty to 
bargain cf. mediation cf. 
factfinding
Salary and hourly pay 
levels
City charac’ics 
Region dummies 
Time dummies
Sig. +ve assoc, between 
arbn. & pay.
Avg. c. 4% higher
Delaney (1983) 700 US public school 
teachers, national 
sample, 1979
Any arbn. cf. no arbn. Weekly salary and 
hourly pay levels
Human capital dummies 
Occupation dummies 
Union membership
Weekly pay 9% higher 
Hourly pay 10% higher
Feuille and Delaney 
(1986)
900 US cities’ police 
depts 1971-81
Conventional & FOA 
but no differentiation,
cf. no right to bargain
Min. & max. salary City charac’ics 
Region dummies
On avg. salaries c. 8% 
higher when arbn. is 
available
Neelin (1987) 3 provinces’ teacher 
avg. hourly earnings 
1972-82. BC (arbn.) cf. 
Ont. & Alb. (no arbn.)
Conventional cf. no 
arbitration
Mean hourly wage 
Ratio of top teacher 
salaries to pvte sector 
wages
None Ratio of teachers’ 
wages to pvte sector 
generally lower in BC 
than in Ont. or Alb.
VO
Table 4.2 continued
Author(s) Sample Arbitration type & Dependent variable(s) Controls Findings
comparison
Freeman and Valletta 
(1988)
Ichniowski, Freeman 
and Lauer (1989)
Currie and McConnell 
(1991)
11,396 US local govt 
dpts\ with duty to 
bargain laws 1977-1980
200 police depts. 1965 
800 police depts. 1978
3985 Canadian govt, 
contracts, 1964-1987
Any arbn. cf. right to 
strike cf. only right to 
bargain
Any arbn. cf. duty to 
bargain cf. bargaining 
permitted cf. no 
bargaining law
Arbn. cf. right to strike 
cf. duty to bargain cf. 
choice of procedure cf. 
no bargaining rights
Average monthly salary
Min., max. & avg. 
salaries
Average real wage over 
life of contract
City charac’ics 
Region dummies 
Department dummies 
Year dummies
City charac’ics 
State charac’ics
Lagged real wage 
Barg’ing unit size 
Provincial unempl.
Year, occupation & city 
dummies
Arbn. avail, coeff. sig. 
-ve especially cf. right 
to strike
Arbn. avail, increases 
salaries by c. 5% cf. 
duty to bargain, c. 10% 
cf. no bargaining law
Arbn. law increases 
wages by c. 1-2% over 
right to strike, & 2.4- 
4.1% over duty to 
bargain & no law
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Table 4.3
Comparison of national manufacturing and sample pay settlements, 1988-9
Settlement range
%
National settlements1
%
Sample settlements2
%
0-4.9 13.5 3.2
5-7.9 63.4 62.4
8-9.9 17.9 29.3
10+ 5.3 5.2
Notes:
1. Estimated from Ingram (1991), Figure 2.
2. Estimated as 75% of 1988 figure plus 25% of 1989 figure.
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Figure 4.2 
Annual pay settlements in the sample
90
80
70
60
50
40
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0
1 2  3 4  1 2  3 4 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
Nominal pay bands
Notes and sources:
Pay bands: 1 = 0.0-4.9%
2 = 5.0-7.9%
3 = 8.0-9.9%
4 = 10.0+%
Comparatives
Year RPI
1986 55%
1987 3.9%
1988 3.3%
1989 15%
1990 7.7%
Mean national 
settlements:
5.34%
5.8%
7.05%
7.06%*
7.66%*
* Estimated: see Note I.
Sources: LSE New Style Deals Survey 1991
Economic Trends, Annual Supplement 1991. 
Ingram (1991): Table 3.
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Figure 4.3
Distribution of estimated real pay settlements
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-4.7 - 2.5 - 1.2 -1 - 0.9 - 0.3 1 1.3 1.5 2.6 3.2 3.5 3.8 4  5.1 5.7 6 8.2
Real pay settlement
Note: See note II for specification of estimation procedure
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Table 4.4
Disputes procedure usage and pay settlements
All procedures Final-offer
arbitration
only
Conventional 
procedures only
Number of bargaining rounds 
(observations)
176 92 86
Mean real wage increase (% p.a.) 1.76 1.56 1.98
S.D. 2.08 2.12 2.11
Use of dispute procedure
Fraction using procedure 0.14 0.13 0.15
Coefficient -0.264 0.089 -0.886
S.E. (0.412) (0.565) (0.583)
Control variables
Manual: 50%+ 0 0 -ve *
Male: 50%+ 0 0 0
Plant established pre 1980 -ve * _Y0 % 0
Japanese owned 0
Size: 250+ employees 0 0 0
Subsidiary of larger organisation _yg jfj _Y0 -
EETPU recognized sfs 0 0
Year dummies: 1987 +ve ** +ve ***
1988 +ve +ve
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant +ve **
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.428 0.390
D.F. 18 18 16
F 6.41 4.79 4.40
SigF
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.
0.000 0.000 0.000
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Notes to Table 4.4
(i) Dependent variable is mean real wage settlement, see appendix for details of 
calculation.
(ii) OLS regressions used.
(iii) Samples used are settlements in dispute procedure rounds only (excluding 
all settlements from no procedure available rounds and involving industrial 
action). Respective samples by column are: All rounds with procedure 
available (176); FOA available rounds (92); and conventional procedures 
available rounds (86).
(iv) means variable not included in model.
(v) ’O’ means variable included but not significant.
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Table 4.5
Disputes procedure availability and negotiated pay settlements
FOA cf no 
procedure
Conventional 
arbitration cf 
no procedure
Non-arbitration 
cf no 
procedure
All procedures 
cf no procedure
Number of bargaining rounds 161 118 108 229
(observations)
Mean real wage increase (% p.a.) 1.71 2.00 1.96 1.73
S.D. 1.87 1.85 1.85 1.93
Dispute procedure
Fraction with procedure 0.49 0.36 0.30 0.65
Final-offer arbitration 0.054 - - -0.222
(0.314) (0.324)
Conventional arbitration - 0.315 - 0.305
(0.428) (0.376)
Non-arbitration only - - 0.504 0.227
(0.471) (0.391)
Control variables
Manual: 50%+ 0 0 0 +ve *
Male: 50%+ 0 0 0 0
Plant established pre 1980 _ y g  * * * 0 0 0
Japanese owned 0 0 0 +ve **
Size: 250+ employees 0 0 0 0
Subsidiary of larger organisation _ y g  * * * 0 _ y g  * * *
EETPU recognized 0 0 0 0
Year dummies: 1987 - | _ y g  * * * +ve ** - J - y g  *** _ j . y g  ***
1988 + y g  *** _ j . y g  *** _ J _ y g  *** _ j . y g  ***
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant _ f . y g  * * * +ve ** 0 _ |_ y g  * * *
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.357 0.324 0.326
D.F. 18 17 18 20
F 6.710 4.820 3.850 6.520
Sig F 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.
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Notes to Table 4.5
(i) Dependent variable is mean real wage settlement, see appendix for details of 
calculation.
(ii) OLS regressions used.
(iii) Samples used are negotiated settlements only (excluding all settlements 
involving industrial action and/or third party intervention). Respective samples 
by column are: FOA and no procedure rounds (161); Conventional arbitration 
and no procedure rounds (118); non-arbitration procedures and no procedure 
rounds (108); and all negotiated settlements (229).
(iv) means not included in model.
(v) ’0’ means variable included but not significant.
158
Table 4.6
Disputes procedure availability and negotiated pay settlements: 
Comparisons between the different procedures
FOA cf all 
other
procedures
FOA cf
conventional
arbitration
FOA cf non­
arbitration
Number of bargaining rounds 
(observations)
149 121 109
Mean real wage increase (% p.a.) 1.82 1.79 1.73
S.D. 1.98 2.00 2.02
Final-offer arbitration
Fraction with FOA 0.52 0.64 0.71
Coefficient -0.750 -0.724 -0.645
S.E. (0.318) ** (0.339) ** (0.512)
Control variables
Manual: 50%+ -ve * 0 -ve *
Male: 50%+ 0 0 0
Plant established pre 1980 _ y g  * * * -ve *
Japanese owned +ve ** 0 0
Size: 250+ employees 0 0 0
Subsidiary of larger organisation 0 . y 0 0
EETPU recognized 0 0 0
Year dummies: 1987 _|_yg *** +ve **
1988 +ve ,^ y 0
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant _ |.y0 +ve ** +ve **
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.408 0.356
D.F. 18 18 18
F 5.42 5.60 4.32
SigF 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.
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Notes to Table 4.6
(i) Dependent variable is mean real wage settlement, see appendix for details of 
calculation.
(ii) OLS regressions used.
(iii) Samples used are negotiated settlements under dispute procedure 
availability (excluding all settlements under no procedure and those involving 
industrial action or third party intervention). Respective samples by column 
are: All dispute procedure rounds (149); arbitration only rounds (121); FOA 
and non-arbitration procedure rounds (109).
(iv) ’O’ means variable included but not significant.
Chapter 5
Final-offer arbitration in action
160
1. Introduction
In North America debate about the merits of FOA has been largely conducted 
in the realms of labour economics and game theory. The criteria for discerning good 
or bad effects in these disciplines are based on utility maximising game players and 
economically efficient substantive outcomes such as dispute rates, the incidence of 
industrial action and pay settlements. However, in the early days of FOA usage in the 
US public sector (i.e. the 1970s) there were some dissenters from this approach who 
emphasised, for lack of a better term, the ’practicalities of FOA’. They had one 
central critique of FOA (from which other criticisms also grew); that FOA had a fine 
theoretical basis as a deterrent but was likely to produce unworkable awards if ever 
invoked. Debate then blossomed around which was most desirable, a procedure which 
encouraged negotiated settlements or one which produced workable awards if invoked.
Their concerns were rather superseded in the 1980s and 1990s by theoretical, 
empirical and experimental emphasis on substantive outcomes under different 
collective bargaining laws (see chapters 3 and 4). Interestingly though the UK studies 
of FOA in the 1980s fit much more easily with some of these early US writings on 
FOA than with the contemporary North American literature. With a few exceptions - 
theoretical papers (Meade 1982, Minford and Peel 1983) and Treble’s work on FOA at 
the turn of the century (Treble 1986, 1990) - all the UK literature on FOA concentrates 
on a few cases of FOA usage in the mid 1980s. Another similarity with some of the 
early US work is that most of these UK studies are written by current or one time 
arbitrators.
Reasons for the concentration on practical issues in the UK include: the lack of 
sufficient empirical evidence until the late 1980s/early 1990s to test for FOA 
effectiveness; the comparative advantage of some previous commentators in knowledge 
of procedural and legal issues associated with arbitration (labour lawyers and/or 
arbitrators); and an awareness of the context of FOA in the new style deals. This 
chapter dissects the issue of FOA in action examining the elements of the US debate 
(section 2), previous studies of FOA usage in the UK (section 3), and using more
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evidence from the interviews at the eight FOA plants described in chapter one (section 
4). Section 5 provides some conclusions on issues of FOA in action.
Note that this concern for practicalities is only in part a product of the 
established distinction in industrial relations between procedure and substance. 
Although procedural issues, such as how arbitration hearings are initiated and 
conducted, are one element, there are also substantive considerations with for instance 
the impact of FOA usage on the level of trust in the continuing bargaining relationship 
and the occurrence of ’zingers’ in final bargaining positions. Hence the catch-all 
description of emphasis on the practicalities of FOA. This is quite a diverse chapter 
and is not prima facie as coherent as previous chapters, but this reflects the disparate 
issues emphasised by commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. Overall it provides 
insights into the impact of FOA on the more qualitative aspects of industrial relations.
Information from the eight interviews provides a new perspective on this debate 
in four ways: cases of FOA usage in the UK not previously analysed are documented; 
the use of questions covering areas not previously considered; attitudinal information 
from negotiators is assessed rather than just arbitrator attitudes as in previous UK 
studies; and the benefits of hindsight are apparent, which might be particularly useful 
for assessing the workability of awards.
2. The US debate
a. Introduction
North American commentators emphasising problems over the practicalities of 
FOA usage tackled the issue from a number of different angles. First, some tried to 
establish a full set of criteria on which to judge an impasse procedure - with particular 
reference to public sector negotiations. Some highlighted the pros and cons of FOA 
and made a judgement about which outweighed the other. Finally, the remainder both 
pointed out the problems of FOA and proposed alternative impasse procedures which 
were designed to out perform basic FOA. A number of these proposals involve 
modifications to basic FOA to reduce the likelihood of an unworkable award, and 
some consist of modified versions of conventional arbitration to prevent chilling 
without the spin-off of unworkable awards.
What is perhaps surprising about much of the US debate is that it was 
conducted in mainly abstract terms, i.e. without reference to evidence on either
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whether or not FOA actually increased the probability of negotiated settlements or 
whether or not arbitration awards under FOA were particularly unworkable in the eyes 
of the parties involved. Although some of the writers (given their positions as 
arbitrators) had experience of arbitration hearings, they rarely cited concrete examples 
of FOA usage to back up their arguments. At least the UK literature on this subject is 
based on case studies of FOA usage (albeit limited numbers) rather than the mere 
ruminations of arbitrators and industrial relations academics about the consequences of 
FOA usage.
b. Criteria for assessing impasse procedures
A basic starting point for some US writers in the 1970s was to establish wider 
criteria on which to judge impasse procedure effectiveness. So although all admitted 
that a key criterion was whether or not the procedure actually promoted collective 
bargaining and therefore negotiated settlements. Some also prefigured the work of 
Farber and colleagues by arguing that an impasse procedure should not bias negotiated 
settlements away from what they would have been without the procedure. The main 
extra criterion which some of these writers debated was the importance of workable 
awards should an impasse procedure be used. There are two dimensions to the 
workability criterion: arbitration award acceptance; and the consequences of inequitable 
awards which are implemented but subsequently cause procedural or substantive 
problems.
Donn (1977) and Feuille (1977b) emphasised these two dimensions. Donn 
argued that any arbitration system should produce acceptable awards in order to 
maintain credibility with the negotiating parties. All forms of arbitration face the same 
fundamental problem that:
"since the parties have the award imposed upon them rather than having 
agreed to it ’voluntarily’, they will feel less responsibility for making 
such an award work than they would a collective bargaining agreement."
(Donn 1977: 307).
Feuille described a "compliance effectiveness" criterion and hence extended the 
concept to encompass the extent to which the parties comply with both an arbitration 
process and its outcomes especially in negotiations subsequent to an arbitration award. 
He also described more fully how such a criterion could be measured:
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"... by the proportion of negotiations which involve refusals to 
participate in the process, refusals to implement awards, court appeals of 
awards, and post-award stoppages, with the smaller the proportion of 
these kinds of behaviour the more effective the process." (Feuille 1977b:
205).
Most of the other relevant writers based their arguments on the two main criteria - 
incentive to negotiate and compliance effectiveness - but did not always spell out from 
the start what their criteria for judging arbitration procedures were. Donn (1981) 
neatly encapsulated the paradigm that policy makers were interested in both increasing 
the risk of impasse procedure usage to encourage bargaining and simultaneously 
decreasing the risks to avoid unworkable awards.
Another criterion for assessing arbitration systems is more concerned with the 
particular context of public sector arbitration and therefore is less relevant to 
consideration of FOA versus conventional arbitration in the UK private sector. Horton 
(1975) and Sulzner (1977) emphasised the political nature of arbitration and argued 
that arbitrators must be charged with considering the public interest when making 
awards. The former of these argues that since arbitration places the final decision 
making authority in the hands of ’persons not accountable to the public, interest 
arbitration weakens political democracy,’ (Horton 1975: 499). The problem of 
arbitrator public accountability is probably the main reason why the UK government 
has generally opposed extending the availability of traditional forms of arbitration for 
public sector employees, but instead has preferred non-binding arbitration in the form 
of Pay Review Bodies.
None of the US authors who either explicitly or implicitly assessed FOA and 
conventional arbitration in the 1970s suggested what weighting should be attached to 
each of the criteria. Although in most circumstances the implied weighting becomes 
apparent in the emphasis and conclusions of the particular writer. Feuille (1975) 
stated, correctly, that decisions of policy makers concerning the form of arbitration 
used will depend mainly on the priorities they attach to various outcomes. Those 
concerned to encourage negotiations will probably make a different choice to those 
fearful about award compliance or political effectiveness. The normative conclusions 
reached about FOA by the various authors were informed by their preconceived
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notions of which is the most important criterion - best dispute deterrent or best dispute 
resolution mecahnism.
c. Problems with FOA
Most of the authors assumed that on the first criterion mentioned above, 
providing an incentive to negotiate, FOA would out perform conventional arbitration as 
Stevens (1966) suggested. Some did note that this was as yet unproven in practice 
(Feigenbaum 1975, Wheeler 1977) but most were content with the assumption of 
greater deterrence. The main problem of FOA was cited by all the relevant 1970s 
authors as one of unworkable awards. Feigenbaum was the most sceptical of these 
writers in arguing that the ’basic flaw’ in the final offer system was the:
"... one-sided arbitration award that can be expected to be less equitable 
and less responsive to the needs of the parties than could have been 
fashioned by the arbitrator." (Feigenbaum 1975: 312).
A central part of Feigenbaum’s and other’s argument concerns the role of arbitrator 
discretion which is paramount in conventional arbitration and by design heavily 
circumscribed in FOA. They believed that under conventional arbitration an arbitrator 
crafts a settlement which is Pareto-optimal in satisficing both parties as much as 
possible, whereas under FOA this satisficing option is unavailable.
The views of arbitrators is most apparent in a paper by Witney (1973), an 
arbitration panel member in Indianapolis, in which he described the arbitration process 
(FOA) on a dispute over a new contract for public works employees. Although the 
arbitration board selected the employer’s offer as the most reasonable of the two, it 
also argued that the final offer selection mechanism produced an award which did not 
meet the tests of equity or desirability. As the Board stated in its judgement:
"It is apparent that a broader grant of authority within which the Board 
could function and exercise its judgement would present a more 
workable procedure and provide a more practical resolution of an 
impasse of this character." (quoted in Witney 1973: 23)
Witney reinforces this conclusion:
"Irrespective of the possible effect that final-offer selection may have in 
promoting agreement, proponents of this system of arbitration fail to
165
take into account properly the cost that may have to be paid in the loss 
of flexibility and the increasing likelihood that the quality of the 
decision may be inferior." (Witney 1973: 25)
This arbitrator’s view on FOA was backed up by other arbitrators who complained that 
FOA meant that they could no longer fashion satisfactory awards, according to 
Wheeler (1977) and Long and Feuille (1974).
The suggestion that FOA produces unworkable awards rests on the notion that 
final offers, should impasse be reached, are likely to be inequitable. Grodin (1972) 
and Nelson (1975) argued that inequitable final offers are more likely in multi-issue 
disputes since the parties can fashion a very reasonable package which includes one 
more outlandish point (also known as a ’zinger’) which would never be awarded in 
conventional arbitration but would have to be included if the arbitrator found in favour 
of that side’s package. This problem is apparent in a rare citation of a negotiator’s 
perspective on FOA:
"... final offer by package would allow us to make inroads upon 
management rights. By making our economic package ’irresistible’ we 
could slip in a clause reducing management’s rights which we could 
never attain in negotiations or conventional arbitration." (quoted in Donn 
1977).
Grodin (1972) suggested that the above possibility was particularly likely in public 
sector disputes where FOA might ’fall victim to ideologically motivated proposals’.
As a counterweight to this suggestion, Feuille (1977a) argued that the although 
the supposed benefit of FOA in promoting agreements had not been empirically 
proven, Feigenbaum’s basic flaw of unworkable awards stood similarly without 
empirical support. He contested that it was not sufficient to simply provide comments 
from arbitrators concerning problems with FOA in order to conclude that 
unworkability was a major problem. What the debate definitely lacked was a more 
thorough investigation of the consequences of FOA awards and the attitudes of 
arbitrating parties towards the process.
A final problem attributed to FOA by Rehmus (1974) was the difficulty of 
determining what constitutes a final-offer. This problem arose because whereas some 
US States allow negotiations to continue during the arbitration process, in the belief
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that a negotiated settlement is always better than an arbitrated one, whenever it comes, 
others stipulate that positions cannot be altered in the course of the hearing.
Concerning the latter cases, Rehmus argued:
’’Those who refuse to permit such changed offers seem to be taking a 
draconian view of final-offer arbitration, insisting that it should be as 
unpalatable to the parties as possible. This may be what proponents of 
final offer intended, but I cannot believe it is good for the bargaining 
relationship or fair to the employees and governmental unit." (Rehmus 
1974: 44)
The assessments of the pros and cons of FOA by these various authors resulted in 
three main camps: those who felt effective resolution was more important than 
deterrence and therefore preferred conventional arbitration to FOA; those who felt vice
versa; and those who argued that an alternative arbitration system should be used
which could provide the positive benefits of both deterrence and effective resolution if 
invoked. Their proposals are summarised in the next section.
d. Proposed alternatives to FOA and conventional arbitration
Out of the above debate came a myriad of proposals to replace basic arbitration 
with a procedure which would both promote agreements and provide acceptable 
awards if invoked. Some of the procedures advocated have been used in practice but 
others remain on the drawing board. Donn (1981) describes the range of suggestions 
in rather knockabout fashion:
"If some of the procedures in use seem rather unorthodox fellows, some 
of the ones which are not in use are even wilder and crazier guys."
(Donn 1981: 462).
Of the proposed alternatives actually in use, issue by issue FOA - designed to prevent 
the problem of zingers in package FOA - has been noticeably unsuccessful in 
promoting agreements as documented in chapter 3. In fact even the proponents of 
issue by issue FOA concede that it is likely to produce the same potential chilling 
effect of conventional arbitration since the parties will expect to win on at least some 
of the issues. Other proposals have slightly more subtlety than simply replacing 
package FOA with issue by issue FOA.
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Restricted mediation-arbitration: Feuille (1977b) proposed a particularly 
modified version of FOA which permits mediation before arbitration for parties who 
wish to have it. A restrictive stipulation is that should mediation fail to provide a 
solution, the parties must submit their pre-mediation final positions to arbitration. A 
single third party should act as both mediator and arbitrator. Feuille argued that this 
procedure would increase the proportion of negotiated agreements (although it is not 
clear what his comparator was) because of increases in costs of remaining in 
disagreement and ’from the mediator’s increased ability to induce concessions from 
each side’. His argument rested, though, on the curious notion that a mediated 
settlement can be classed as a negotiated settlement. It seems more likely that this 
procedure would induce pre-mediation chilling but would probably improve the 
chances of a mediated settlement compared to a procedure involving ordinary 
mediation-arbitration (i.e. where an arbitrator chooses between the final positions after 
mediation).
Repeated-offer selection: This is one of three modifications to basic FOA 
suggested by Donn (1977). Repeated-offer FOA is designed to counter the problem of 
inequitable final offers either one of which would be unworkable. The key featureis 
that if an arbitrator feels that both final offers are unacceptable, he or she could refuse 
to arbitrate and instead compel the parties to come back with two new offers. Donn 
believed that each party would then make further concessions based on the knowledge 
that their offer had been rejected. ’Thus the arbitrator is manipulating the parties’ 
subjective perceptions of the probabilities that their own offer will be chosen.’ (Donn 
1977: 311) Donn correctly states that the arbitrator should not tell the parties why 
their offers are deficient since this would mean the arbitrator would be effectively 
writing the agreement. Having said this Donn rather strangely suggests that the 
arbitrator could (as an experiment) tell the parties which of their offers he would have 
chosen if compelled to do so. This experiment would surely have the same 
implication as the former suggestion which he himself rules out.
Repeated-offer FOA would soon come up against the problem of chilling, one 
would imagine, since the parties would have little incentive to negotiate an agreement 
prior to the first hearing - unless they felt that there was a strong probability that the 
arbitrator would chose to arbitrate at the first opportunity. Given the opinions of most
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arbitrators about FOA restricting their discretion it would seem quite likely that over 
time they would increasingly reject the first set of ’final’ positions. Donn himself 
acknowledges this potential difficulty and correctly states that this type of FOA would 
only encourage negotiated settlements if arbitrators very rarely rejected the first set of 
final offers.
Donn’s second suggestion is modified FOA in which an arbitrator could reject 
both final offers if thought unacceptable and instead fashion his or her own award. A 
binding condition is that the resultant award must be accepted by both parties. If 
either or both refuse to accept the award, the arbitrator would be forced to make a 
straight choice between the original final offers. Again this is a type of arbitration 
designed to allay arbitrators’ concerns about unacceptable offers.
In the event that the arbitrator decided to write his or her own award, they 
would surely have to produce a ’split the difference’ award to maximise the chances 
that both parties would accept it. In fact there has been a case of quasi-modified FOA 
in the UK in the Iveco Ford case (explained in section 3) where the arbitrator selected 
the company’s final offer but stated in his award that he would have preferred to make 
a compromise award which he also detailed. The company subsequently implemented 
this compromise award even though it was under no obligation to do so. The 
personnel manager at Iveco Ford claimed that with hindsight the action of the 
arbitrator undermined the company’s trust in FOA and arbitration in general. If such 
action by the arbitrator was ’legalised’ as in modified FOA, this effect could be more 
widespread.
Donn’s preferred version of FOA was multiple-offer selection which again is 
designed to deal with the problem of arriving at Pareto-optimal awards. In the event 
that arbitration is reached the parties submit multiple final offers. Although the 
number could be many more, Donn describes a system involving three final offers per 
side. The arbitrator would then choose one of the six offers but would only announce 
which party’s final offer he had selected. The losing party then chooses which one of 
the winner’s three offers. This then becomes the award. In terms of economic theory 
each party would be specifying three different points on its indifference curve instead 
of only one as in basic FOA. Each party should therefore be indifferent between their 
three offers but is likely to prefer one of the other party’s positions to the other two.
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Therefore this technique may permit one side to be made better off at no loss of 
welfare to the other.
Although this version of FOA is theoretically appealing, there must be a strong 
suspicion that in practice it would not act as a spur to negotiated settlements. Parties, 
especially in the first few rounds of bargaining under the procedure, would probably 
want to play the game that this arbitration system encourages. A form of multiple- 
offer selection operated in the city of Eugene, Oregon in the 1970s where parties were 
allowed to submit two final offers rather than one. Long and Feuille (1974) document 
the first two years of bargaining under the procedure. Although the number of 
arbitration awards was not excessive, a very high proportion of (the admittedly small 
number of) negotiations reached impasse (five out of six). It seems that parties were 
enticed to reach arbitration, ascertain some information about the arbitrator’s 
preferences in the arbitration hearing but then negotiate their own settlement without 
waiting for an arbitration award. Clearly any deterrent power of FOA is decreased by 
allowing multiple offers.
Wheeler (1977) looked to the British Whitley Council system and to legal 
litigation to provide another variety of arbitration - closed-offer arbitration. The 
main element in closed-offer arbitration is that in the event of arbitration the parties 
final offers need not necessarily be related to their pre-arbitration negotiations. 
Regardless of offers made in negotiations, the parties can enter the arbitration hearing 
with any offer they wish. This is akin to legal litigation where pre-trial negotiations 
are usually inadmissible as evidence should the case reach court. This should in 
theory allow free negotiations and remove the chilling effect of conventional 
arbitration. The arbitrator or judge then can enjoy the compromise option without 
prejudicing pre-hearing negotiations.
Wheeler himself pointed out two problems of closed-offer arbitration: 
confidentiality; and extreme offers. The confidentiality of pre-arbitration negotiations 
must be assured for this type of arbitration to properly function. This may be difficult 
for two reasons. First, particularly for public sector negotiations, it is quite likely that 
the parties positions will be revealed during negotiations because of union consultation 
with members over offers (both their own offers and the employer’s) and/or because of 
canvassing for wider public support for each side’s position through the media. The
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confidentiality problem may be particularly acute if the arbitration panel is tri-partite 
since the union and employer representatives are likely to be fully informed about pre­
arbitration negotiations. Even if the confidentiality problem is overcome, this type of 
arbitration may still provide a further difficulty in the form of extreme offers at 
arbitration. Although Wheeler does not make much of this problem, there is a 
considerable moral hazard predicament here. If a hearing takes place, not only do the 
parties have an incentive to present extreme offers, they are also likely to seek to 
restrict information provided for the arbitrator probably through the use of skilled 
advocates as in the legal system. Moreover, Wheeler fails to acknowledge that the 
main reason for extensive use of negotiations before legal trials is the excessive direct 
cost of litigation which is not such an issue in arbitration.
Finally, Donn and Hirsch (1983) proposed cost-formula arbitration as means 
of making arbitration costly but still permitting an arbitrator some discretion in writing 
an award. The notion underlying their proposal is that the imposition of substantial 
direct costs in the use of arbitration should increase the contract zone of negotiatable 
outcomes. Arbitration costs are usually flat rate whoever the parties and whatever the 
dispute. This means that larger bargaining units will find arbitration relatively cheaper 
than smaller units and will therefore have less disincentive to use arbitration.
Secondly, the costs of arbitration provide no incentive to reasonableness once the 
parties decide that their problems are so intractable that arbitration has to be used.
Donn and Hirsch argued that if conventional arbitration costs were geared to be 
a function of the size of the bargaining unit and the magnitude of the difference in 
final positions submitted to arbitration, then conventional arbitration could deter 
disputes just as effectively as basic FOA. Without going into the details of their 
proposal it is clear that establishing such a system would be quite difficult - setting an 
arbitration tax rate, determining what to do about non-monetary items in a package etc. 
Again this proposal appears to provide for a rather complex game which over time is 
likely to become unacceptable to bargaining parties. The workability problem is 
heightened for public sector negotiations as successive legislatures would wish to 
amend details of the system if they felt that outcomes were unacceptable, say by 
redistributing the cost sharing to favour particular sides.
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Although many of the above suggestions are theoretically interesting and could 
be explored by chapter three’s experimenters for years to come, there must be some 
concern about the practicality of most of them. Either they will create their own 
chilling effect or the parties will be encouraged to play a game which is much more 
complex than ones currently played under more simple arbitration systems. Moreover 
the proposals appear to show far too much deference to the worries of arbitrators when 
ultimately the concern should really be to satisfy the public and parties’ interests in 
terms of few disputes and non-biased outcomes. The inconclusiveness of the debate 
around what is the most appropriate system of arbitration to both deter its own use, 
create workable awards and keep arbitrators happy must explain why more recent 
North American authors on arbitration have concentrated on measuring the effects of 
actual arbitration mechanisms rather than on speculating about the possible effects of 
other systems.
3. Previous UK studies
a. Introduction
Concern with the practicalities of usage dominates the small existing FOA 
literature in the UK. However, despite the paucity of studies, they are in some ways 
more revealing than the more numerous body of US studies of this ilk since they are 
all based on examination of actual cases of FOA in action. Although we may worry 
about drawing too many conclusions from a few case studies, since there are a host of 
conventionally arbitrated disputes which have not been recorded for comparison and 
these few FOA cases may not be representative of FOA cases generally, they at least 
provide interesting examples of the problems of FOA in action. Potted histories of the 
five well documented cases of FOA usage previously examined are probably the most 
sensible way of highlighting the problems of FOA in action that other authors have 
identified. Other cases have been referred to in the literature (for the most up to date 
list prior to this study, see Lewis 1990: Table 1, page 43), but the full details of those 
are not so readily available as for the five discussed below. Various themes are drawn 
out before analysis of further evidence from the interviews at FOA usage (or near 
usage) plants in section 4.
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b. Five cases of FOA in action 
Cadbury (Chirk) 1984
The first documented use of FOA in the 1980s was at Cadbury’s Chirk plant 
where an FOA dispute procedure had been agreed to in 1982 (see Appendix C for 
details of the dispute procedure). This was quite a straightforward case yet it still 
highlighted arbitrators’ concerns about their discretion in even simple disputes, let 
alone the more complicated multi-issue disputes. In March 1984, a stalemate was 
reached during pay negotiations for a new contract to run from 25 March 1984 to 
March 1985. The company was offering 4 per cent and the union claiming 5.5 per 
cent. Negotiations proceeded through the disputes procedure although bypassing the 
conciliation stage, which illustrates the flexibility of most UK disputes procedures and 
perhaps poses a question about the usefulness of conciliation once an impasse is 
reached. However, no agreement was reached and the parties opted for FOA, choosing 
Mr F Burchill as the arbitrator under the auspices of AC AS. The hearing took place 
on 22 June 1984.
Burchill has not subsequently published a study of this path breaking case 
unlike some other arbitrators, but part of his award is recorded in the IDS report on 
the case (IDS 1988: 15). The award was made in July 1984. Burchill first 
commented that because of the nature of FOA one side was certain to be disappointed 
by the decision. Perhaps more interesting is that he also stated that "the terms of 
reference in this case are such that the positions of the parties are much closer than I 
have previously experienced". However, although he intimates that he would have like 
to further comments to the award, the dispute procedure at Cadbury specifically 
prohibits further recommendations or observations (see Appendix C). After going 
through the various arguments used, he said of the company’s offer:
"I do believe that in all circumstances it is reasonable. It does exceed the RPI; 
it matches offers across units and it fits into the range of current ’going rates’ 
of increase. ... My decision is, taking into account all the circumstances, that 
the company’s offer of 4 per cen t... be accepted rather than the trade union 
claim of 5.5 per cent."
Despite the simplicity of the case before him and the proximity of the final bids, the 
arbitrator still complained about the restriction of his ability to formulate an award to
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satisfy both parties. The tendency for arbitrators to be the main opponents of FOA 
was even more apparent in later cases of FOA usage.
Sanyo (Lowestoft) 1985
The new style deal at Sanyo in Lowestoft is probably one of the best known of 
such deals in the UK. The 1985 dispute at the plant is also the most oft cited case of 
the problems that FOA can provide when used. This is despite the fact that FOA was 
not actually used in the 1985 dispute but rather problems with FOA were instrumental 
in the mediated settlement there. Although the details of the case have been well 
worked over (Kessler 1987, Gennard 1988, IDS 1988, Lewis 1990) they are worth 
repeating since they illuminate some of the problems of FOA identified by US writers 
in the 1970s.
Contract negotiations for the 1984/85 round failed to reach a settlement at the 
final JNC (Joint Negotiating Committee) meeting on 13 December 1984. By then the 
union’s final claim was for:
1. A three-year agreement whereby Sanyo’s pay and conditions would be 
increased to the industry average in steps of 30, 50 and 20 per cent.
2. Five weeks’ holiday.
3. 39-hour week.
And the employer’s final offer stood at:
1. All job salaries would be increased by 6 per cent from 1 December 1984.
2. Holiday entitlement would be increased by one day to 23 days a year.
3. The company would look positively on the introduction of a pension scheme.
4. A bonus of three weeks’ pay would be paid pro rata to service in the last 12 
months.
5. Other pre-review salary adjustments announced would be implemented 
subject to some detailed amendments and had been costed outside of the 
review.
The company’s offer was rejected in a subsequent ballot of the workforce and the 
issues referred to FOA. The terms of reference were quite unusual in themselves and 
again illustrate the flexibility of the UK system in that ad hoc use of procedures is 
commonplace. The terms were:
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"1. To attempt to resolve the disagreements between Sanyo and the 
EETPU over the review of salaries and conditions of employment due 
on 1 December 1984.
2. In the event that a mediated settlement is not possible then to 
arbitrate a settlement by deciding for the company’s case or the union’s 
case only."
Quite clearly the terms of reference allowed for mediation prior to the arbitration 
hearing even though the written disputes procedure did not mention mediation. This 
proved to be a problematic stage since the parties disagreed fundamentally about the 
purpose of mediation. The union argued that mediation should fulfil its usual function 
in the UK, i.e. a full-blown attempt to arrive at a settlement with the assistance of the 
mediator. The company, on the other hand, envisaged mediation as a means to clarify 
final negotiating positions and the terms of reference. This highlights one of the 
problems of any dispute procedure. Much depends on what parties expect from 
dispute procedures and it is important that both parties are fully informed about the 
exact specifications of each stage in a procedure. Difficulties caused by confusion are 
likely to intensify as the nature of an arbitration system becomes more complicated as 
with some of the systems envisaged by US writers described in section 2.
A second problem arose over what precisely was the union’s last claim. The 
hearing was fixed for 10 and 11 January 1984 and the arbitrator (Professor Sid Kessler 
of City University Business School) received notification of the parties’ final offers 
when he arrived in Lowestoft on 9 January. The union substantially modified its final 
claim compared to that of the last JNC meeting in December. The claim for a three- 
year agreement had been dropped and instead the following three point claim 
appeared:
1. An increase of £1.86 (8 per cent) per week on all salaries from 1 December 
1984.
2. A 39-hour working week from 1 July 1985.
3. An extra day’s holiday from January 1986 and a further day from January 
1987.
At the start of proceedings the company protested at the union’s changed claim with 
the following statement:
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"The company has examined the union’s submission and is 
deeply concerned that their claim against the company is different from 
their position when negotiations between the parties ended on 13 
December 1984.
The company believes that the integrity of pendulum arbitration 
entirely depends upon both parties declaring their final positions for 
consideration at the final negotiating discussions. Therefore, the 
company firmly believes that the last opportunity the parties had to 
modify their proposals occurred during the JNC on 13 December 1984.
The concept behind pendulum arbitration is, we believe, to make 
negotiators carefully consider the content and direction of their final 
negotiating position in the knowledge that, without agreement, those 
positions would be tested by arbitration.
Changes made at the arbitration stage are not in keeping with the 
concept behind the pendulum arbitration process."
The union claimed that their revised final offer was in the spirit of FOA in the US 
(though it is not clear on what precedent). So the arbitrator was faced with three 
potential decisions: determining which of the union’s positions should be considered its 
final offer; what function mediation was to fulfil; and if necessary the actual arbitration 
decision between the final offers.
In brief, Kessler decided to allow the union’s second claim as their final 
position and he encouraged the parties to attempt to resolve the dispute through 
’proper’ mediation. His decisions were consented to by the parties. After a mediation 
hearing, Kessler made the following recommendations:
1. A 7 per cent increase on all salaries (claim=8 per cent, offer=6 per cent).
2. Extra holiday from 1 January 1985 and second day from 1 January 1986, 
giving 24 days (claim=25 days, offer=23 days).
3. A 39-hour week from December 1985 (claim=39-hour week from 1 July 
1985, offer=status quo).
A classic case of ’splitting the difference’. After some consideration the mediated 
recommendations were accepted by both parties. This is probably not surprising since 
Kessler had fashioned the recommendation in a way which did not favour either side
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and therefore he had not indicated which side he would have favoured if forced to 
arbitrate. Kessler was obviously quite satisfied with this mediated outcome:
"A mediated settlement was therefore achieved, which I personally feel 
was a satisfactory outcome from what was a very difficult situation."
(Kessler 1987: 41)
This dispute throws up certain procedural issues associated with FOA in action, some 
of which were discussed by Kessler in his reflections on what was to be learned from 
Sanyo. He concentrates on two questions: whether or not mediation and or 
conciliation should be included in FOA systems; and whether or not ’final offer’ 
should constitute the last bargaining position (an issue raised in the US by Rehmus 
1974). On the first he concludes, perhaps unsurprisingly, that:
"... there is a strong case for a conciliation/mediation step between 
failure to agree and pendulum arbitration." (Kessler 1987: 42)
This was also the view of the EETPU post-Sanyo as explained in chapter 2 but was 
definitely not the view of Sanyo management who put the issue to a ballot of the 
workforce. As a result of that vote the Sanyo procedure now emphatically states that 
any failure to agree will be followed by FOA with no provision for mediation or 
conciliation (see Appendix C).
Kessler does not answer his second question concerning what should constitute 
the final offer but, as he argues that compromise is a good thing whenever it comes, 
he probably favours continuing negotiations and movement throughout the dispute 
procedure up to arbitration. The Sanyo 1985 dispute reveals more about FOA in 
action, however, than simply whether or not pre-arbitration procedures are valuable 
instruments and what constitutes a final offer.
The dispute raised doubts about the EETPU’s commitment to and 
understanding of FOA. Chapter 2 revealed that Roy Sanderson, architect of the new 
style deals, initially favoured ’pure FOA’ because this was the starkest dispute 
deterrent. However, when faced with the all or nothing position at Sanyo the concern 
was to avoid ignominious and possibly costly defeat at the hands of his own creation. 
Subsequently the EETPU tried to tone down their pure FOA agreements to more 
modified forms including conciliation and/or mediation. The fact that employees at 
Sanyo rejected a toned down version of their agreement in a ballot raises some 
interesting issues about FOA in action.
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There may be principal-agent problems connected to the use of FOA in 
addition to those which are highlighted in chapter 3. If a failure to agree is reached a 
union leader, anxious to impress the membership, will be keen to salvage as much as 
possible from the dispute procedure. In fact he/she may be more concerned to ’win’ in 
the dispute procedure than avoid the procedure itself. This problem will be 
compounded if full-time officers of the union do not get involved in a dispute until 
just before or even after impasse. This was certainly the case at Sanyo where 
Sanderson became part of the union team only after the breakdown of in-house 
negotiations. Obviously his main concern then was to prevent a defeat at all costs, 
even to the detriment of the integrity of the dispute procedure. Moreover in the 
aftermath of such an experience a union leader may be concerned that in order to 
prevent similar problems occurring in other organised plants the FOA procedure should 
be toned down. He or she may prefer to have more disputes but less total defeats than 
vice versa.
The Sanyo dispute indicates that to an extent there are problems of FOA usage. 
This is not surprising since it is exactly what FOA depends on to deter disputes. What 
is more interesting is how negotiators have reacted, given the potentiality of 
humiliating defeat once bargaining breaks down. The EETPU reacted in three ways: 
successfully stalled arbitration with an ad hoc mediation stage; drastically reduced their 
claim at the last possible moment; and, unsuccessfully, tried to alter the details of the 
procedure subsequent to the dispute. All three of these options were made possible 
because of the flexibility of the UK industrial relations system. A union faced with a 
similar situation in the US public sector could not have reacted in the same way, 
unless the legislated dispute procedure specifically allowed for it, which is improbable. 
They could lobby the legislature for a change in the procedure post-dispute but it is 
extremely unlikely that the workforce concerned would be allowed to vote to decide 
the issue, as at Sanyo.
Sanyo illustrates then that the problems of FOA in action may be augmented by 
the UK industrial relations system which permits great flexibility. In addition the 
actions and decisions made by the arbitrator in this dispute contributed to this 
flexibility. This may also be another reason why FOA does not generally appear to 
have been a good dispute deterrent in the UK - parties perceive that even if a failure to
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agree is reached the malleability of the system means that they can probably mitigate 
the starkness of pure FOA.
Bowman Webber 1986
The arbitration of a dispute at the Bowman Webber glass plant in Harlow, 
Essex did not raise fundamental problems of FOA in action. The only notable point 
from the dispute is that again the negotiator was unhappy with the lack of a 
compromise option available to him. The details of the dispute are contained in two 
reports, by IRRR (1986) and IDS (1988). The dispute arose over shift premiums after 
the company proposed a move to double-day shift working in October 1985. After 
some compromise during negotiations the dispute boiled down to a company final 
offer of £151.91 and a union claim for £160.31 (both pro-rata across grades). After a 
hearing in February 1986, the arbitrator, Mr John Davies, a legal advisor to the British 
Medical Association, selected the union’s final offer on the basis that the union had 
better substantiated its case on the grounds of comparability with other firms in the 
area.
Of particular interest in this context are comments made by Davies after the 
award. IDS reports that:
"... the pendulum nature of the case had presented difficulties because 
’the usual arbitrator’s refuge of compromise’ was not available." (IDS 
1988: 13).
In similar vein Industrial Relations Services report that the arbitrator told them that if 
he had had an element of discretion his award would have been a compromise 
somewhere between the company’s offer and the union’s claim. Clearly arbitrator’s 
are worried because under FOA they are inevitably the villain of the piece for one side 
whereas they are more used to playing the peacemaker. Unfortunately the reports on 
the Bowman Webber dispute do not indicate the reactions and attitudes of the parties 
towards FOA. If the experience made them negotiate more effectively in later years 
then it was probably a success. However, if it encouraged them to seek ways either to 
amend the procedure to make it more palatable if used again or to avoid the procedure 
altogether in future, then it may not have been a beneficial, cathartic process. 
Unfortunately, when approached for inclusion in the interview panel for this research,
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Bowman Webber management refused access. This might suggest that FOA usage did 
not have beneficial after effects at Bowman Webber.
Iveco Ford 1987
The interventionist role of arbitrators is again and perhaps even better 
illustrated in the dispute at Iveco Ford’s Langley plant in 1986-87 over cushioning 
payments for the cessation of shift work. This dispute has been extensively 
documented elsewhere (Davis 1989, IRRR 1987b, IDS 1988, Lewis 1990) so details of 
it will be kept brief.
Very soon after the signing of a new contract including FOA in November 
1986, a dispute arose the following month over whether or not 33 employees who 
worked in the final assembly/inspection garage should receive cushioning payments for 
the loss of shift work premia. The company offered no payments since they were not 
contractually obliged to do so. The union claimed 2 years payments to compensate the 
loss of earnings. With the new system supposed to start on 23 February 1987 A 
failure to agree was reached on 17 February. There was a very short stoppage (one 
and a half hours) by the employees concerned on the 23rd but this was ended after the 
union and company agreed to refer the matter to FOA. Before the hearing the union 
amended its final claim to 1 year’s cushioning payments but the company stuck to its 
position. Again this may illustrate the principal-agent situation within the union 
(TGWU) with the leaders anxious to ’win’ the award once arbitration was reached.
The arbitrator (Roy Lewis, then of Warwick University’s Industrial Relations 
Research Unit) found for the employer after the hearing on 30 March 1987. However, 
Lewis did not stop there. Although the terms of reference for the arbitrator clearly 
stated that a straight choice between two positions was required, in making his 
decision for the company Lewis also suggested a compromise solution in his award of 
three months’ cushioning payments. This was one step further than Kessler’s role at 
Sanyo where mediation and therefore a compromise option was agreed to by the 
parties without arbitration and certainly much more interventionist than Davies or 
Burchill who only hinted that they would have preferred a compromise option.
Lewis’s suggested compromise effectively became the non-binding arbitration award 
and subsequently was included into the terms of a new contract. Therefore he
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fundamentally undermined the whole basis of FOA as a dispute deterrent. His 
decision had long term implications for the credibility of the FOA procedure at Iveco 
Ford which may or may not have been foreseen by him (see section 4).
IBC Vehicles 1988
The final of these five cases also concerns a brownfield, multi-union site like 
Iveco Ford and also involved Roy Lewis as the arbitrator. The dispute procedure at 
IBC is unusual in two respects: it allows the parties to choose their variation of 
arbitration (conventional or FOA) once arbitration is reached; and it stipulates that any 
arbitration award will be legally binding on the parties. This is similar therefore to the 
procedure operating for police and firefighter negotiations in New Jersey State (see 
chapter 3). The particular dispute in 1988 was resolved through FOA. It arose over 
different interpretations concerning the transition from the old agreement at GM 
Vauxhall’s Luton plant and the new agreement at the joint venture with Isuzu of Japan 
on the same site. The point at issue was whether the company had to allow 
compensatory time off - lieu days - if workers were sick during holiday periods. The 
old agreement had provided for this but it was not expressly included in the new deal. 
The company interpreted the position that since the provision was not included in the 
new agreement it meant that the practice had been discarded. The union disagreed 
with this interpretation and a dispute over the interpretation ensued which was not 
settled in conciliation but instead reached arbitration. Lewis was asked to determine 
whether the company’s or the unions’ interpretation was correct
In his discussion of the case Lewis (1990: 47) points out that his first task was 
to actually clarify the unions’ position. Note that the dispute at arbitration involved 
the procedural relationship between the old agreement and the new agreement rather 
than the substantive issue of time off in lieu. The company thought that the union’s 
interpretation was that if the new agreement did not explicitly regulate a matter then 
the old agreement still applied. However, during the course of the hearing it became 
clear that the unions’ interpretation was not so strong. The unions maintained that it 
understood that any issues not expressly regulated in the new agreement:
’were in principle appropriate for negotiation ... [but] that some previous 
practices not expressly regulated by the new agreement were intended to 
be and had been discarded’. (Lewis 1990: 47)
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On the specific question of lieu day entitlement because the company had been 
inconsistent in negotiations and practice, the unions’ interpretation was that the old 
condition applied. Lewis then states:
"Having thus defined the unions’ interpretation, I found that it was 
wholly correct. It also seemed to me that an award in these terms might 
help to ensure the parties’ commitment to the deal, on which the success 
of the joint venture depended." (Lewis 1990: 47)
This case does not particularly add to knowledge about the problems of FOA in action 
apart from perhaps reiterating the point that disputes can often hinge on 
misunderstandings of an issue and that final offers may not always be clear cut. 
However, the case is fundamentally different from the other four cited since it actually 
boiled down to a rights rather than an interests dispute, although with substantive 
implications. We know that rights disputes by nature are often only resolvable by 
straight choice arbitration whether or not FOA is stipulated in the collective agreement. 
Therefore we should not be surprised that FOA functioned perfectly well for this 
dispute. The details of the dispute combined with information on other arbitrated 
disputes at IBC (from the interview) suggest that this is not a typical FOA deal 
because it effectively excludes interest disputes from being arbitrated through FOA. 
This was not discemable, however, until the interview had taken place.
c. Conclusion
It does appear from these five cases that the biggest problem with FOA in 
action is perceived and in some case fuelled by arbitrators. In none of the reports of 
these five cases are the attitudes and reactions of the bargaining parties recorded. FOA 
is not designed to provide an opportunity for arbitrators to demonstrate the skills of 
their craft and they should be aware that it is not their role. If arbitrators go around 
trying to undermine the whole basis of FOA then we should not be surprised that FOA 
may not have successfully deterred disputes in the UK thus far. Whoever had a hand 
in writing the Cadbury’s (Chirk) agreement (see Appendix C) was alive to this 
potentiality since that agreement specifically prohibits an arbitrator from making 
further observations or recommendations in addition to an award. Perhaps if the Iveco 
Ford agreement had included a similar clause management’s lasting impression of
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FOA in action might not have been so negative (see section 4). Some counterweight 
to the arbitrator-centric reports of FOA usage are clearly needed. These are provided 
by the interviews with participants in various cases of FOA in action, some from cases 
already examined by other writers but others from more recent or non-publicised cases.
4. Evidence from the interviews
Specifications of the panel of plants where interviews took place are contained 
in chapter one. Table 5.1 provides information on the basic details of their disputes. 
Three of the disputes (Sanyo’s in 1985, Iveco Ford’s in 1986-87 and EBC’s in 1988) 
have been examined quite thoroughly before and are described in the preceding 
section. Although this analysis is concerned to draw out some themes concerning 
disputes under FOA, brief descriptions of the other disputes examined are a useful 
backdrop to these themes. Of particular interest is the attitude of the negotiating 
parties (in most cases though only management’s) towards FOA and arbitrators having 
experienced the procedure and with some hindsight.
a. The disputes
ABB Capacitors (Ellesmere Port) 1989
This firm is a subsidiary of the Scandinavian giant Asea Brown Boveri and was 
formerly known as BICC Capacitors when owned by BICC. The FOA and single 
union agreement (EETPU) developed after a beauty contest organised by the Managing 
Director, Mr John Conlan, in the mid 1980s. A dispute arose in 1989 during pay 
negotiations about the management’s plan to increase skill differentials by awarding 
lower grade workers less than their higher skilled colleagues. The resultant use of 
FOA was relatively matter of fact, but even a simple case can raise issues about the 
practicalities of FOA. Parties’ preconceptions about what FOA is and how it should 
be used (as in the Sanyo dispute) had a significant bearing on the consequences of 
FOA usage here. Specifically, Conlan stated, when discussing the introduction of the 
FOA procedure, that he never envisaged that it would be used over pay since that was 
management’s prerogative. However, as the collective agreement did not exclude pay, 
this was not technically ruled out.
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During negotiations management’s position of 7.25 per cent for the lowest 
grades remained unchanged, the union’s position remained ’a substantial increase’ until 
just before arbitration. Although conciliation did take place under the auspices of 
AC AS, this resulted in no extra movement by either side. Prior to arbitration the 
union actually put a figure on its claim - 7.7 per cent - which was only a little above 
the employer’s offer. The arbitrator found for the union.
The company duly implemented the award but, aggrieved that his prerogative 
had been undermined, Conlan made two significant decisions: decreed that FOA would 
never be used on a pay dispute again; and, even though the £21,000 cost of the award 
was not excessive and could have been accomodated, fired three members of staff to 
’pay’ for the award. So although the arbitration award was financially workable, the 
industrial relations implications of the defeat were certainly not acceptable because it 
implied that management’s perception of ability to pay could be questioned. Conlan 
let it be known to the union and the employees that he "would never let a third party 
decide pay again". The wider implications of this case are assessed along with 
information from other cases below.
Anonco
Anonco is a small engineering plant now operating semi-independently from 
1988 but still a subsidiary of a large engineering corporation. Before 1988 the plant 
had no independent personnel function and there was no plant-level bargaining with 
unions. When industrial relations were decentralised in 1988 corporate personnel 
managers wrote the collective agreement for Anonco, which included single union 
recognition and FOA. Consequently when the parties first began to negotiate with one 
another they were completely inexperienced and had little idea about the function of 
FOA as a dispute deterrent.
A dispute arose over the 1989 pay settlement and although this did not quite 
reach arbitration, it still provides another vignette to add to the general picture of FOA 
in action. The personnel manager stated that there had not been much movement 
during negotiations mainly because the employee representative had set the sights of 
the workforce too high and was subsequently unable to convince them management’s 
offer would not be revised upwards. A gap of ’several per cent’ persisted when a
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failure to agree was reached. At this stage a regional official of the union became 
involved to perform what the personnel manager described as ’union conciliation’.
The official "banged the members’ heads together" to force acceptance of the 
employers offer rather than go to arbitration with such a large gap between the parties.
The dispute involved a similar role for the outside union official as that at 
Sanyo. The personnel manager believed that the employees had not really considered 
the implications of FOA defeat but that management and the trade union official were 
acutely aware of this. It was the role of the union official which prevented arbitration 
as in the Sanyo case except that in this case intervention did not involve any 
procedural skulduggery. Management’s realisation of the potentiality of FOA after this 
near miss prompted the managing director of Anonco to call a meeting with a senior 
official of the union. After this the MD spoke to the personnel manager about FOA 
and emphasised that at all costs the company must avoid the use of FOA because of 
the consequent loss of financial control to a third party. This seems to be quite a 
positive outcome for FOA: the threat of its near use strengthened its deterrent power.
IBC Vehicles (Luton) 1988, 1990 and 1991
The 1988 dispute at IBC was followed by two further collective disputes. The 
first over the shorter working week was settled in conciliation without the need for 
arbitration. The second in 1991 was over a grading dispute involving just seven 
employees. Details of these disputes are somewhat incidental since they contribute to 
the picture that the IBC agreement envisaged FOA as a means to settle rights disputes 
only. This was confirmed in the interview with the personnel manager, Mr David 
Biggs. The key element here was the process of signing the new agreement which 
was stipulated by Isuzu as a necessity for their involvement in the new venture. Biggs 
states that a major role was played by Sir Pat Lowry as chairman of negotiations and 
that the latter was particularly influential in producing the conventional or FOA choice 
for disputes. The argument offered for both types being made available was that in 
some disputes the final positions would be so far apart that it ’would be unpalatable 
for either side to lose’.
The purist would argue that it is the fear of this which FOA relies on, therefore 
the IBC procedure effectively negates that fear. Again we find that one of the main
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reasons for the undermining of pure FOA is the role of the arbitrator. Unfortunately, 
but probably for reasons of confidentiality or perhaps modesty, Lowry does not digress 
about his role in the IBC agreement in discussion of the dispute procedure (Lowry 
1990: 73), so we cannot glean his opinions at the time on FOA. However in general 
comments about FOA he states that:
"A degree of flexibility must be retained except in the most 
straightforward cases ... opposition to pendulum arbitration in the 
coalfields [at the turn of the century] came not from the negotiators but 
from the arbitrators. History seems to be repeating itself." (Lowry 1990:
77)
A second notable feature of the IBC experience is that conciliation was generally quite 
successful. Not only was the 1990 dispute regarding the shorter working week settled 
in conciliation but there was also some movement during conciliation prior to the 1991 
arbitration on grading. Moreover, Biggs was one of the few managers to state that 
conciliation was very useful and constructive even though the conciliator did not use 
the threat of FOA to cajole the parties to reach agreement This adds further to the 
impression that the IBC FOA agreement is very different from some of the others.
FOA was not really seen as a dispute deterrent rather just an alternative means to 
resolve some of the disputes which were inevitably going to surface.
IBC represents the ultimate breakdown of FOA theory in the face of traditional 
UK industrial relations flexibility. Management is content to allow FOA to be used as 
a conflict resolution mechanism for small scale disputes, but would refuse to allow 
arbitration over a pay issue. The 1990 pay negotiations illustrate this point perfectly.
A failure to agree was reached but the parties jointly agreed not to use the 
conciliation-arbitration procedure. Instead they adopted an ad hoc procedure of 
allowing the workforce to vote on the settlement with a view to taking industrial action 
if they did not accept management’s offer. Employees accepted management’s offer.
A strike therefore was avoided but the dispute procedure was inconsequential in the 
aversion of strike action. In this plant, FOA is not acting as a strike substitute because 
there are certain issues that management would prefer to take a strike over than face 
the possibility of losing at arbitration. FOA is ineffectual unless the procedure is quite 
stark, it does not allow for ad hoc procedures and has commitment from both sides as 
a dispute deterrent.
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Iveco Ford 1987
The IBC experience of and attitude towards FOA is very similar to that at 
Iveco Ford. Details of FOA in action at the plant have already been discussed. What 
was of particular interest therefore was garnering some attitudinal information from 
management concerning the use of FOA and the consequences of usage on subsequent 
years’ industrial relations. It is clear that the experience of FOA did not enthuse 
management or unions into adapting to a dispute deterrent bargaining system. Instead 
they sought to circumvent arbitration altogether and return to more traditional means of 
resolving disputes.
Going back to the actual use of FOA in 1987, the personnel manager, Mr John 
Eskdale, stated that the reason management implemented the arbitrator’s compromise 
option was that ’it felt fair’ and that, more importantly, the company had to ’pay 
something to prevent a dispute’. If the award had been strictly implemented there 
would have been industrial action, since the union leaders had staked their reputations 
on achieving some concession, and the bargaining relationship would have been 
damaged. In other words the actual award was unworkable, but Lewis’s (the 
arbitrator’s) compromise suggestion successfully prevented industrial action. This 
provides something of a counterweight to the criticism of Lewis’s actions above. It 
also suggests, however, that the parties were not prepared to live with the FOA 
procedure in the first place.
Since the use of FOA in 1987 both unions and management have indicated that 
they are not prepared to use arbitration again over a major collective issue such as a 
pay dispute. Preference for the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in 
preference for FOA was graphically illustrated in 1990 when the plant experienced a 
six week strike over the two year pay settlement which also included proposals for 
changes in working practices. In seems clear that both management and unions 
preferred to submit themselves to the whims of industrial action rather than the whim 
of an arbitrator over such an important issue. Eskdale, in summing up the company’s 
general attitude towards FOA, stated that ’it is potentially useful for non-pay issues 
and disciplinary or dismissal cases only’. There was certainly no enthusiasm for FOA 
but he also implied that FOA was never expected to fulfil an important industrial 
relations role at the plant.
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The experiences of IBC and Iveco Ford suggest that perhaps FOA is useless 
without the concomitant new industrial relations structures of single-unionism, a no 
disruption clause, single status etc. It could also be argued that what is really lacking 
in both cases was any commitment from management in a low trust industrial relations 
environment. FOA needs to be clearly established as the final and binding stage in 
negotiations, rather than being one of the options should bargaining breakdown, if it is 
to be successful. These agreements have seen FOA fail because one side can always 
block FOA use and provoke or take industrial action instead. Therefore any power 
that FOA has to encourage settlements is dissipated. FOA becomes just another 
conflict resolution mechanism rather than a conflict deterrent. It is not designed to be 
a good resolver of conflicts, hence the problems with its use.
RHM Foods 1987 and 1990
There were two disputes which involved the use of the FOA procedure at RHM 
Foods in Wythenshawe, Manchester during the period examined. One in 1987 
concerned whether or not mixers should get paid during meal breaks if their machines 
were still running. The second arose over the procedural aspects of the movement 
from hourly to monthly pay for a group of engineering employees. Both the personnel 
manager (Ms Julie Lynch) and the senior steward (Mr Graham Callton) of the GMB, 
the main union at the plant, were interviewed. The actual disputes were not 
complicated so there were no problems in determining final offers or how the 
procedure was supposed to function, but again the flexibility of dispute procedure 
usage was evident.
In the first case the union claimed an extra half an hour’s pay for the Paxo 
mixers on the grounds that their machines were still running during the break and 
therefore they might have to be called back to the machines if a problem arose. The 
company refused the claim on the grounds that the running of machines during meal 
breaks was not a new phenomenon therefore there was no reason why these workers 
should now be paid for the time. Interestingly, although the collective agreement 
provides for conciliation (see Appendix C), the parties chose to by pass that stage and 
instead take the issue straight to arbitration. Both interviewees stated that this was 
because both parties were committed to their positions such that arbitration was the
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only means of breaking the stalemate. The arbitrator found for the company at the 
hearing. Unfortunately the parties did not supply copies of the award so it is not 
possible to determine whether the arbitrator in this case complained about the lack of a 
compromise option.
Although the second arbitration award had substantive implications for one 
group of workers - previously hourly paid engineers - the actual dispute arose over one 
procedural aspect of the transition from hourly to monthly pay. Two months after the 
change in payment system, management became aware that the engineers were being 
paid more than had been budgeted for. It transpired that the wages officer and cashier 
had told the union representatives (AEU) in a meeting just involving them, that the 
engineers would receive an extra premium because of the change. A premium which 
had not been offered to them by management. Management claimed that this had been 
a mistake and that the premium should be removed. The company’s and union’s 
positions did not change during in-house negotiations and, having clarified their terms 
of reference, the parties referred the matter to ACAS. After unsuccessful conciliation 
the dispute progressed to arbitration under the auspices of a barrister selected by 
ACAS. The arbitrator chose for the union on the grounds that the wages officer and 
cashier were agents of management and having offered the premium could not renege 
on it.
Three aspects of the second dispute are notable: again conciliation proved to be 
an empty vessel since no movement occurred and the parties were not deterred from 
moving to arbitration; the arbitrator judged the issue on the procedural facts of the case 
rather than the cost implications significantly affecting the quality of the award - as a 
result of this management declared that it would block the use of a lawyer-arbitrator 
should it have to use arbitration again; and finally although the estimated cost of the 
award was £6,000, management paid for it by scaling down offers to the engineers in 
other areas. Lynch described this latter aspect as ’learning to live with’ an 
unfavourable arbitration award. This illustrates another feature of the UK system 
which might not occur in North America. If management (and to a lesser extent 
unions) lose an arbitration award they can pay for it by altering other terms and 
conditions fairly easily, as the ABB Capacitors case also shows. By contrast, this is 
much more difficult in the US where collective agreements are complex, long term,
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legal contracts which mean that once terms are determined for (usually) three years, 
they stay fixed. Although this suggests that completely unworkable awards are 
unlikely in the UK, it also provides another plausible explanation for why FOA also 
appears to have minimal deterrent power in the UK system.
The overall impressions of FOA from the two RHM Foods interviewees were 
quite favourable. The personnel manager stated that FOA had made industrial 
relations more constructive at the plant and even that using FOA ’was good for the 
factory’. She described the 1990 dispute as an ’honourable defeat’ since the company 
had not actually capitulated to the unions but had instead showed trust by allowing a 
third party to decide the issue. Presumably she was also content because the pecuniary 
loss had been made good elsewhere. The steward was quite positive but a little more 
cautious about the benefits of FOA. He thought that the ’black and white’ nature of 
FOA was ’a problem’ and that this had discouraged the union from using FOA again 
after the 1987 dispute. This provides quite a neat picture of management willing to 
use FOA to foster high trust because losses can be mitigated and unions less willing to 
use it because defeats are less likely to be recouped. FOA could therefore really only 
be described as a dispute deterrent for the unions at RHM rather than for the 
management.
Sanyo (Lowestoft) 1985 and 1988
The details of the 1985 mediated dispute at Sanyo have already been fully set 
out in section 3 but there was also an arbitrated dispute in 1988 over the pay 
settlement. The union’s initial claim for the 1987/88 salary review was for a 
’substantial increase in all basic salaries’ plus a demand to discuss bonus payments and 
an end to merit payments. The company first offered a 4.2 per cent increase on basic 
rates. In response at the first JNC meeting the union claimed a basic increase of 8.5 
per cent plus the award of a bonus payment. The company came back with a six per 
cent offer plus certain conditions such as co-operation in improving productivity and 
absenteeism and no bonus to be paid. The workforce was balloted on this offer but it 
was rejected with 92.8 per cent voting against. At the final stage of the domestic 
procedure the union rejected the company’s final offer of six per cent and reduced its 
claim to one item: an 8.5 per cent increase in basic rates. After a failure to agree was
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reached both sides agreed to refer the matter to ACAS for arbitration. The arbitrator 
awarded for the union (in March 1988) on the grounds that it would ’provide a boost 
to morale and raise the level of employee commitment’ which would in turn improve 
productivity and reduce absenteeism at the plant.
The personnel manager, Mr Noel Salmon, declared that the award was 
workable since labour costs were a very low proportion of total costs and that the 
award was a convenient way of improving employee commitment without capitulating 
to the union. The experience of FOA in 1988 was certainly far less complex and 
difficult than that in 1985. Salmon indicated that the 1985 experience meant that all 
parties were fully aware of what FOA entailed and it was therefore not surprising that 
the procedure went quite smoothly. He also argued that the main reason for the 
problems in 1985 was a clash of personalities between himself and Sanderson. This 
seems to be somewhat of an understatement, though, since there was also clearly some 
confusion over the procedural details of the FOA mechanism.
Sanyo (Newton Aycliffe) 1990
In 1988 Sanyo established another plant in the UK on a greenfield site at 
Newton Aycliffe in County Durham to manufacture microwaves. The FOA dispute 
procedure was agreed to in 1989 in time to cover the first proper terms and conditions 
review to determine salaries from 1 January each year starting from 1990. The 
procedure included a conciliation stage and the details of the procedure were quite 
tightly defined presumably because both the union (EETPU) and management had 
learned from the experience at other plants, particularly Sanyo at Lowestoft. The 
Advisory Body is the main bi-partite body comprising seven elected employee 
representatives and three management members. Any recommendation on pay has to 
back to Sanyo members, i.e. employees, for approval. If a recommendation is rejected 
by the workforce, then the Advisory Board drops out and management and union 
officials negotiate directly through conciliation.
For the first proper terms and conditions award (to begin 1 January 1990) the 
Advisory Board recommended 6 per cent but this was rejected by a workforce ballot. 
The union adopted a position of 8 per cent and these were the respective positions at 
conciliation, with the main argument over whether to use a 12 month or 7 month
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inflation figure as a guide for the award. There was no movement during the 
conciliation stage apart from some cost-neutral changes offered by management which 
were rejected in a workforce ballot. Despite the dispute procedure’s stipulation that 
any dispute should now progress to FOA, the matter was instead brought back in- 
house after conciliation. The Managing Director intervened directly to negotiate with 
the union full-time officer and offered a ’Japanese bonus’: a 1 per cent one off 
payment in addition to the 6 per cent settlement. This offer was accepted by the 
workforce and therefore arbitration was avoided.
There are a two principal aspects to this dispute which are particularly relevant. 
First, on the role of conciliation, there must be a strong suspicion that it performed no 
positive function here since no substantive movement occurred. However, the 
personnel manager (Mr Paul Mann) argued that although conciliation was an empty 
vessel in substantive terms it was procedurally very useful because it established a 
negotiating relationship between the union and management outside the Advisory 
Board framework. This perahps suggests that the effectiveness criterion of 
compromise during conciliation may be too strong. In this case conciliation proved to 
be the catalyst which prompted the parties to resolve the dispute post conciliation and 
before arbitration. Secondly, as a consequence of this dispute the workings of the 
Advisory Body were altered such that the Terms and Conditions Review would be put 
on the agenda in August rather than December and more information would be 
provided by management for the negotiations. There was no proposal to scrap the 
conciliation stage of the procedure as had occurred at Sanyo, Lowestoft. In addition, 
in the following year management made a very high offer of 12 per cent plus an 
additional day’s holiday ’to give the Advisory Board some credibility’. It appears that 
the near miss with FOA prompted both procedural and substantive changes to avoid 
the possibility of arbitration again.
Shotton Paper 1988
FOA was used at Shotton Paper’s plant in North Wales to settle a dispute 
concerning the shift pattern. Before the dispute the plant operated on an eight hour 
shift system which provided for six days on, two days off and one week off in four. 
During the summer all employees worked six weeks straight then had two weeks off
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because of holidays. In 1988 the union (EETPU) requested that this pattern be 
changed to 12 hour shifts on a four days on, four days off basis. Management was 
opposed to this on the grounds of loss in productivity and safety dangers through 
fatigue and problems of cover because of resultant absenteeism. During negotiations 
the union reduced its claim to this system just for summer working. Eventually after 
further negotiations the union official refused to continue to press the workforce’s case 
on the grounds that 12 hour shifts were against national union policy. However, after 
another union threatened to recruit the workforce, the incumbent union sent in a new 
official to continue the claim. The final negotiating positions boiled down to 
management’s refusal to alter the status quo and the union asking for an experimental 
use of the 12 hour shift pattern in the summer of 1989 with monitoring to check for 
any detrimental effects in line with management’s objections.
As the plant’s procedure does not provide for conciliation or mediation the 
dispute was taken straight from a failure to agree to FOA. At arbitration management 
claimed that effective monitoring would be impossible since the new system would 
coincide with the introduction of a new paper machine. The arbitrator, an academic 
from Cardiff, awarded in favour of the company on the basis of the inconsistency of 
the union’s position. This is despite the fact that during the hearing he had been more 
attentive to the union side than the employer according to the personnel manager, Mr 
John Shield.
This case illustrates no particularly interesting aspects of FOA in action not 
also suggested by other cases. In terms of attitudes towards FOA and its function in 
the plant, Shield appeared to be quite content with FOA and claimed it had led to 
more effective negotiations at the plant than he had experienced in other plants. He 
stated that management had rejected the idea of including a pre-arbitration stage in the 
dispute procedure on the grounds that it would not have encouraged further 
compromise in this or other cases. When asked about the danger of unworkable 
awards, he said that this was unlikely to occur since even if arbitration was used ’you 
will have converged sufficiently that the gap [between final positions] is small’ and 
therefore a ’defeat’ would not be particularly more expensive than a ’victory’.
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5. Summary and conclusions
Drawing together information from these various UK instances of use or near­
use of FOA suggests a number of problems which can reduce the deterrent power of 
FOA. Some of these are peculiar to the UK but others may be a factor in problems 
with FOA usage in North America. Five themes stand out:
. Flexibility: The still relatively voluntarist nature of UK industrial relations 
means that procedural details of negotiations can be very flexible unlike in the US and 
Canada where the legalistic system precludes such flexibility. However, the dispute 
deterrent power of FOA relies on a certain amount of inflexibility - parties have to be 
sure that if they fail to negotiate an outcome, then winner takes all arbitration is 
definitely the outcome. Moreover the ’losing’ party should not be able to easily 
mitigate the effects of an unfavourable award by negotiating or imposing changes in 
other terms and conditions. Further arbitrators need to be explicitly prevented from 
exercising their discretion under FOA for it to be effective, yet the UK has seen at 
least one arbitrator managing to achieve a compromise solution in an arbitration by 
FOA. The fact that arbitration awards are, in the great majority of agreements, not 
legally binding contributes to this flexibility. So whilst Kessler and Lewis may 
applaud flexibility which prevents unworkable awards, those interested in dispute 
deterrence may see this aspect of the UK system as a drawback.
. The role of arbitrators: Following on from the issue of flexibility is the role 
of arbitrators in undermining the deterrent power of FOA. The rather scathing 
opinions of the arbitration ’profession’ have been laid out by the Central Arbitration 
Committe (1984) and ACAS (1987) and this has been carried forward into arbitration 
cases by individual arbitrators. Whilst some have confined themselves to merely 
expressing dissatisfaction with having no compromise option, others appear to have 
damaged the integrity of FOA by their actions during proceedings. Some negotiators 
have expressed dissappointment at these activities by arbitrators. Essentially arbitrators 
need to realise that their own interests in satisficing both parties must come second to 
maintaining the principle of FOA if this is what the parties want.
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. The role of union officials: One feature of the very different context of FOA 
in the UK compared to North America which has not been suggested before concerns 
the role of union officials. In North America most bargaining units covered by FOA 
will be very large as they are overwhelmingly public sector units. Therefore one 
would imagine that relatively senior union officials are likely to be involved from quite 
early on in negotiations and will be interested in substantive outcomes from the off.
On the other hand in the UK, because all FOA procedures are in private sector plants, 
union officials are unlikely to become involved in collective bargaining until a failure 
to agree is reached. A union leader faced with the immediate prospect of defeat under 
FOA may behave very differently from one who has been involved in negotiations 
from an early stage. This certainly seems to be the case in a number of the UK cases 
of FOA usage thus far. Union officials have either drastically cut their members’ 
claim just before arbitration and/or tried to stymie the effect of arbitration with ad hoc 
use of other procedures, in order to be seen to ’win’ procedurally. Such activities are 
also likely to undermine the integrity of an FOA procedure.
. Empty vessels: In general most managers viewed conciliation and/or 
mediation as empty vessels which did not contribute towards the encouragement of 
effective negotiations. In a couple of cases it was argued that conciliation had helped 
to clarify the parties’ positions but rarely was there any movement in issues of 
substance during the hearings. Other managers argued that if anything conciliation 
helped to make the parties positions more intransigent rather than less. Interestingly 
the main union involved with FOA deals (EETPU) and its leader largely responsible 
for the early agreements (Roy Sanderson) increasingly took the opposite view - that 
some form of pre-arbitration was crucial to the success of these procedures after the 
Sanyo experience. The fact that the EETPU’s members at Sanyo agreed with 
management might suggest that union leaders are more interested in avoiding total 
defeats at the hands of FOA rather than avoiding disputes in the first place. Perhaps 
union leaders are worried about their value in dispute-free plants.
. Two types of FOA: The case studies reveal that FOA is operating in two 
distinct ways in different UK plants: as a deterrent for all types of disputes; and
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alternatively as merely a resolution mechanism for some, mainly rights, disputes.
There seem to be two main determinants of which category a particular plant falls into. 
First, the level of trust in the bargaining relationship. In low trust, mainly multi-union 
environments FOA is merely seen as another mechanism to resolve the inevitable 
disputes that are going to arise. Management will not, however, allow a pay dispute to 
be decided by a third party but would instead prefer to resort to traditional means of 
settling conflict though industrial action. Secondly, it does appear that FOA is more 
likely to be viewed as a dispute deterrent when accompanied by other well known 
feature of the ’new style deals’ stereotype such as single status, employee involvement 
and especially single unionism. Of course these may contribute towards an 
environment with higher trust and managers definitely view them as necessary for the 
deterrence of disputes alongside their FOA procedure.
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Table 5.1
Disputes in the eight case study plants
Plant Year of 
dispute
Issue(s) Pre­
arbitration
Arbitration award
For For 
company union
ABB Capacitors 1989 Pay
differentials
Conciliation X
Anonco Pay settlement Settled in 
conciliation
- -
IBC Vehicles 1988 Time off in 
lieu
Conciliation X
t t 1990 Shorter 
working week
Settled in 
conciliation
- -
t t 1991 Grading Conciliation X
Iveco Ford 1986-7 Cushioning
pay
None X
RHM Foods 1987 Pay for meal 
breaks
Not used X
t t 1990 Pay
composition
Conciliation X
Sanyo
(Lowestoft)
1985 Pay package Settled in 
mediation
- -
i t 1988 Pay None X
Sanyo (Newton 
Aycliffe)
1990 Pay Settled in 
conciliation
- -
Shotton Paper 1988 Shift pattern None X
197
Chapter 6
Strikes and non-strike action: evidence on relative incidence
1. Introduction
Allan Flanders, writing in 1965 about the state of British industrial relations, said:
"One of the notable features of workplace relations in recent years, not 
revealed by strike figures, has been the increasing use of ’cut price’ 
industrial action such as overtime bans, working to rule or going slow." 
(Flanders 1970: 112).
Unfortunately Flanders did not provide or cite any evidence to back up his claim. The 
official statistics on industrial action published by the Department of Employment still 
only record strikes, excluding all other forms of organised industrial action1.
However, there have been a number of surveys of British industrial relations since 
1965 which collected data on the incidence of the main types of industrial action. In 
the main these tend to show that the incidence of cut-price action relative to strike 
action has in fact been declining since the mid 1960s such that even if Flanders was 
correct about industrial conflict before 1965, his statement would certainly not apply to 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Brown (1981) summarised the survey evidence up to 1978 
as damning to Flanders’s analysis because ’the relative importance of action short of a 
strike has fallen’.
The CBI Databank is a previously under used survey which provides data on 
industrial action over pay claims in manufacturing for over 1000 bargaining groups per 
year in the 1980s. Evidence from this survey suggests that Flanders’s analysis 
warrants some rehabilitation. Overall the incidence of non-strike action is higher than 
that of strikes in every year of pay bargaining recorded. The comparative picture is 
driven by one particular form of action short of a strike - the overtime ban - which has 
been substantially more prevalent than strike action throughout the 1980s according to 
these data. Although care must be taken when comparing results from very different 
surveys, the general picture seems to be that in this, as in other aspects of post-war 
industrial relations, the 1970s may have been a peculiar decade. A comparison of 
results from these surveys also suggests that the tactics of industrial conflict deserve 
more systematic investigation than they have thus far received. There has been a
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disproportionate concentration of research effort on strikes to the detriment of other 
forms of organised industrial action.
The chapter is structured to emphasise the considerable differences between the 
surveys in a number of respects, such that comparison of their results is subject to a 
range of caveats. After detailing the surveys in section 2, the caveats are spelt out in 
section 3. The picture of comparative incidence of the different forms of industrial 
action is examined in section 4 and section 5 provides some tentative conclusions
2. The surveys
Workplace industrial relations surveys are not new to the 1980s and 1990s. 
Independent or official surveys have examined the British industrial relations system at 
(roughly) workplace level five different times before 1980. These surveys include the 
first study of its kind conducted in 1966 for the Donovan Commission (Government 
Social Survey 1968). In the 1970s, surveys were conducted by the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) in 1972 and 1973, commissioned by the 
Department of Employment (Parker 1974 and 1975), by Political and Economic 
Planning (PEP) in 1975 (Daniel 1976) and by researchers at Warwick University in 
1977-78 (Brown 1981). More recent and well known are the three Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) of 1980 (Daniel and Millward 1983), 1984 
(Millward and Stevens 1986) and 1990 (Millward et al 1992). Part of each survey’s 
remit was to examine the incidence of different forms of organised industrial action. 
The four main forms of action recorded were strikes, overtime bans, work to rules and 
go slows. Most of the pre-1980 surveys also collected data on threats to strike but 
recording of such action was discontinued after 1975. The Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) Pay Databank survey has been collected on a quarterly basis since 
1979. Details of the sampling frame and composition of the survey can be found in 
chapter 1. In terms of industrial action the data refer only to action taken during the 
course of pay negotiations. Information is collected on the threat of action, whether 
action was taken and, if so, its form - overtime ban, work to rule or go slow2, strike 
or other - and duration of the most important form of action.
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3. The caveats
Before comparing the figures on industrial action from the CBI Databank to 
those produced by these earlier surveys, some of their idiosyncrasies should be 
highlighted. Specifications of the nine surveys are listed in Table 6.1. This records 
the year of the survey, its published report (where appropriate), the sample used, the 
timescale covered, and any restrictions of the survey in terms of unionised status, 
industries sampled and issues covered.
Five of the studies are genuine workplace surveys, the unit of analysis is the 
single establishment. Parker, however, employed a very unusual measure, the 
’industrial relations situation’, as the unit of analysis in his two surveys. This is 
defined as ’the establishment or that part of it which, for industrial relations purposes, 
was under the control of a single senior manager.’
Although participants in the Government Social Survey conducted in 1966 as 
part of the Donovan Commission’s work were asked to respond to questions about 
their place of work, the results are not presented as per establishment for each category 
of respondent but rather per shop steward, manager, personnel officer and foreman.
As there were likely to be more than one shop steward or foreman interviewed per 
plant, the resultant data cannot really be seen as even approximating plant based 
incidence. The foremen were drawn from the same plants as the managers but the 
shop stewards were selected through six trade unions, not necessarily connected to 
these plants. Finally, as detailed above the CBI sample is bargaining group rather than 
workplace based.
’Timescale’ refers to the period of time covered by the resulting data. The 
most unusual survey in this respect is the 1966 survey. Participants were asked 
whether or not there had been a strike (say) at their place of work whilst they had 
been in their current position. Average post tenures in the sample ranged from five 
years for foremen, through six years for shop stewards, six-and-a-half years for 
personnel officers, to 8 years for the management respondents. This timescale 
compares with one or two years for the other surveys, apart from the CBI survey. The 
timescale of the CBI data is potentially different for each individual observation. The 
survey asked about industrial action in support of the most recent pay claim. The 
great majority (around 90%) of pay settlements apply for 12 months (Ingram 1991).
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However, as the questions specifically relate to negotiations over pay, most of the 
industrial action is likely to be in a one or two month period surrounding the 
expiration of the contract.
A further feature of the surveys worth noting is that some surveys report the 
incidence of action in both plants where unions are recognised for collective 
bargaining and those where no union is recognised. However, some of the studies 
either only surveyed unionised states (Government Social Survey 1968, Daniel 1976), 
or only provide the breakdown of different types of action for unionised states (Daniel 
and Mill ward 1983)3. So for each of these three surveys the incidence of industrial 
action figures are based on a sample of respondents where unions, to some degree, are 
recognised for collective bargaining.
Industrial action is infrequent in non-union workplaces. Millward and Stevens 
(1986: Table 10.3) report the incidence as being less than 0.5% in non-union plants in 
1984. In the CBI sample around 1.5% of non collectively bargained pay settlements 
involved some form of industrial action. Although this is considerably higher than the 
figure reported for all industrial action in WIRS 1984, it is still substantially less than 
the 6.6% recorded for settlements in the CBI data involving collective bargaining.
Five of the surveys contain data from across industrial sectors, very broadly 
defined in some cases - for example data from only four industries but at least one is 
in the service sector, Parker (1974). The CBI data (made available) are confined to 
manufacturing (data on private services have been collected since 1983 but are 
unavailable at present) as were the Daniel survey, the Warwick Survey and the shop 
steward responses to the government’s 1966 survey. Note that the WIRS data are 
heavily dominated by industrial action in the public sector which is not covered by the 
CBI Databank. This is particularly influential in explaining the great disparity of 
results on the comparative incidence of strikes and non-strike action between the two 
sets of data.
Finally, and particularly important, all the surveys bar the CBI Databank record 
industrial action over any issue, whereas the CBI survey is restricted solely to action in 
pursuit of a pay claim or taken over a pay award. This would make meaningful 
comparisons between the surveys very difficult if type of industrial action employed in 
pay disputes was fundamentally different from that over other issues, such as working
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hours, working conditions or disciplinary issues, i.e. pay disputes were more likely to 
be associated with a certain type of action.
Evidence from the successive WIRS on the reasons given for the most recent 
industrial action (Millward et al 1992: Table 8.3) in the main suggests that the 
restriction of the CBI survey to disputes over pay should not invalidate comparisons 
with other surveys. It is clear that pay was the predominant reason for strike and non­
strike action for both manual and non-manual workers in 1980, and despite a slight 
decline, this was in general still the case in 1984 and 19904. Note, however, that the 
WIRS definition of pay disputes could include action taken over merit-based pay 
systems as well as annual negotiations, unlike the CBI survey.
One unusual result for 1984 is the pattern for manual strikes with only 32% of 
respondents giving pay as the reason for the action compared to 59% in 1980. 
However, much of this difference is explained by the abnormally high level of 
’political’ strikes covered by the 1984 survey (which are classified as miscellaneous in 
WIRS) over privatisation in the postal services and telecommunications industry.
There are therefore a range of caveats which need to be borne in mind when 
comparing these surveys. The compositional differences of the sample, different 
timescales, varied units of analysis and respondents all mean that this is definitely not 
a comparison of like with like. The accumulation of results from the surveys cannot 
and should not be treated as a continuous time series. However, the comparative 
picture is still worth investigating since it suggests such a stark picture of change.
4. Comparative incidence of industrial action
Table’s 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 report the incidence of different forms of industrial 
action recorded by the surveys listed in Table 6.1. Table 6.2 shows the results from 
the pre-1980s surveys, Table 6.3 provides a breakdown of figures from the WIRS, and 
Table 6.4 shows figures for each pay year (August to July) from the CBI survey for 
1979-1989.
The considerable dissimilarities of the surveys, described above, mean that it 
would be nonsensical to compare the absolute figures on levels of industrial action 
reported between the different surveys. However, one notable feature of Tables 6.2 
and 6.3 which deserves some comment is the discrepancies in reported incidence for
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the surveys which collected information from both management and worker 
representatives. Some of these discrepancies can be explained because there was no 
attempt to match the worker and management samples (as in the 1966 survey). 
However, in Parker’s surveys and the WIRS there are differences in the responses 
from representatives of employees and management in the same establishment. In the 
latest reporting of data from the three WIRS, management and worker representative 
responses are combined in order to best measure the extent of industrial action in the 
majority of cases (Millward et al 1992: Table 8.2).
Daniel and Millward (1983) put the divergence in reporting between 
management and worker respondents down to three factors: problems over the 
definition of certain forms of action; incomplete recall of events; and ’telescoping’ of 
events where events outside the reference period are recorded as inside it. They also 
point out that managers are more likely to understate the level of non-strike rather than 
strike action. The CBI Databank respondents are predominantly management members 
of the negotiating team, therefore there should be little suspicion that they are over 
reporting the incidence of non-strike action compared to strikes.
Given that we are ostensibly interested in the relative importance of different 
forms of action, the best means of comparison is to report the level of each form of 
industrial action relative to the level of strikes. Following Brown’s example (Brown 
1981: Table 5.3), Table 6.5 shows the relative incidence of any non-strike action, 
overtime bans and works to rule/go slows compared to the reported level of strikes.
Comparison of the ’any non-strike action’ results from the pre-1980 surveys 
with the later surveys are problematic since before the former record ’threat of strike’ 
as a form of non-strike action (or pressure). This category is not recorded or reported 
for the later surveys since it is is too nebulous. As Brown notes:
"The pilot survey revealed that this definitionally difficult concept was 
of little value since, as several respondents put it, ’they’re always 
threatening to strike’." (Brown 1981: p80).
Although the CBI Databank survey does record the occurence of threats to action, 
these data were not used for this analysis.
Note also that the work to rule and go slow classifications have been combined 
in the table because the CBI Databank treats them as a single category of action. As
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this survey is the main new source of evidence reported here, some attempt must be 
made to make the surveys comparable. Therefore the incidence figures for works to 
rule and go slows from the non-CBI surveys are simply added together for Table 6.5. 
This does mean that the comparative incidence of works to rule / go slows compared 
to strikes for each of the non-CBI surveys is likely to be overstated - some of the 
respondents must have experienced both forms of action over the period. Such 
respondents will be recorded as two different observations for the non-CBI surveys 
rather than one for similar cases in the CBI data.
The relative incidence levels reported in Table 6.5 are displayed graphically in 
Figures 6.1 to 6.3. Figure 6.1 shows the relative level of any non-strike action 
compared to strike action recorded by the none surveys. In all but three surveys (in 
1978, 1984 and 1990) non-strike action was more prevalent than strike action, and the 
CBI data fit with this general picture. However, as stated earlier there is a 
considerable problem with the pre-1978 results in that they record threat to strike as a 
form of non-strike action. Moreover, because the incidence of such threats is not 
trivial (ranging from 19 to 50 per cent across the surveys), comparisons of these 
indices is misleading. More interesting is the comparison of the CBI data to those 
surveys which did not record threats to strike within the catch-all of non-strike action. 
The relative incidence of any non-strike action is considerably and consistently higher 
in the CBI survey than the non-CBI surveys in 1978, 1980, 1984 and 1990. On 
average non-strike action is just over double the rate of strike action (2.10), which 
compares with 0.88, 1.23, 0.95 and 0.50 respectively for these other surveys.
When this picture is broken down into its constituent parts, a clear depiction of 
what is driving this comes out. The main explanation for the highly disparate 
comparative levels of non-strike and strike action is the considerably greater 
comparative use of overtime bans recorded by the CBI survey. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 
depict the relative incidence of overtime bans and works to rule/go slows against 
strikes.
The picture of works to rule/go slows compared to strikes in Figure 6.3 shows 
that the incidence of these forms of action has been fairly consistently below the level 
of strikes throughout the period examined. The CBI data indices do not look out of 
place with results from the other surveys, although it may be that the non-CBI indices
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are slightly overstated because of the addition of works to rule and go slows responses 
to match the figures with the CBI survey responses.
Without doubt the key feature of these figures is the picture of the relative 
prevalence of overtime bans compared to strikes shown in Figure 6.2. In every year of 
the CBI data the level of overtime bans is higher than that of strikes, though only just 
for 1979-80. On an annual average basis, the level of overtime bans was roughly 
double the level of strikes. These figures are remarkable when compared to the other 
surveys’ results. All the studies conducted in the 1970s bar the OPCS survey of 1973 
(which is considerably out of kilter with the others) indicate that the overtime ban was 
substantially less popular than the strike. If data from WIRS did not exist, the 
overwhelming impression from Figure 6.2 is that the overtime ban overtook the strike 
in the 1980s as the most popular form of organised industrial action. However, the 
WIRS data show a very different picture of a decline in the use of overtime bans, 
particularly after 1984 when the relative incidence drops from 0.58 to 0.30, alongside 
the decline in non-strike action more generally relative to strikes.
These very different indices require an explanation. Some of the difference 
between the WIRS and the CBI figures must be explained by the composition of the 
samples and particularly the restriction of the CBI data to only manufacturing, whereas 
the WIRS sample covers all industries and only around a fifth to a quarter of the 
weighted sample base in each year is made up of manufacturing plants (27%, 21% and 
21% in the respective samples). The three source books do provide some breakdown 
of action across sectors (although unfortunately not below the ’any non-strike action’ 
level to overtime bans and works to rule/go slows). The relative incidence of non­
strike action to strike action is slightly higher for manufacturing compared to other 
sectors for manual and non-manual workers (classed separately) for 1980 and 1984, 
with the one exception of non-manuals in public services in 1980 (Millward and 
Stevens 1986: Table 10.2). Note, however, that the indices are still somewhat lower 
than those from the CBI data.
Even more consistent with the CBI data is the 1990 WIRS finding that the 
relative incidence of non-strike compared to strike action in manufacturing was 1.75 
with 7% of plants reporting non-strike action and 4% reporting strikes, compared to 
the overall ratio of 0.50 (5% and 10% reporting each type of action respectively). One
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suspects that a more thorough breakdown of the WIRS data to show overtime bans and 
works to rule/go slows relative to strikes in manufacturing would produce data not as 
much out of kilter with the CBI data. Furthermore, as explained above, the 1984 
WIRS recorded a high level of industrial action over political issues for manual 
workers which usually meant strike rather than non-strike action. Perhaps if the WIRS 
results were restricted to solely pay issues, they would report a higher relative level of 
overtime bans compared to strikes.
Therefore the relatively simple picture of relative incidence reported in Table 
6.5 and Figure 6.2 must be qualified. In British manufacturing there appears to have 
been a shift towards the use of overtime bans relative to strikes in the 1980s compared 
to previous decades, especially over pay disputes. This has run alongside the 
continued decline in the absolute level of all forms of industrial action especially after 
1983-84 (see Table 6.4).
5. Conclusions
This description of the reversal in the relative incidence of overtime bans and 
strikes between the 1970s and 1980s sheds light on, and provokes further questions 
about, some interesting issues in British industrial relations.
First, concerns the extent to which the 1970s should be seen as a unique decade 
in UK industrial relations. Already documented are post-war peaks in union 
membership and density (Bailey and Kelly 1990) and strike activity, whatever measure 
is used (Milner and Metcalf 1993). The evidence cited in this paper, suggests that a 
further peculiarity was over the preferred tactics of organised industrial conflict - in 
favour of the strike over non-strike action. Just as union membership and strike 
activity trends have been reversed in the 1980s, so too have the preferences for 
particular weapons of industrial conflict at least in manufacturing. However, because 
of the relative lack of data from before the 1970s on the incidence of forms of action 
other than strikes, it is not possible to state whether or not the overtime ban/strike 
comparison of the 1980s marks a return to the pre 1970s position, as the union 
membership and strike series suggest. Without the relevant data, this question could 
only be guessed at if we had some conception of what factors might determine the 
relative incidence of strikes and overtime bans.
206
There is an important, often unasked question which the divergent results of 
these various surveys makes all the more interesting. This concerns the tactics of 
industrial disputes. Specifically, why is it that some bargaining groups choose the 
overtime ban in preference for or as a preliminary to the strike, while others choose 
only to strike after reaching a failure to agree. The theoretical and empirical literature 
on strikes is huge (Edwards 1992), yet there has been very little work of any type on 
potential explanations for the incidence of overtime bans or other forms of organised 
action compared to strikes. Chapter 7 develops an argument that to date empirical 
studies of strikes using UK data have too readily sought to test economic strike 
theories developed in the US, without giving proper consideration to the different 
context of industrial action in the two countries. Economist’s theories of strikes are 
based on the US private sector, where the strike is really the only possible action open 
to workers after a failure to agree in negotiations over a new contract. This is plainly 
not the case in the UK where there are a range of options available to workers after a 
failure to agree, including different sorts of industrial action and/or third party 
intervention.
Given that evidence from the UK in the 1980s shows that, over pay settlements 
in manufacturing at least, the overtime ban has been consistently more popular than 
the strike and that this may be a very different picture from the 1970s, further 
investigation of this whole area is warranted.
The strike weapon appears to be withering away as industrial relations progress 
into the 1990s (Department of Employment Gazette, successive issues: Table 4.2). 
Therefore it seems particularly pertinent to examine somewhat more closely what 
happened to other forms of organised and unorganised industrial action in the 1980s. 
The greater preference for the overtime ban over the strike as a means to pursue pay 
claims in manufacturing over the decade revealed by the CBI Databank survey, must 
rank as another major change in the outcomes of British industrial relations seen in the 
1980s.
207
Footnotes
1. In fact the official strike figures also exclude stoppages involving fewer than 10 workers 
and those of less than one day’s duration, except where the aggregate number of working 
days lost exceeds 100. See Milner and Metcalf (1993) for comprehensive information on the 
official strike figures, and a record since 1893 of official strike statistics.
2. Perhaps the major drawback of the CBI survey is that it does not measure work to rule and 
go slow as different categories. There may be very good reason for this, for instance if 
practitioners believe that only semantics separates the two forms of action. However, this 
makes comparison of the CBI data with evidence from other surveys on these two forms of 
industrial action very difficult. Hence another reason for the concentration on the overtime 
ban and strike comparison.
3. In their comparisons of data from the three WIRS, Millward et al. (1992) provide data for 
1980 for unionised and non-unionised establishments combined.
4. The only exception to this is for non-strike action by non-manuals in 1990. 29% of the 
most recent cases of non-strike action were over pay (wage rates and earnings) issues 
compared to 36% over manning and work allocation.
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c. Notes
1. Table 6.5 and Figures 6.1 to 6.3: For the 1978 Warwick survey only the figure for 
manual workers, and for the three WIRS only the combined answers for either manual 
and/or non-manual workers are reported as indices. The relevant indices (strikes=100) 
for the categories not reported are:
Year of 
survey
Worker type Non-strike
action
Overtime
bans
Works to rule 
go slows
Respondent
% % %
1978 Non-manual 120 80 60 Managers
1980 Non-manual 200 125 100 Combined
Manual 91 64 50 Combined
1984 Non-manual 86 43 43 Combined
Manual 100 75 25 Combined
1990 Non-manual 25 13 13 Combined
Manual 100 67 33 Combined
Table 6.1
Specfications of surveys
Study Sample Timescale Union/non­
union status
Industries Issues
Government Social Survey 
(1968)
Survey date: 1966
1197 shop stewards in 6 unions; 
319 managers and 121 personnel 
officers in 343 plants; 598 
foremen in 319 plants
Post tenures: Means (years) 
Stewards 6, Managers 9, 
Personnel Officers 6.5, 
Foremen 5.
Unionised 
plants only
Stewards: all industries. 
Others: Manufacturing 
and construction only.
Any
Parker (1974) 
Survey date: 1972
296 industrial relations 
’situations’ in 202 plants
Previous two years Both All Any
Parker (1975) 
Survey date: 1973
468 industrial relations 
’situations’ in 319 plants
Previous two years Both All Any
Daniel (1976) 
Survey date: 1975
242 establishments Previous 12 months Unionised 
plants only
Manufacturing only Any
Brown (1983) 
Survey date: 1978
970 establishments Previous two years Both Manufacturing only Any
Daniel and Millward (1983) 
Survey date: 1980
2040 establishments Previous 12 months Both All Any
Millward and Stevens (1986) 
Survey date: 1984
2019 establishments Previous 12 months Both All Any
Millward et al (1990) 
Survey date: 1990
2061 establishments Previous 12 months Both All Any
CBI Pay Databank 
Survey dates: 1979-89
11866 bargaining rounds Most recent pay claim or 
award
Both Manufacturing^ Pay claim 
or award
Notes: (i) CBI Pay Databank survey also covered private services from 1983 but not included in data made available.
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Table 6.2
Reported incidence of industrial action from various surveys 1966-1978
Year of 
survey
Worker type Strike
action
Non-strike
action
Threat to 
strike
Overtime
ban
Work to rule Go slow Other Reported by
% % % % % % %
1966 Any 40 59 30 42 28 12 6 Stewards
Any 30 55 33 33 18 18 6 Managers
Any na 32 46 48 27 23 10 Personnel
officers
Any 28 44 20 22 10 7 3 Foremen
1972 Any 35 60 24 38 30 7 7 Stewards
Any 32 38 19 24 19 9 8 Managers
1973 Any 23 53 26 36 25 9 7 Stewards
Any 18 40 19 25 17 9 7 Managers
1975 Any 24 na 50 17 16 7 5 Managers
1978 Manual 33 29 - 23 12 4 6 Senior
managers
Non-manual 5 6 - 4 3 1 1 t t
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Notes to Table 6.2:
(i) Sources: Government Social Survey (1968): para. 2.105 (stewards); para. 4.67
(managers and personnel officers); para. 5.43 (foremen).
Parker (1974): Tables 126 and 127.
Parker (1975): Tables 106 and 107 
Daniel (1978): Table H 6.
Brown (1981): Table 5.1.
(ii) ’na’ means not reported in text.
(iii) means not recorded by the survey.
Table 6.3
Incidence of industrial action reported by Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 1980,1984 and 1990
Survey Worker type Sub-sample Strike
action
Non-strike
action
Overtime
ban
Work to 
rule
Go slow Other Reported by
% % % % % %
1980 Manual Unionised 17 15 12 5 1 4 Worker reps.
workplaces 19 15 11 5 2 5 Managers
All workplaces 11 10 7 4 1 4 Combined answers
Non-manual Unionised 9 17 9 7 * 10 Worker reps.
workplaces 8 12 8 4 * 6 Managers
All workplaces 4 8 5 4 * 4 Combined answers
Any All workplaces 13 16 10 7 1 7 Combined answers
1984 Manual All workplaces 8 8 6 2 * 4 Combined answers
Non-manual All workplaces 14 12 6 6 * 4 Combined answers
Any All workplaces 19 18 11 8 * 5 Combined answers
1990 Manual All workplaces 3 3 2 1 * 1 Combined answers
Non-manual All workplaces 8 2 1 1 * 1 Combined answers
Any All workplaces 10 5 3 2 * 2 Combined answers
Sources: Daniel and Millward (1983), Table IX. 1; Millward and Stevens (1986), Table 10.1; and Millward et al (1992), Table 8.2.
213
Table 6.4
Incidence of industrial action recorded by CBI Pay Databank 1979-89
% of bargaining groups experiencing following forms of action
Any
action
Strike Non-strike
action
Overtime
ban
Work to rule, 
go slow
Other
By Pay 
Round
1979-80 8.0 4.0 5.5 4.1 2.7 1.0
1980-81 6.2 2.1 4.5 3.8 1.8 0.7
1981-82 6.4 2.2 5.0 4.3 2.2 0.3
1982-83 5.6 2.0 4.4 3.9 1.5 0.4
1983-84 8.6 3.5 7.3 6.0 2.8 1.1
1984-85 4.2 1.1 3.5 3.1 1.3 0.2
1985-86 5.4 2.2 4.7 4.2 1.3 0.0
1986-87 4.3 1.2 3.8 3.4 1.3 0.3
1987-88 3.4 1.7 2.5 2.5 0.5 0.2
1988-89 2.0 0.7 1.9 1.7 0.6 0.2
Mean 5.5 2.1 4.4 3.8 1.6 0.4
Source: CBI Pay Databank
Notes: Number of observations = 11866
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Table 6.5
The relative incidence of strike and non-strike action in Britain, 1966-1990
Year of 
survey
Strikes
Any non-strike 
action
Non-CBI CBI
Overtime bans 
Non-CBI CBI
Work to rule / 
go slows
Non-CBI CBI
1966 100 148 110 120
100 183 105 100
100 157 79 61
1972 100 171 109 88
100 119 75 106
1973 100 230 157 89
100 222 139 148
1975 100 - 75 96
1978 100 88 70 48
1980 100 123 138 77 103 54 67
1981 100 214 182 86
1982 100 227 197 100
1983 100 220 192 72
1984 100 95 209 58 172 42 81
1985 100 318 278 114
1986 100 214 202 60
1987 100 317 279 107
1988 100 147 142 27
1989 100 271 244 87
1990 100 50 30 20
Notes: (i) Figures reported are the number of repondents experiencing given action as 
percentage of number experiencing strikes expressed as an index (strikes=100).
(ii) Range of responses recorded for same year signifies a multi-repondent 
survey. Details of surveys listed in Table 6.1
(iii) indicates not recorded in survey.
Sources: Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
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Figure 6.1
Relative incidence of strike and non-strike action 1966-1990
350
300
CBI Survey
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150 - A
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100
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Year o f survey
Notes:
1. Reported by:
•  Managers -•-M anagers A Shop stewards
* Combined reports □ Foremen
2. Figures used are % reporting non-strike action/% reporting strikes.
Source: Table 6.5
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Figure 6.2
Relative incidence of strikes and overtime bans 1966-1990
300
250
CBI Survey
200
150
Strikes=100
100
50
0
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Year of survey
Notes:
1. Reported by:
•  Managers Managers A Shop stewards
* Combined reports n Foremen
2. Figures used are % reporting overtimes ban/% reporting strikes.
Source: Table 6.5
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Figure 6.3
Relative incidence of strikes and works to rule/go slows 1966-1990
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Year o f  survey
1. Reported by:
•  Managers — Managers A Shop stewards
* Combined reports □ Foremen
2. Figures used are % reporting works to rule/go slows/ % reporting strikes.
Source: Table 6.4
Chapter 7
Disputes, overtime bans and the tactics of industrial action
"It appears from this that overtime bans may be as frequent as strikes - 
a reflection of the extensive use of overtime in this country..." (Donovan 
Commission, 1968: para 375)
"... an explanation of differences in strikes might hold good for the use of all 
kinds of sanctions." Clegg (1976).
1. Introduction
Overtime bans were the most prevalent form of industrial action in 
manufacturing in the 1980s. During the decade over 4.5 per cent of wage settlements 
in UK manufacturing involved an overtime ban, according to data from the CBI Pay 
Databank. This is almost double the rate of strikes in such settlements for the same 
period (2.6 per cent). The Donovan Commission’s survey of workplace industrial 
relations conducted in 1966 suggested that the incidence of overtime bans and strikes 
was very similar (Government Social Survey 1968), yet the Commission’s Report 
devoted a whole chapter to strikes and a mere half sentence to overtime bans (quoted 
above). Although a great deal of time has been devoted to the issues of strike 
incidence, causes, duration and effect, there has been virtually no analysis of this 
apparently more popular form of action (at least in the 1980s). Clegg (1976) implied 
that a satisfactory explanation for the incidence of strikes would be sufficient as an 
explanation for the use of overtime bans and other industrial sanctions (quoted above). 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why overtime bans have been so little investigated. 
Using data from the CBI Pay Databank covering over 1000 wage settlements per year 
in the 1980s, this chapter examines the incidence of these different forms of industrial 
action.
The paper also challenges the accepted economic approach to explaining strikes 
in the UK. Previous economics based UK empirical studies of strikes (Booth and 
Cressy 1990, Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth 1993) have been restricted to testing US 
economic strike theories, which are constructed on the basis of a very different
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industrial relations system. In essence the established economic strike theories can 
really only be said to explain bargaining impasses. To explain the incidence of strikes 
or overtime bans (or any other outcome post-impasse) in the UK, some consideration 
of tactics as well as dispute causes is necessary.
Section 2 provides some further descriptive information on the incidence of 
overtime bans compared to strikes and other forms of industrial action in the 1980s, in 
addition to that provided in chapter six. The main conceptual basis of the paper is 
fleshed out in section 3. In section 4 the theories which attempt to explain bargaining 
impasses are assessed and some possible determinants are outlined. Section 5 
discusses factors which could in theory influence the tactics of industrial action with 
special reference to overtime bans. Section 6 provides results from the CBI Pay 
Databank, on the incidence of different forms of industrial action. Conclusions and 
some implications concerning the findings are outlined in section 7.
2. Industrial action in the 1980s
Data from the CBI Pay Databank survey reveal that 6.6% of wage settlements 
in manufacturing in the 1980s, where collective bargaining took place, involved some 
form of industrial action. By far the most common form of action was the overtime 
ban - a restriction on the level of overtime working imposed as a sanction by workers. 
Table 7.1 records the incidence of the various forms of industrial action for each year 
in the sample, as well as by industry1. The sample for this table is all 9117 
settlements in the CBI Databank in establishments where unions were recognised for 
determining some element of the pay and conditions of at least some of the workforce, 
hence the higher figures than those reported for the whole survey in Table 6.4.
The overtime ban was the most popular form of industrial action in every pay 
round covered. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 7.1. Note that after the 
overtime ban, the strike is next most prevalent form of action, followed by the go slow 
or work to rule. This picture of industrial action tactics is very different from that 
suggested by workplace surveys of the 1970s. Most of the latter report that strike 
action was the most popular form of industrial action. This comparison is explored in 
chapter 6, and the evidence presented here sheds some light on why the relative 
popularity of overtime bans and strikes seems to have reversed in the 1980s compared 
to the previous decade.
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Particularly dispute prone industries in the 1980s were Coal and Petroleum 
Products (note that this does not include coal mining which is excluded from the 
survey), Instrument Engineering, Vehicles and Timber, which generally confirms 
expectations and earlier findings (Brown 1981). In terms of the strike versus overtime 
ban split, Coal and Petrol Products, Metals and Mechanical Engineering seem to have 
disproportionately higher incidences of overtime bans than strikes compared to other 
industries.
There is a general consensus in the academic literature concerning the 
complementary relationship between strikes and non-strike action (Clegg 1976, Smith 
et al 1978, Kelly and Nicolson 1980, Brown 1981, Ingram et al 1991). A plant which 
has one sort of action (say an overtime ban) in a particular bargaining round is also 
more likely to have another type of action (say a strike) in that round. This finding is 
supported for individual bargaining groups in the CBI data by the correlation 
coefficients between the various forms of action, which are all positive (Ingram et al 
1991: Table 3).
One implication of this complementarity could be that explanations for strikes 
may also be appropriate for other forms of action, as implied by Clegg (1976). 
However, this second best approach can be rectified because of the depth of data from 
the CBI Databank. Despite the complementarity there are variations within the pattern 
and it is certainly not the case that all strikes are preceded by overtime bans, nor are 
all overtime bans followed by strikes2. Thus far no study has looked more closely at 
the connection between the two main forms of action. Specifically why the tactics of 
industrial conflict might vary between different bargaining groups and at different 
times.
3. Strike theories, bargaining impasses and industrial action
a. Introduction
Economic theories of bargaining and strikes are virtually all of US origin and 
consequently owe much to the particular industrial relations system and labour law 
environment which exists there. In fact most strike theories are restricted to theoretical 
modelling of contract renewal negotiations in the US private sector, and so ignore 
other (intracontractual and usually illegal public sector) strikes and other types of
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bargaining impasse. The main thematic argument underlying this chapter is that 
because the particular contextual scenario on which strike theories are based does not 
even closely fit the UK industrial relations environment, strike theories when applied 
to the UK need to be relabelled as impasse theories. The key point is that, unlike in 
the US, in the UK there are a range of potential types of bargaining impasse which are 
not pre-determined before bargaining begins. This has important consequences and 
means that these strike theories cannot and should not be tested on UK data in the 
same way as they are tested on US and Canadian data.
The ensuing analysis suggests that previous micro studies of strikes in the UK 
which have attempted to test the various economic strike theories have actually only 
skimmed the surface of bargaining impasses and strikes. This argument does not 
necessarily invalidate their conclusions but rather suggests that they have not really 
conducted the right tests. Note that this point is about much more than semantics over 
what is the most appropriate nomenclature of these theories. It argues that ’strike 
theories’ should be tested as impasse theories in the UK (i.e. with different dependent 
variables or sample selection than previously used), and that some consideration of the 
tactics of industrial action is a necessary complement to impasse theories for a more 
credible analysis of strikes and other forms of industrial action.
b. The context of strike theories
Existing economic models of strike activity concentrate on one particular type 
of strike - contract renewal strikes in the US and Canadian private sectors. Labour 
contracts are fixed term, usually three years duration and legally enforceable. About 
50% of US strikes occur after the breakdown of negotiations over the new contract 
(Flaherty 1983). There has been very little work on the distinction between contract 
and intracontractural strikes and in the main this has largely been ignored in theories 
or analyses of strikes with Flaherty’s (1983) paper an exception.
There are a number of reasons for this concentration on contract strikes. 
Principal is probably their lesser economic impact because of shorter duration, the 
lower number of workers involved and hence days lost. In addition, however, is the 
fact that the rules of the game are more closely defined for contract strikes than for 
more sporadic action, which suits econometric modellers. However for purposes of
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comparison with the UK, the contractural nature of the strike may be less important 
than the legal environment and legal status of such contracts.
A crucial element is that the legally enforceable nature of North American 
collective agreements means that the only possible outcome should the parties fail to 
reach agreement on the terms of a new contract is a strike (or a lockout). The only 
sanction available to employees should they fail to agree new terms with their 
employer is a strike. There is no equivalent to the overtime ban or go slow as in the 
UK, nor can either or both sides call for the intervention of a third party to help 
resolve any impasse. It is the sole availability of the strike weapon in the private 
sector which makes economic theories of bargaining impasse almost by default also 
theories of strike incidence.
This may seem an overstylised description of the US scene. But this stark 
(strike or settle) picture is confirmed in a recent paper by Crampton and Tracey
(1992):
"Previous [strike] models have assumed that all labor disputes take the 
form of a strike." (plOO).
Acknowledging this fact, Crampton and Tracy develop a new model on the basis that a 
’holdout’ is another possible outcome rather than just strike or settle. A holdout is 
defined as the time between the expiration of the previous contract and either the 
beginning of a strike or the settlement of a new contract, whichever comes first It is 
quite clear that a ’holdout’ cannot be classed as a post-impasse sanction. In the UK a 
holdout is equivalent to the extension of negotiations beyond the expected date of the 
next pay award or settlement. This would not be classed as a bargaining impasse in 
the UK, and certainly not a case of industrial action. There is no indication in the US 
literature that, once contract negotiations fail, there is any alternative to strike action 
and this is the context on which all the economic strike theories are based.
One caveat concerning private sector arbitration should be acknowledged 
though. Parties in the private sector can use arbitration as an alternative to strike 
action, but only in circumstances which do not undermine the general picture of 
impasse equals strike. In the terms of a new contract, parties can incorporate a clause 
which provides for arbitration rather than the strike option, should they fail to 
negotiate the next contract successfully. This is best classed as a voluntarily agreed,
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compulsory arbitration clause. Again, fundamental to this scenario is the concept that 
the consequence of a bargaining impasse is pre-determined.
In this restricted context it is readily apparent that a theory which can 
successfully predict a failure to agree, will also predict the incidence of strike action 
(although an additional model is required to predict the duration of the stoppage) or 
arbitration should the parties have adopted such a clause.
This conclusion can also be applied to the use of dispute procedures in the 
public sector. As described in chapter three, although all North American public 
employees have no right to strike unless their particular State, Province or municipality 
legislature provides such a right (and very few jurisdictions have done), many of them 
are covered by compulsory arbitration or alternative dispute procedures (Ashenfelter 
1985). Some jurisdictions provide a choice of procedure, but this is similar to the 
situation described in the private sector, i.e. the choice of post-impasse procedure is 
made before contract negotiations. Again the procedural outcome should negotiations 
fail is relatively pre-determined. This is not to deny that illegal strikes sometimes take 
place in the public sector (Olson 1986), but economic theorists have largely ignored 
this possibility when providing models which attempt to explain why dispute 
procedures are used.
c. An unexplored hiatus
Figure 7.2 provides a pictoral representation of the limiting effect of using 
existing economic strike theories in the UK. The stylised picture of the US and 
Canadian private and public sectors envisaged by economic models are indicated. The 
actual picture of dispute possibilities in the UK is spelt out below this. The argument 
for a new approach to the application of economic theories to the UK context hinges 
on this distinction. Whilst the actual North American context is slightly stylised for 
the sake of economic models, the UK context would have to be over simplified to be 
tested purely on such models. The great majority of bargaining pairs in the UK are 
not faced with a pre-determined procedural outcome should they fail to agree in 
negotiations.
A consequence of this critique is that a theory of strikes, or overtime bans, or 
arbitration usage should have two elements. The first comprising some version of the
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economic theories of impasse, and the second hypothesising which action(s) the parties 
take, conditional on impasse. This second element represents an unexplored hiatus at 
the heart of the disputes literature. It is the conceptual equivalent of measuring the 
effect of unions on pay by only comparing 100 per cent unionised, closed shop plants 
with non-union equivalents. There are a range of possible positions in the haitus 
between these two polarised positions which would be, and in the case of industrial 
action have been, ignored.
d. Exploring the unexplored
Without explicitly defining it, Currie and McConnell (1991) have come upon a 
similar unexplored hiatus when studying disputes in the Canadian public sector. Their 
principal concern is to examine the impact of alternative bargaining laws on collective 
bargaining outcomes. The laws range from a right to strike to compulsory arbitration 
to choice of procedure to duty to bargain to no bargaining rights. The possible 
outcomes range therefore from negotiated settlement to mediated to arbitrated to strike. 
Interestingly cases of each different outcome are observed under all possible legislative 
frameworks, for example arbitration awards in right to strike jurisdictions and strikes 
in arbitration only (and therefore no legal right to strike) jurisdictions. Currie and 
McConnell examine the incidence of different types of disputes in two ways: first, 
using trimmed probability models; and second using multinomial logit models.
Trimmed probability models involve restriction of the sample to exclude other 
types of dispute other than those being examined. For instance when examining the 
impact of strikes, the sample includes only those bargaining rounds which involved a 
strike or a negotiated settlement. Rounds which result in arbitrated or mediated 
awards are excluded. Similar selection criteria is used to examine the incidence of 
arbitration awards and mediated settlements.
A more suitable statistical method is to use a multinomial logit estimation 
technique. This is designed to model choice among more than two outcomes and is 
therefore appropriate to estimate the choice among the four bargaining outcomes. As 
Currie and McConnell state:
"These estimates should be more efficient than the estimates of the 
linear probability models." (p699)
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Although the results are similar across the two different models there are some 
nuances which the trimmed models do not pick up, partly presumably because they are 
using smaller sample sizes.
Given evidence on the relative incidence of other forms of industrial action in 
the UK (chapter 6), it appears that the multinomial logit technique is appropriate for 
examining the incidence of industrial action here. This also suggests that the few 
previous studies of strikes using micro data in the UK may be misspecified, because 
none of them appear to have sample selected in their models to exclude other types of 
industrial action or impasse outcome. This is certainly the case for Ingram et al
(1993) and Booth and Cressy (1990) who explicitly test economic strike theories, as 
well as Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) and Machin et al (1993) who use more 
deductive analyses. Although the latter two studies do estimate separate equations on 
the probability of any industrial action and strikes (long and short), they do not use a 
trimmed probability model for the strikes equations. So in the latter the depdendent 
variable is actually ’1’ for strike and ’O’ for no action or action short of a strike.
The proposition in this paper is that these approaches hide much of the richness 
in UK data on disputes. A statistical technique which can test simultaneously for the 
different forms of industrial action will permit an investigation of the unexplored 
hiatus. This may then help to provide some insights into the tactics of industrial 
action as well as economic theories of bargaining breakdowns.
4. Dispute theories
a. Introduction
Accepting that a theory of disputes is a necessary prerequisite for an 
understanding of the incidence of different forms of industrial action, provides a welter 
of theories to draw on. As well as the various strike theories, such as Hicks’s accident 
theory (Hicks 1932) and two main asymmetric information approaches, there are also a 
range of theories connected to the use of arbitration in the US public sector, which are 
outlined in chapter 3. The strike and arbitration theories highlight very similar 
elements, connected to parties’ expectations, the information available to them and 
relationships between groups on the same side. Up to date summaries of the different 
models concerning causes of disputes can be found in Ashenfelter and Currie (1990)
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and Babcock and Olson (1992). This section discusses some of the theories outlined 
and tested in chapter 3 but the variables used to test them are somewhat different for 
the CBI data and for ease of analysis the main points of the theories are best 
reiterated.
The approaches start from a similar pretext - the consequences of a bargaining 
impasse are costly to both sides, therefore if parties are correctly able to predict the 
outcome and they are risk averse, they should avoid the impasse. This suggests three 
main explanations for why impasses occur: One or both parties fail to correctly 
predict the outcome of the impasse, this is not necessarily a mistake but is certainly 
Pareto-inferior to a non-impasse settlement; the costs of the impasse are not 
sufficiently prohibitive to induce settlement; or the parties are not risk averse.
Many of the theories outlined below are conceptually very appealing, but being 
able to distinguish between them through empirical testing has been distinctly 
unrewarding both in the US and the UK to date. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, many of the theories - asymmetric information, over optimism, risk aversity, 
principal-agent problems - are based on abstract concepts which can only be measured 
with proxies. Moreover some proxies are the same for different theories such that two 
or more theories might predict the same association (say between multi-unionism and 
the likelihood of a dispute). Second, most empirical studies have been unable to find 
support for one theory alone because disputes are likely to be caused by divergent 
factors in different contexts. Chapter 3 described that in the US, work has increasingly 
turned to the social science laboratory to attempt to test single theories of disputes 
avoiding the complexity of field data. Whilst such studies can be quite interesting 
because they usually suggest support for the individual theory being tested, taken as a 
whole they in fact reach a similar conclusion to studies based on real world data - that 
the range of different explanations for disputes can be supported by empirical 
evidence.
b. Failure to correctly predict the outcome of a dispute
There are three closely connected theories which attempt to explain why one or 
both parties might fail to correctly predict the outcome of a dispute.
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i. Asymmetric information: If the parties are not fully informed about each 
other’s concession curve post-impasse, then they may over or under estimate the final 
outcome. If one or both over estimate the other’s reservation price (how low the union 
will go or how high the employer will go) then the resolution of the dispute by 
industrial action or third party intervention may be required (Kennan and Wilson 
1989). There are two main versions of the theory dependent on where the 
asymmetries exist. The more orthodox version suggests that in certain contexts 
workers may be under informed about the level of employer profits. A dispute is one 
method for determining the employers ’ability to pay’. Ingram et al (1993) highlight 
an alternative version of the theory on strikes, that the employer has less information 
about the militancy of workers than the union negotiator, and therefore a strike is a 
means for workers to demonstrate their strength and solidarity. If it is assumed that 
the determinants of reservation price are principally the firm’s profits and the militancy 
of the workers, then certain predictions can be made.
Factors likely to be associated with impasse inducing asymmetries include:
a. Whether or not the plant is part of a larger organisation rather than a single 
plant firm, workers may be less able to determine the true level of profit in the 
former;
b. Whether or not there was industrial action in the previous period, industrial 
action provides information to the employer about the militancy of the workers 
and therefore workers should not have to repeatedly take action to provide 
accurate information;
c. Industrial action legislation which make pre-strike ballots compulsory, 
providing workers can be held to the ballot result - forced to strike if the 
majority decision is for a strike3 - then compulsory ballots should reduce the 
incidence of strikes since they provide accurate information on the militancy of 
workers (Metcalf and Dunn 1991, Manning 1993);
d. The presence of multiple bargaining units, each individual group may be less 
able to accurately determine what fraction of profits it can claim.
e. The occupational composition of the bargaining group. Non-manual 
employees may have access to more financial information concerning the 
employer’s profits, because they are closer to the management function, than 
manual workers.
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ii. Principal-agent problems: Asymmetric information and principal-agent 
problems have been intrinsically linked even though the two concepts are actually 
quite distinct. If asymmetries of information about the employer’s ability to pay or 
employees militancy occur then impasses are likely. This is especially so if there are 
principal-agent problems. In other words, the asymmetries are inter-party and/or intra­
party.
The most famous use of this analysis is the Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) 
model of strikes but it also been used in reference to arbitration (McCall 1990). The 
classic interpretation is that union members (the principal) have less information about 
an employer’s ability to pay than their negotiator (agent) and believe that the employer 
can pay more than the union negotiator says he can. A strike, or arbitration, is used to 
check that the negotiator is not shirking in negotiations. It seems plausible to argue 
that such principal-agent problems may be less likely in workplace bargaining (which 
predominates in the CBI sample) than a company, industry or national bargaining 
context
Chapter 3 highlights an alternative version applied to arbitration which suggests 
that in certain contexts a management negotiator may be more concerned with 
impressing their constituency (higher level management) with a tough negotiating 
stance than preventing an impasse. This will be even more likely if there are 
asymmetries of information about arbitrator preferences, or worker militancy in the 
case of industrial action, between the different management levels.
Variables which can be used to test principal-agent theories include:
a. The wage outcome in the previous period, if the principal-agent problem is 
on the employees side then a lower real or relative wage at t-1 may be 
associated with a greater likelihood of an impasse at t, similarly on the 
employers side a previously high settlement may encourage a manager to be 
tougher in the current negotiations.
b. A management side principal-agent problem will be more likely if the plant 
is part of a larger organisation.
c. If Ashenfelter and Johnson are right about workers forcing unwilling union 
negotiators to sanction strike action, then legislation which provides union 
members greater power over the decision to call industrial action should
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increase impasse incidence, all else equal. Therefore the industrial action 
balloting provision of the 1984 Employment Act could conceivably increase the 
incidence of industrial action. Bearing in mind the prediction made concerning 
ballots on asymmetric information theory, it will be interesting to establish 
which of these opposing forces has the greatest influence.
d. Certain occupational groups may be more likely to have principal-agent 
problems. One prediction might be that manual bargaining groups are more 
likely to experience asymmetries of information between leaders and members, 
than non-manual or mixed groups. One rationalisation for this is the role of 
shop stewards in manual bargaining groups who, as activists, may serve to 
drive an expectations or aspriations wedge between union members and their 
leaders.
e. Industrial action in the previous bargaining round, should be associated with 
a lower incidence of action in the following round. If a negotiator has recently 
been audited then both the negotiator should know not to shirk this time and 
the workers would not need to audit them again so soon.
iii. Over optimistic expectations or differing beliefs: This type of explanation 
has been principally applied to arbitration theories (Farber 1980, Farber and Bazerman 
1989) and is specifically concerned with the predictions parties make concerning 
arbitrator behaviour. If parties are over optimistic about their chances of winning the 
award, i.e. they have differing beliefs about the arbitrator’s preferred award, then they 
will fail to negotiate an agreement. Note that this hypothesis is bolstered if there are 
asymmetries of information, but it does not rely on those asymmetries. The parties 
may have exactly the same information but may assess that information in a biased 
way (Babcock et al 1991).
In some ways this is a modem, bargaining psychology version of Hicks’s 
’accident theory’. Impasses generated through over optimism are still ’mistakes’ in an 
economic sense because they produce Pareto-inferior outcomes, but they are not really 
accidents. The theory is entirely based on the notion that parties will assess the same 
information in a biased rather than a rational way.
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Concerning industrial action this theory would suggest that one cause of 
impasses leading to industrial action is that both sides are over optimistic about each 
other’s concession curve, if action were to take place. In other words both sides 
believe that their opposite number will concede more and more quickly after an 
impasse than they actually do, even if they have the same information. It seems 
reasonable to argue that differing beliefs are more likely to be a cause of impasse 
when:
a. Macroeconomic conditions make predicting an opponent’s reservation price 
more difficult, for instance in periods of high inflation or unemployment or 
when such indicators are more volatile (Currie 1989);
b. When there has not been industrial action in the previous pay round.
c. Costs are not sufficiently prohibitive
The comparative costs of negotiating a settlement against the costs of resolving 
it through either industrial action or third party intervention have been cited as a 
reason for disputes. Joint cost theory concerning strikes is the most well known 
impasse theory concerning costs. Reder and Neumann (1980) argue that bargaining 
involves the establishment of ’protocols’ or rules for resolving predictable issues which 
might otherwise become disputes. Protocols cost bargaining time and effort to 
establish, so they are more likely to be developed if the costs of a potential dispute are 
high and the longer a bargaining relationship lasts. Similarly on arbitration, Bloom 
(1981) has argued that there are high potential costs associated with negotiations 
therefore arbitration must be an expensive option if it is to deter disputes. The cost of 
a dispute must be sufficiently high such that it is avoided through the development of 
a protocol.
Joint cost theory has been given relatively short shrift in some studies because 
pinning it down to predictions is difficult (Ingram et al 1992), though this criticism 
could also apply to other theories. McConnell (1990) has manipulated joint cost 
theory to claim that it could suggest that strikes are both contra-cyclical - good times 
in the product and labour markets raise joint costs and thereby lead to fewer strikes - 
and pro-cyclical - good times imply a high alternative wage in another workplace, 
making a strike more likely. However, it may still have some worth. The issue of the 
cost and time of developing rules or protocols does have some attractions.
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Unfortunately there is no information on the length of bargaining history of the 
parties in the CBI data set, which might be a good proxy for whether or not rules will 
have been developed. However, other variables could might indicate the lack of such 
rules include:
a. If there was industrial action in the previous bargaining round. One 
interpretation might be that if a mle did not prevent action in the last round 
then it is still unlikely to do so in the current round. The absence of protocols 
might explain why some bargaining pairs are dispute prone. However, an 
alternative interpretation might be that action in the previous round would have 
stimulated the construction of new protocols to avoid a recurrence.
b. If the bargaining group is relatively small. It may be prohibitively expensive 
to develop rules for small bargaining groups compared to large groups. 
Therefore disputes might be more likely in smaller bargaining groups. Some 
care must be taken here, however, if small bargaining group also means small 
workplace, such a dispute although involving a small bargaining group may be 
relatively costly.
c. If labour costs are a low proportion of total costs. Bargaining group size 
may not be the best indication of the effect of a dispute on production and 
therefore on the incentives to develop protocols. However, joint cost theory 
might predict that disputes are more likely if labour costs are a low proportion 
of total costs, since a dispute involving labour may not disrupt production to 
the extent that it would if labour costs were a high proportion of total costs. 
Some care should be taken here though since low labour costs imply a more 
capital intensive plant such that labour may in fact be more able to disrupt 
production with fewer workers taking action than plants which are more labour 
intensive.
d. The legislation on industrial action in the 1980s has made industrial action 
progressively more difficult (costly) to call (Elgar and Simpson 1993, Marsh
1992). A strike cannot be maintained by secondary picketing or secondary 
action. Trade unions face financial penalties and cannot rely on the closed 
shop to secure solidarity. It seems that this legislative programme has raised 
the joint costs of industrial action. For employers the costs are the same as
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before except for the prospect of damages if the strike is illegal. Therefore 
joint cost theory would predict a negative association between dispute rates and 
1980s legislation.
d. Parties are not risk averse
All impasse or strike theories assume that parties are risk averse. Farber and 
Katz (1979) argue that even if the costs of disagreement are prohibitive, and there is 
full information, if parties are risk neutral or risk loving then impasses can occur. 
Taking the gamble may be preferable to the certainty of a possibly higher or lower 
negotiated settlement. The analysis of data from bargaining in new style deal plants in 
chapter three finds support for this explanation for the use of third party intervention in 
some UK plants. It has been suggested that groups take more risks and the positive 
association between strikes and multi-unionism under separate bargaining 
arrangements, found by Metcalf et al (1993a) and Machin et al (1993), provides further 
support for a risk aversity explanation of impasses which lead to industrial action. 
Further most studies of strikes have found a positive association between bargaining 
group or workplace size and dispute incidence. This may be because larger groups are 
more willing to take risks than smaller ones.
The predicted associations between the theories outlined above and the various 
factors mentioned are set out in Table 7.2. This illustrates the problem of 
distinguishing between the different theories because of their similar predictions 
concerning certain variables. It also highlights the malleability of some of the theories 
concerning predictions on certain variables.
5. Industrial dispute tactics
There are no established theories which attempt to analyse the tactical decisions 
which determine what happens after a bargaining impasse. What is really needed is 
some explanation for why, given that bargaining has broken down, some workers 
choose to go on strike, others use an overtime ban, some another form of industrial 
action such as a go-slow and still others press for third party intervention. An all 
encompassing theory which can explain these variations seems implausible but an 
explanation for the overtime ban versus the strike decision should be possible. There
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are two main sources here: previous surveys which provide basic evidence on the 
incidence of overtime bans compared to strikes; and a case study of the 1973 miners’ 
strike which was preceded by an overtime ban (Allen 1981). Five main factors have 
been suggested as possible influences on the tactical decision over which form of 
industrial action to employ and the expected determinants are summarised in Table 7.2.
a. Overtime working
Of course, just as the unemployed cannot go on strike, an overtime ban is only 
feasible if overtime is actually worked. What is less clear, however, is whether or not 
the relative level of overtime working across plants or time periods will be related to 
the incidence of overtime bans. The Donovan Report suggested a clear positive 
linkage between the aggregate level of overtime bans in the UK and the level of 
overtime working compared to our competitors (see quote at beginning of chapter).
However, this issue is surely not so straightforward. The cost versus 
effectiveness conundrum makes a prediction very difficult. If overtime working is 
relatively high, then the overtime ban will be more effective (costly for employers) but 
also more costly to employees than when overtime working is low. Similarly if 
overtime working is low it will be a relatively painless sanction compared to striking, 
but also may be comparatively ineffective for achieving concessions from the 
employer.
Allen’s case study of the 1973 miners’ strike includes a summary of the 
contemporary debate within the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) about the pros 
and cons of an overtime ban. One of the unanticipated effects of the ban was that 
because as a consequence miners had to depend solely on their basic pay, the ban 
made them realise how low their non-overtime pay was. Allen states, "It [the overtime 
ban] had an enormous politicizing influence which no one really foresaw."(p 179).
Allen’s conclusion about the galvanizing effect of the ban is perhaps an 
additional pointer to a positive relationship between the level of overtime working and 
the likelihood of an overtime ban being preferred to a strike. If the miners’ scenario 
(an overtime ban focuses attention on basic pay and so increases militancy) holds for 
other workers, and union leaders are aware of this, then there should be a positive 
association between overtime working and overtime ban incidence given an impasse.
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The direction of any possible effect can be tested, though unfortunately only with 
industry overtime figures (annual weekly averages) because the CBI data do not 
include information on overtime working.
b. Macroeconomic conditions
Brown (1981) argues that in ’good times’, action short of a strike is popular 
whereas strikes are relatively more prevalent in ’bad times’:
"Employers may be more prepared to hold out against limited actions 
when they are operating at a low level of capacity (and thus when 
overtime bans and the like are relatively painless) than when they want 
to maximise production." (p 85)
There is again a cost versus effectiveness problem with this explanation which 
suggests that the opposite relationship could also exist. The relationship between the 
tactical decision to use the overtime ban or the strike and macroeconomic indicators 
(both levels and changes), can be tested using the CBI data.
c. Shopfloor organisation
Edwards (1983) and Brown (1981) using evidence from the Warwick Survey 
argue that the use of non-strike action (grouping overtime bans with other forms of 
non-strike action) is related to the level of shopfloor organisation. Long established 
groups of workers, well organised shop stewards, high union density, the closed shop 
and multi-unionism (which are presumably all heavily correlated) are seen as relatively 
more likely to be associated with non-strike action than their counterparts. They write: 
"Relatively youthful organisations will not have developed an 
established position and may thus have relied more on the weapon of 
the strike." (Edwards 1983: p 229)
"..experience of non-strike action was much higher in plants with high 
levels of union density than it was elsewhere... [and] More complex 
steward organisation appears to permit the greater use of sanctions other 
than strikes" (Brown 1981: pp 89-90)
One rationalisation for the importance of union organisation in determining the tactics 
of industrial conflict concerns the role of the employer in the course of a dispute. 
During an overtime ban, employees continue to work a basic week and therefore they
235
come into contact with, and in some sense are still under the control of, the employer. 
However, during a strike there is likely to be no direct contact between management 
and rank and file workers. The maintenance of industrial action in the face of 
employer pressure on workers during an overtime ban may thus require a relatively 
high level of union organisation in comparison to the strike scenario.
d. Industry stocks
If overtime bans are used to reduce stocks in anticipation of a strike (as with 
the 1973 miners’ strike) then we might expect a positive association between high 
stock levels and the preference for the overtime ban before or in place of a strike.
This can be tested using industry level, annual stock figures.
e. The law on industrial action
The changing legal framework on industrial action in the 1980s may have 
encouraged the increasing use of the overtime ban compared to the strike over the 
decade for two reasons. The first, somewhat technical and not widely appreciated, 
concerns the details of the 1984 balloting provisions. The second is a more general 
point concerning the legal framework.
The technical issue concerns the wording of the main clause in the Trade Union 
Act 1984 concerning pre-action ballots. The key clause states that in a ballot a union 
must ask whether or not a worker is ’prepared to take part... in a strike involving him 
in a breach of his contract of employment’, (Wedderburn 1986: 74). The balloting law 
did not then specifically include non-strike industrial action and because it was unclear 
whether or not such action constitutes a breach of contract, it was not certain whether 
action short of a strike needed to be sanctioned by a pre-action ballot. This anomaly 
was cleared up by the 1988 Employment Act which amended the balloting provisions 
to cover any ’industrial action’ rather than action in breach of an employment contract. 
However, if union leaders and members were aware of this irregularity in the law 
between 1984 and 1988 and were prepared to exploit it, we might expect to find a 
greater use of the overtime ban compared to strike action (or other action short of a 
strike) in this period, all else equal.
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More generally there is some recent anecdotal evidence that the impact of the 
whole gamut of legislation may be disproportionately concentrated on the incidence of 
strikes. In a survey examining managements’ actual use and willingness to use the 
new legal provisions on industrial action, Incomes Data Services (IDS) found that 
managers did not consider using the law to tackle non-strike action as readily as for 
strike action. One firm, quoted in the report, stated that:
’injunctions are too hamfisted to deal with bans and working to 
contract’, (IDS 1992: 6).
IDS comment on the basis of their survey that:
’Industrial action short of a strike - more widespread in recent years, 
and especially during this recession - can therefore present a nagging 
problem’, (IDS 1992: 6).
If the opinion expressed by this firm is shared more widely by managers as IDS 
suggest, and employees also see the law as being a much less important factor when 
considering non-strike action rather than strike action, then the 1980s law changes 
which weakened union power should be positively associated with the incidence of 
overtime bans compared to strikes. If proven, this would be a consequence of the 
1980s changes which has not previously been identified.
6. Results
There are fifteen potential industrial action outcomes which could be recorded 
by the CBI survey, ranging from use of all four types of action through combinations 
of three and two and down to the use of a single type of action only. An empirical 
test based on sixteen different discreet outcomes (the sixteenth being no action) would 
be technically very difficult and probably unrewarding even if feasible. It seems more 
appropriate to test for the incidence of five different outcomes: the strike (with no 
overtime ban); the overtime ban (with no strike); the strike and overtime ban 
combined; industrial action involving neither of these; and no industrial action.
Table 7.3 presents results of four different multinomial logit regression models 
on an industrial action variable taking one of these five values for each bargaining 
round. The default category of the dependent variable is no industrial action. 
Interpretation of the results depends upon the sign of the coefficients across the
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different outcomes and the varying level of marginal impact and significance. A 
consistent sign and predominantly significant coefficient is cited as evidence on dispute 
theories. Variation in sign across the outcomes is strong evidence concerning tactics. 
Notable differences in the marginal impact and/or significance of a variable on 
different outcomes provides weaker evidence on tactics.
a. Evidence on dispute theories
Factors which are consistent across the different industrial action outcomes and 
are also positively associated with the likelihood of a dispute are: the size of the 
bargaining group, if the group is manual, the level of regional monthly unemployment 
(Model II), if an overtime ban occurred in the previous bargaining round, the level of 
stocks in the industry, and the legislation index (a high index score indicates laws 
comparatively favourable to unions). Consistent negative coefficients appear for the 
non-manual bargaining group dummy, for those settlements after the 1984 Trade Union 
Act became law (except some estimates in model IV), for those bargaining pairs who 
experienced a go slow over the previous settlement and on the industry overtime 
working level.
Predominantly non-significant or inconsistently signed variables include the 
number of bargaining groups, if there was a strike over the previous contract, the 
relative wage under the previous contract (and the real wage, although not reported in 
tables), the level of union density in the industry, the level of inflation, the percentage 
change in both unemployment and inflation from the preceeding year (Model II), the 
proportion of labour costs in total costs (Model IV) and if the plant is a subsidiary of a 
larger enterprise (also Model IV). Some of these results require further clarification 
before discussing their implications for dispute theories.
Bargaining groups of 50 employees or over are significantly more likely to 
experience any form of industrial action than groups of under fifty employees.
However there is no monotonic rise in the marginal effect of each bigger size dummy. 
In general, a bargaining group of over 500 workers is no more likely to experience any 
particular form of action than one of 50-100 workers. Note that this does not 
necessarily contradict previous findings on plant size and strike incidence (inter alia 
Prais 1978, Edwards 1981) because the unit of analysis here is the bargaining group
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rather than the workplace as in those studies. Moreover the CBI data cover only 
industrial action over changes usually negotiated annually in collective terms and 
conditions rather than action over other issues such as redundancy, grading, discipline 
or dismissals, which are potentially more likely in larger units. However, Metcalf et al 
(1993a) who have thoroughly investigated the role of bargaining group and workplace 
size and multi-unionism with respect to strike action using a smaller sample of these 
data, conclude that it is the confluence of large plants, multi-unionism and multiple 
bargaining units (in particular more than 3) which significantly increases the 
probability of strikes.
Metcalf et al’s results also put in context those presented here on the number of 
bargaining units. Although the sign on the coefficient for each outcome in each model 
is as expected, the coefficient only reaches significance for the overtime ban/no strike 
outcome in three of the models. The measure of multiple bargaining used for the full 
sample is a censored measure of 1,2 or 3+ bargaining units because this information is 
available for the whole sample whereas the specific number of bargaining groups is 
only available for a sub-sample. This may explain why the results presented do not 
show more consistently the expected significant relationship between multiple 
bargaining arrangements and dispute incidence4.
The two results concerning industrial action over the previous contract need to 
be treated with some caution since they could be picking up unobserved characteristics 
of the bargaining group or workplace. So although the result concerning an overtime 
ban at t-1 seems a priori to provide evidence against most of the economic theories 
cited above, which predict that parties learn from their mistakes, we cannot reject any 
theory solely on this result.
The central question for this section is what these results can tell us about the 
merits or demerits of the five economic theories of disputes described in section 5. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the problems of proxying these abstract concepts, none 
of the theories receives complete support from these data.
Whilst the asymmetric information theory is supported by the results on the 
manual and non-manual dummies and less consistently by the post 1984 Trade Union 
Act dummy, it is not supported by the results on multi-plant enterprises, the number of 
bargaining groups or previous industrial action. Some of the results in support of this
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theory are also compatible with other theories such as principal-agent (manual groups) 
and joint costs (the post 1984 Act dummy), which again adds to the problem of 
distinguishing between the theories.
Principal-agent theory is only supported (on the employees’ side) by the 
manual/non-manual results but the weight of evidence against this explanation is fairly 
comprehensive otherwise. While some results are in the right predicted direction but 
non-significant (previous wage and multi-unionism), three variables have opposite (and 
sometimes significant) signs to those predicted (multi-plant firms, previous industrial 
action and the 1984 Trade Union Act).
Joint cost theory emerges somewhat better than the other theories, suggesting 
that either it is a better explanation for disputes than other theories or perhaps more 
plausibly that it is sufficiently malleable to fit most results (as argued by Ingram et al
1993). The theory correctly predicts findings on the legisaltion index and the 1984 
Trade Union Act in isolation. It is the only theory compatible with the positive signs 
on previous strikes or overtime bans, although the theory would also have been 
consistent with directly contrary results. It is not supported by the bargaining group 
size and labour costs/total costs results.
An proper appraisal of joint cost theory should really concentrate on some 
empirical measure of the development and determinants of protocols. The questions of 
how, why and when bargaining parties develop rules to prevent or settle costly 
disputes is the fulcrum of Reder and Neumann’s theory, yet this is almost completely 
unexplored ground. The link between the incidence of disputes procedures and strikes 
has been partially examined (chapter 2, Blanchflower and Cubbin 1986, Booth and 
Cressy 1990), but the more fundamental issue of what prompts parties to develop rules 
is unresearched. Without this analysis, conclusions on joint cost theory are always 
likely to be relatively indefinite.
It is very difficult to test for the existence of differing beliefs as an explanation 
of bargaining impasses. Without some direct measure of the parties’ prior beliefs 
concerning the dispute outcome (as in Babcock et al’s experiment study, 1991), a 
second best solution is to test variables which might be expected to engender over 
optimism. Macroeconomic indicators have been used by Currie (1989) as proxies for 
such conditions. Three sets of indicators are used here - the levels (monthly), changes
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(over 12 months) and volatility (mean/standard deviation, again over 12 months) of 
inflation and regional unemployment. The results on two of these sets (volatility, 
found to be insignificant, is not reported), set out in Model II of Table 7.3, suggest 
that only the level of unemployement at the time of the pay settlement is significantly 
associated (negative) with the incidence of disputes in general. Coefficients on the 
other three indicators reported are both inconsistently signed and not always 
significant. There is also little evidence that parties learn from their mistakes from the 
previous industrial action variables.
There is hardly any empirical support for a general differing beliefs explanation 
of disputes from the CBI data. However, much of this may be due to the simplicity of 
the proxies used to test a reasonably abstract theory. Case studies may a more 
appropriate means to test for the existence of over optimism as a cause of disputes. 
Chapter 3 documents that in some case studies of the use of final-offer arbitration, 
over optimism on the losing side is a credible explanation for why disputes developed 
and progressed to the ultimate sanction of winner takes all arbitration.
Finally, on dispute theories, although the coefficients on bargaining groups size 
and multi-unionism are consistent with the predictions of a risk aversity explanation, 
these seem insufficient to argue that risk taking is a generally applicable reason for the 
occurrence of industrial action. It may be that in certain situations more risk loving 
parties are willing to see a dispute progress to industrial action, but the cause of the 
original dispute may be over optimism or asymmetric information.
As predicted - and as demonstrated in other empirical studies (see chapter 3) - 
no single dispute theory emerges as a dominant explanation for impasses. While this 
result is illuminating, indicating that disputes are caused by a range of different factors 
contingent on certain contexts, it is also fairly unrewarding since it appears that 
economics can provide no straightforward answer as to why disputes occur. Whilst 
some authors continue to investigate this issue using more and more elaborate 
experiments, others have turned to complementary issues within the industrial disputes 
field. These alternative avenues include interest in the consequences of disputes 
(Metcalf et al 1993b and Richardson and Rubin 1993) and, in this case, the range of 
industrial action outcomes post-impasse.
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b. Strong evidence on industrial action tactics
The criterion for strong evidence on dispute tactics is that variable coefficients 
for different outcomes - particularly for the two most popular forms of action - should 
be oppositely signed. Perhaps unsurprisingly there are very few factors which satisfy 
such a strong condition. Those which do so, indicate that union organisation and the 
macroeconomic environment have key roles in the tactical considerations over 
industrial action.
Industry union density is positively associated with only one industrial action 
outcome - an overtime ban without a strike - in all the models, and is negatively 
(though insignificantly) associated with all other possible outcomes. Above average 
union density increases the probability of an overtime ban without a strike being used 
by between 3.6 and 5.5 per cent, all else equal. Despite various caveats, over the use 
of aggregate density figures and that density may be proxying another factor, this 
result seems to be quite strong evidence to confirm Edwards’s and Brown’s 
suggestions concerning the role of union organisation and the tactics of industrial 
action, since it seems sensible to expect union organisation to be heavily correlated 
with union density.
There is some suggestion of a link between industrial action tactics and the 
macroeconomic environment from Model n. Although some of the results are non­
significant, the signs on the coefficients suggest that whereas strikes without overtime 
bans are positively associated with the level of inflation, and negatively associated 
with the change in inflation, the reverse is indicated for actions involving overtime 
bans. Overtime bans are more likely to be employed when inflation is low or rising 
whereas strikes alone are more likely when inflation is relatively high or falling. The 
results on unemployment are less clear cut. Whereas the level of regional 
unemployment is positively associated with all forms of industrial action, strikes alone 
or preceeded by an overtime ban are more likely when unemployment is falling, but 
the probability of an overtime ban alone declines as unemployment falls.
Although the mechanisms of how macroeconomic conditions impact upon the 
tactical considerations over industrial action are not at all clear, at very least we can 
argue that for the 1980s Brown’s argument that overtime bans are employed in good 
times and strikes in bad is not supported by these data. If anything it seems that the
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evidence points to an opposite conclusion. One rationalisation for these results 
concerns the different roles of strike and non-strike action. Perhaps overtime bans are 
used in some situations as a relatively low cost way for employees to express 
dissatisfaction with a pay award rather than to necessarily expect to change the award, 
for which a strike may be more effective. The fact that overtime bans are marginally 
more popular in periods of low or rising inflation, when the rents avaliable for higher 
than average pay awards may be relatively low, provides some support for this 
suggestion. Furthermore Metcalf et al (1993b) find some evidence that strikes are 
positively associated with higher pay settlements yet there is no evidence that a similar 
association exists for the use of overtime bans (Metcalf et al 1993b (earlier version): 
Table 5, the coefficient on overtime ban in a wage equation is actually negative, 
though insignificant).
c. Weak evidence on industrial action tactics
There are a number of variables for which the significance level and/or 
marginal effect differs markedly across the possible industrial action outcomes which 
provides weaker evidence on the determinants of industrial dispute tactics.
Manual bargaining groups are positively associated and non-manual groups 
negatively associated with all types of action (compared to the default mixed 
category), but the result is more pronounced for overtime bans rather than strikes. For 
instance Model II shows that the marginal probability of a strike alone is 0.1 per cent 
lower and non-significant for non-manuals than mixed groups but for overtime bans 
alone it is 2.9 per cent lower and highly significant. There may be two factors at work 
here. First, non-manuals are less likely to work rostered overtime perhaps because of 
more flexible hours arrangements such that an overtime ban is simply not feasible.
This result might also add weight to the link between union organisation and industrial 
dispute tactics. The level of shop steward organisation among non-manuals is lower 
than that for manual and mixed bargaining groups (Millward and Stevens 1986: Table 
3.11; Millward et al 1992: Table 4.2) and the closed shop is much less common for 
non-manuals than for manuals (Millward and Stevens 1986: Table 4.1; Millward et al 
1992: Table 3.17).
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Union organisation might also explain the fact that the number of bargaining 
groups (which is the best available measure of multi-unionism for this sample), 
although positive for all industrial action outcomes, only reaches significance for the 
overtime ban only option (in 3 of the 4 models reported). In contrast to this result, 
Machin et al (1993) using WIRS data from 1984 find that multi-unionism with 
separate bargaining is significantly and positively associated with strikes of one or 
more day’s duration but not with shorter strikes or action short of a strike. However 
their multi-unionism and bargaining measures are somewhat different from those in the 
CBI sample and their data is only from one year in the 1980s so the divergent results 
are not necessarily incompatible.
The annual weekly average level of overtime working by industry is negatively 
associated with the use of all forms of industrial action but the marginal effect is 
consistently more for the use of an overtime ban only. So any hypothesised positive 
link between the level of overtime working and overtime bans can be rejected. On the 
contrary, in industries or time periods when overtime working is relatively high the 
probability of an overtime ban alone being used is effected much more than other 
industrial action outcomes including strikes. There are a number of mechanisms by 
which this result could be explained: because workers who work proportionately more 
overtime can use the threat of the overtime ban more effectively without actually 
having to take action; because high overtime working means heavy reliance on 
overtime pay, therefore reduced willingness to lose that pay through using the overtime 
ban; because an overtime ban is most effective for workers who do not usually work 
overtime - a refusal to work ’emergency’ overtime may be a more potent weapon than 
refusal to work institutionalised overtime where both parties know that lost output can 
be made up after the dispute.
Although the results are not particularly robust to changes in specifications 
there is some suggestion that the industrial relations legislation of the 1980s has had 
differential impact on the incidence of overtime bans and strikes. It seems that in this 
respect the legislation as a whole has had more impact than the particular nuance of 
the 1984 Act’s balloting provisions concerning strikes and non-strike industrial action. 
The coefficients on the 1984 Trade Union Act dummy are non-significant in both 
Models I and IV and are generally signed as expected (negative for all outcomes).
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However, Freeman and Pelletier’s (1990) index (Models II and III) is associated more 
significantly with action involving strikes than the overtime ban only. This adds 
therefore, albeit fairly weak, support to the findings of IDS’s survey of management 
concerning the law and industrial action short of strike and provides a new twist to 
existing evidence on the impact of the law on British industrial relations in the 1980s.
7. Conclusions
Empirical testing of dispute theories - especially strike theories - has not arrived 
at a definitive answer to why disputes occur. Although the CBI data provide exactly 
the right type of data from bargaining group/pay negotiations scenarios on which 
economic theories are based, the picture of no dominant explanation persists. It seems 
that there are a range of credible economic theories which are unrankable by empirical 
testing.
An alternative to further examination of this melee of theories, is the tactics of 
industrial action. The richness and extent of the CBI data permit the first thorough 
analysis of this almost entirely unresearched area. Overall there is empirical support 
for the contention that union organisation and macroeconomic conditions are the main 
determinants of the tactics of industrial action although other factors may inflence 
whether or not a dispute reaches the industrial action stage in the first place. Other 
factors which seem to be marginally important include the occupational characteristics 
of the bargaining group, the number of bargaining groups in the workplace, the level 
of overtime working and the 1980s industrial relations legislation.
An interesting postscript to these findings concerns the very different picture of 
industrial action in the UK in the 1970s compared to the 1980s. Chapter 6 documents 
the reverse in relative prevalence of overtime bans and strikes between the two 
decades. In the light of evidence from this paper certain explanations emerge for this. 
The very different macroeconomic and legislative environments must provide a 
reasonably straightforward part of the explanation. The results on union organisation, 
however, provide something of a conundrum. There are two potential means to 
reconcile the finding that union organisation is positively associated with overtime 
bans as opposed to strikes in the 1980s yet strikes were more prevalent than overtime 
bans in the 1970s than 1980s when unions seemed prima facie to be better organised.
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One explanation might be that any association between union organisation and 
industrial action tactics is contingent on other exogenous factors and that the 
association reversed over the two decades. Alternatively, although aggregate union 
density declined considerably in the 1980s, perhaps the result was a pared down, 
relatively well organised core whereas in the 1970s, although union membership was 
historically very high, this included a large proportion of workplaces where 
organisational features were less well developed.
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Footnotes
1. Definitions of various forms of organised and unorganised industrial action can be found 
in Turkington (1976). Note that one drawback of the CBI data, for research purposes, is that 
works to rule and go slows are grouped under the same category, unlike in other surveys 
(chapter 6).
2. For the sample used here of 9117 pay settlements: there were 414 overtime bans of which 
only 96 (23.2%) were followed by a strike; conversely there were 233 strikes, 41.2% of which 
were preceded by an overtime ban.
3. Until the 1988 Employment Act, union members could be officially disciplined for not 
taking part in industrial action. Since the Act, union members can seek redress for being 
’unjustifiably disciplined’ in such cases, whether or not the action is lawful. This so-called 
strike-breaker’s charter effectively means the floccinaucinihilipilification of pre-strike ballots. 
In other words because the balloters can not be held to the result, and therefore a ’Yes’ vote 
is no indication of militancy, the ballots can be estimated as worthless.
4. Note that other measures of multiple bargaining were also tried but not reported, notably 
a dummy on more than one bargaining group, these were also non-significant.
Figure 7.1
Figure 7.2 
Table 7.1
Table 7.2 
Table 7.3
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Figure and tables
Industrial action in unionised bargaining groups in British manufacturing 
1979-89
Dispute theories, the North American and UK contexts
Industrial action in unionised bargaining groups in British manufacturing
1979-89
Summary of predictions on disputes and industrial action tactics 
Multinomial logit estimates on industrial action (Models I-IV)
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Table 7.1
Industrial action in unionised bargaining groups in British manufacturing 1979-89
% of bargaining groups experiencing following forms of action 
Strike Overtime Go slow Other Any
Ban Work to Rule action
By Pay Round
1979-80 4.9 5.2 3.4 1.2 9.8
1980-81 2.7 4.7 2.3 0.9 7.8
1981-82 2.7 4.8 2.5 0.4 7.3
1982-83 2.7 4.4 1.9 0.5 6.7
1983-84 3.9 7.3 3.4 1.4 10.3
1984-85 1.5 3.9 1.6 0.2 5.2
1985-86 2.8 5.3 1.6 0.0 6.6
1986-87 1.6 4.2 1.7 0.2 5.2
1987-88 2.3 3.0 0.6 0.2 4.2
1988-89 0.8 2.0 0.8 0.3 2.4
By Industry
Food, Drink, Tobacco 2.5 4.5 2.1 0.3 6.7
Coal, Petroleum 2.0 11.1 6.1 * 11.1
Chemicals 1.5 2.4 1.0 0.5 4.0
Metal Manufacture 1.8 7.2 1.1 0.4 8.5
Mechanical Engineering 3.0 6.2 2.6 1.0 8.4
Instrument Engineering 3.2 7.1 5.1 0.6 11.6
Electrical Engineering 4.5 5.2 2.8 0.4 8.3
Shipbuilding * * * * *
Vehicles 4.5 5.4 2.7 0.8 8.9
Metal Goods 2.7 4.5 1.5 0.3 6.4
Textiles 1.2 2.4 0.8 * 3.5
Leather Goods 1.9 * * * 1.9
Clothing, Footwear * * * * *
Bricks, Pottery 1.9 1.5 1.5 0.4 2.6
Timber 4.2 8.4 4.2 * 10.2
Paper, Printing 1.7 3.2 2.5 1.1 5.1
Other Manufacturing 2.3 2.5 0.9 0.9 5.3
Mean 2.6 4.5 2.0 0.5 6.6
Source: CBI Pay Databank
Notes: (i) Number of observations = 9117. (ii) * denotes no action observed.
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Figure 7.1
Industrial action in unionised bargaining 
groups in British manufacturing, 1979-89
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Figure 7.2
Dispute theories, the North American and UK contexts
1. NORTH AMERICAN DISPUTE THEORIES AND THEIR CONTEXTS 
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Table 7.2
Summary of predictions on disputes and industrial action tactics
Impasse Theories Tactics'
Variables Asymmetric
Information
Principal- Differing 
agent Beliefs
Joint
Costs
Risk
Aversity
Bargaining group size -ve +ve
Multi-unionism +ve +ve +ve +ve
Multi-plant firm +ve +ve
Industrial action 
previous contract
-ve -ve -ve +ve or 
-ve
Legislation index1 +ve -ve
Post 1984 Trade 
Union Act
-ve or no 
effect
+ve -ve +ve
Manual group +ve +ve +ve
Low wage in previous 
contract
+ve or -ve
Unemployment +ve +ve or 
-ve
+ve or 
-ve
Inflation +ve +ve or 
-ve
+ve or 
-ve
Labour costs +ve or 
-ve
% of overtime 
working
-i-ve
Union organisation +ve
Stock levels -i-ve
Notes: (i) Tactics column reports predicted associations with overtime ban rather
than strike.
(ii) Legislation index scaled 1-20, high index implies pro-union 
legislation and vice versa.
(iii) See Data Appendix for detailed definition of variables.
Table 7.3
Multinomial logit estimates on industrial action (Model I)
Variables Sample Strike only =1.15 
Mean B dP/dX
Overtime ban & strike = 1.07 Overtime ban only = 3.30 Other action = 0.50 
B dP/dX B dP/dX B dP/dX
Constant
Bargaining group
50-100 workers 0.204
101-250 workers 0.268
251-500 workers 0.138
501+ workers 0.131
Manual 0.571
Non-manual 0.333
Number of 2.418
bargaining groups
-4.818***
(0.944)
1.340***
(0.481)
1.306***
(0.460)
1.324***
(0.495)
1.603***
(0.483)
0.483
(0.411)
-0.799
(0.506)
0.245
(0.173)
0.015
0.014
0.015
0.018
0.005
-0.009
0.003
-6.599***
(1.028)
1.322**
(0.577)
1.772***
(0.540)
1.581***
(0.583)
1.846***
(0.568)
0.372
(0.440)
-0.474
(0.514)
0.152
(0.178)
0.014
0.018
0.016
0.019
0.004
-0.005
0.002
-4.711***
(0.575)
0.721***
(0.257)
0.843***
(0.241)
1.168***
(0.252)
0.898***
(0.268)
0.434*
(0.252)
-0.541*
(0.297)
0.135
(0 .102)
0.023
0.026
0.037
0.028
0.014
-0.017
0.004
-4.056***
(1.312)
1.171*
(0.682)
1.258*
(0.660)
I.494**
(0.699)
1.424**
(0.723)
0.543
(0.633)
0.380
(0.687)
-0.273
(0.239)
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.003
0.002
- 0.001
Post 1984 Trade 
Union Act
Previous contract
Strike
Overtime ban 
Go slow 
Relative wage
Industry charactersitics
Overtime/total hours
Stock/output 
Union density 
Regional dummies
0.664
0.030
0.050
0.023
-0.008
0.120
0.193
0.434
-0.271
(0.271)
0.181
(0.468)
1.404***
(0.362)
-0.959
(0.669)
-0.037
(0.056)
-10.338*
(5.684)
2.619**
(1.136)
- 1.866
(1.134)
Yes
-0.003
0.002
0.015
- 0.011
0.000
-0.114
0.029
- 0.022
0.286
(0.297)
0.511
(0.454)
1.522***
(0.352)
-1.426*
(0.776)
0.024
(0.065)
-7.886
(5.827)
2.495**
(1.068)
0.050
(1.035)
Yes
Diagnostics Chi-squared 349.85 d.f. 88
0.003
0.005
0.016
-0.015
0.000
-0.080
0.026
0.000
-0.142
(0.165)
-0.016
(0.331)
1.498***
(0.216)
-0.675*
(0.384)
- 0.001
(0.036)
-7.065**
(3.326)
1.372*
(0.722)
1.256**
(0.561)
Yes
-0.005
- 0.001
0.048
- 0.022
0.000
-0.224
0.043
0.042
-0.075
(0.411)
0.283
(0.790)
0.310
(0.794)
0.575
(0.950)
0.077
(0.095)
-15.689*
(8.405)
1.931
(1.711)
-1.380
(1.604)
Yes
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.000
to
-0.076
0.009
-0.007
Pseudo R2 0.0845 Sample size 6943
Table 7.3 (continued)
Multinomial logit estimates on industrial action (model II)
Variables Sample Strike only = 1.50 
Mean B dP/dX
Overtime ban & strike = 1.05 Overtime ban only = 3.49 Other action = 0.59 
B dP/dX B dP/dX B dP/dX
Constant
Bargaining group
50-100 workers 0.202
101-250 workers 0.264
251-500 workers 0.138
501+ workers 0.133
Manual 0.573
Non-manual 0.328
Number of 
bargaining groups
2.413
- 8 . 122* * *
(0.998)
0.878***
(0.337)
1.187***
(0.309)
1.225***
(0.339)
1.337***
(0.337)
0.632*
(0.338)
-0.092
(0.382)
0.146
(0.129)
0.013
0.017
0.018
0.019
0.009
- 0.001
0.002
-6.467***
(1.105)
0.746*
(0.385)
0.982***
(0.354)
1.019***
(0.391)
1.139***
(0.389)
0.246
(0.345)
-0.734*
(0.421)
0.077
(0.149)
0.007
0.010
0.010
0.011
0.002
-0.007
0.001
-6.153***
(0.674)
0.576***
(0.205)
0.698***
(0.189)
1.069***
(0.199)
0.726***
(0 .212)
0.340*
(0.201)
-0.834***
(0.246)
0.187**
(0.085)
0.019
0.023
0.036
0.024
0.011
-0.029
0.006
-4.466***
(1.640)
0.971**
(0.466)
0.883*
(0.454)
0.695
(0.540)
1.005*
(0.515)
0.630
(0.533)
0.183
(0.585)
-0.107
(0.192)
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.006
0.004
0.001
- 0.001
to
-p*
Legislation index
Industry characteristics
Union density
Overtime/total hours 
Stock/output
Macroeconomic
Unemployment level
Inflation level 
Change in U 
Change in RPI
10.276
0.434
0.120
0.198
9.579
7.768
0.094
0.056
0.148***
(0.045)
-0.609
(0.806)
-2.288
(4.012)
1.302
(0.912)
0.066*
(0.038)
0.046
(0.036)
-0.479
(0.460)
- 0.220
(0.275)
0.002
- 0.010
-0.030
0.019
0.001
0.001
-0.007
-0.003
0 .212* * *
(0.058)
-0.279
(0.926)
-6.946
(4.909)
1.475
(1.031)
0.030
(0.044)
-0.097*
(0.054)
-1.601**
(0.719)
0.002
(0.321)
Diagnostics Chi-squared 309.2 d.f. 60
0.002
-0.003
-0.070
0.015
0.000
- 0.001
-0.017
0.000
0.065
(0.039)
1.426***
(0.469)
-4.855*
(2.677)
1. 122*
(0.596)
0.081***
(0.025)
-0.007
(0.028)
0.464
(0.293)
0.144
(0.179)
0.002
0.051
-0.164
0.038
0.003
0.000
0.017
0.005
-0.059
(0.100)
-2.003
(1.434)
-9.747
(6.722)
0.558
(1.892)
0.016
(0.058)
0.080
(0.061)
0.705
(0.616)
0.054
(0.435)
0.000
- 0.012
-0.056
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0526 Sample size 9117
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Table 7.3 (continued)
Multinomial logit estimates on industrial action (model HI)
Variables Sample Strike only = 1.50 
Mean B dP/dX
Overtime ban & strike = 1.05 Overtime ban only = 3.49 Other = 0.59
B dP/dX B dP/dX B dP/dX
Constant
Bargaining group
50-100 workers 0.202
101-250 workers 0.264
251-500 workers 0.138
501+ workers 0.133
Manual 0.573
Non-manual 0.328
-8.098***
(0.976)
0.905***
(0.338)
1.169***
(0.310)
1.207***
(0.339)
1.265***
(0.337)
0.657*
(0.339)
-0.111
(0.382)
0.013
0.017
0.017
0.018
0.010
- 0.001
-7.126***
(1.227)
0.767**
(0.387)
0.974***
(0.355)
1.032***
(0.392)
1. 121* * *
(0.390)
0.189
(0.345)
-0.807*
(0.420)
0.008
0.010
0.010
0.011
0.002
-0.008
-5.917***
(0.665)
0.597***
(0.206)
0.704***
(0.191)
1.070***
(0.200)
0.764***
(0.214)
0.323
(0.201)
-0.857***
(0.246)
0.020
0.023
0.036
0.025
0.011
-0.030
-6.170***
(1.687)
0.927**
(0.468)
0.835*
(0.456)
0.609
(0.542)
0.889*
(0.516)
0.701
(0.534)
0.190
(0.587)
0.005
0.005
0.003
0.005
0.004
0.001
toUl
ON
Number of 2.413
bargaining groups
Legislation index 10.276
Industry characteristics
Union density 0.434
Overtime/total hours 0.120
Stock/output 0.198
Regional Dummies 
Year Dummies
0.142 0.002 0.103
(0.130) (0.151)
0.155*** 0.002 0.083**
(0.032) (0.042)
-0.555 -0.009 -0.282
(0.816) (0.963)
-0.168 0.001 -3.560
(4.176) (5.242)
1.758** 0.026 1.813
(0.893) (1.125)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Diagnostics Chi-squared 392.2 d.f. 104
0.001
0.001
-0.003
-0.035
0.018
0.194**
(0.086)
0.048*
(0.026)
1.545***
(0.480)
-4.122
(2.841)
0.901
(0.629)
Yes
Yes
0.007
0.002
0.055
-0.140
0.030
-0.096
(0.195)
0.170***
(0.063)
-1.972
(1.420)
-10.580
(7.629)
-0.079
(2.171)
Yes
-0.001
0.001
- 0.012
-0.061
- 0.001
Yes
Pseudo R2 0.067 Sample size 9117
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Table 7.3 (continued)
Multinomial logit estimates on industrial action (model IV)
Variables Sample Strike only = 1.09 
Mean B dP/dX
Overtime ban & strike = 1.03 Overtime ban only = 3.27 Other action = 0.51 
B dP/dX B dP/dX B dP/dX
Constant
Bargaining group
50-100 workers 0.209
101-250 workers 0.263
251-500 workers 0.128
501+ workers 0.132
Non-manual 0.313
Number of 
bargaining groups
Labour costs
2.385
1.947
-4.125***
(1.195)
1.438**
(0.569)
1.272**
(0.559)
0.992
(0.639)
1.503**
(0.592)
-1.206***
(0.418)
0.234
(0 .202)
-0.271*
(0.159)
0.015
0.013
0.010
0.016
-0.013
0.002
-0.003
-6.586***
(1.252)
1.095*
(0.600)
1.376**
(0.562)
1.410**
(0.618)
1.618***
(0.599)
-0.486
(0.358)
0.386
(0.223)
- 0.102
(0.148)
0.011
0.014
0.014
0.016
-0.004
0.004
- 0.001
-4.545***
(0.708)
0.816***
(0.289)
0.755***
(0.278)
1.042***
(0.297)
0.772**
(0.309)
-1.156***
(0.238)
0.223*
(0.120)
0.021
(0.078)
0.026
0.024
0.033
0.024
-0.037
0.007
0.001
-2.974*
(1.559)
1.164*
(0.683)
0.571
(0.717)
1.384*
(0.725)
0.533
(0.834)
0.247
(0.429)
-0.148
(0.285)
-0.133
(0.220)
0.006
0.003
0.007
0.003
0.002
- 0.001
- 0.001
Subsidiary
Previous contract
Strike
Overtime ban 
Go slow
Industry charactersitics
Overtime/total hours
Stock/output
Union density
Post 1984 Trade 
Union Act
0.210
0.030
0.049
0.024
0.118
0.193
0.435
0.604
-0.693
(0.447)
0.177
(0.570)
1.060**
(0.476)
-0.331
(0.724)
-8.782
(6.927)
3.661**
(1.823)
-1.984
(1.298)
-0.281
(0.326)
-0.007
0.002
0.011
-0.003
-0.090
0.038
- 0.022
-0.003
- 0.012
(0.387)
0.213
(0.579)
1.710***
(0.408)
- 1. 886*
(1.065)
-8.186
(6.993)
4.478***
(1.647)
-0.116
(1.187)
0.425
(0.344)
Diagnostics Chi-squared 210.25 d.f. 60
0.000
0.002
0.017
-0.019
-0.079
0.045
0.001
0.004
-0.401*
(0.238)
-0.305
(0.426)
0.964***
(0.297)
-0.049
(0.439)
-8.271**
(3.956)
2.814**
(1.106)
1.066*
(0.644)
0.192
(0.191)
-0.013
- 0.010
0.030
- 0.001
-0.260
0.089
0.036
0.006
-1.093
(0.757)
-0.163
(1.089)
0.582
(0.930)
0.013
(1.271)
-26.996***
(10.090)
3.774
(2.970)
-1.013
(1.755)
0.403
(0.477)
-0.005
- 0.001
0.003
0.000
-0.135
0.018
-0.005
0.002
Pseudo R2 0.0700 Sample size 5140
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Notes to Table 7.3
(i) Dependent variable = Action: 1 = No action (default); 2 = Strike, no overtime
ban; 3 = Overtime ban and strike; 4 = Overtime ban, no strike; 5 = Neither
overtime ban nor strike.
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses.
(iii) Defaults: for bargaining group size = less than 50 employees; for type of
bargaining group = mixed (manual and non-manual) group; for previous
contract = no industrial action over previous contract; post Trade Union Act =
1979-July 1984.
(iv) Significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Data appendix 
Definitions of the variables are as follows:
Number of workers in bargaining group: categorised into 5 groups. Default 
in Table 7.3 is less than 50 workers.
Number of bargaining groups: takes value of 1, 2 or 3. Latter category 
indicates presence of at least three groups in the workplace.
Composition of bargaining group: manual, non-manual or mixed (default). 
Action last year: strike, overtime ban, go slow/work to rule, none (default) 
involving same bargaining group in connection with last year’s settlement. 
Relative wage: nominal percentage increase in earnings of typical employee in 
previous year minus mean percentage increase in earnings of industry (1 digit 
Activity Heading) to which group belongs, disaggregated manual/non-manual/ 
mixed.
Real wage: last year’s annual percentage increase in settlement earnings minus 
increase in retail price index at date of settlement.
Labour costs: categorical variable, takes value one if labour costs are less than 
25% of total costs, two: 25-40%, three: 41-55%, four: 56-70%, five: over 70%. 
Subsidiary: takes value one if establishment is part of larger company, zero 
otherwise (N.B. Labour costs and subsidiary only recorded for sub-sample of 
5140 settlements where unions are recognised for bargaining).
In addition the CBI dataset has been supplemented with information from the 
following sources:
Unemployment: monthly unemployment rate disaggregated by 10 standard 
regions. Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table 2.3.
Change in unemployment: percentage change in level of unemployment for 
each region from 12 months ago.
Volatility of unemployment calculated as: Mean/standard deviation, for twelve 
months prior to settlement (results not reported, insignificant in all models). 
Inflation: monthly percentage index in retail price index. Source: Department 
of Employment Gazette, Table 6.4.
Change in inflation: percentage change in inflation from 12 months ago.
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Volatility of inflation calculated as: Mean/standard deviation, for twelve 
months prior to settlement (results not reported, insignificant in all models). 
Legislation index: ratings (one to five) for each of 4 categories of industrial 
relations legislation: recognition, individual rights to associate/disassociate, 
immunities, relative power of employers/unions. These are summed to produce 
a total out of 20. High index implies pro union legislation and vice versa. 
Source: Freeman and Pelletier (1990).
Legislation dummy 84-89: takes value one if settlement occurred after July 
1984, zero otherwise.
Overtime/total hours: Average weekly overtime hours for full-time manual 
males on adult rates for year to April, divided by average weekly total hours 
for same, disaggregated by industry (2 digit Activity Heading). Note that this 
includes workers who do not work overtime. Source: New Earnings Survey, 
Part C, Table 54.
Union density: union density figures among employees in Great Britain for 
1989, disaggregated by industry (2 digit). Source: Bird, Stevens and Yates 
(1991) using Labour Force Survey.
Stocks: Stocks and work in progress at end of year divided by gross output for 
year, disaggregated by industry (2 digit). Source: Census of Production,
Table 5.
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Technical appendix 
The industrial action incidence equations in Table 7.3 are estimated by a 
multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable (ACTION) is categorical but 
unordered taking values from 1 to 5: 1 = No industrial action (which is the default or 
base category in all calculations); 2 = Strike but no overtime ban; 3 = Strike and 
overtime ban; 4 = Overtime ban but no strike; and 5 = Action, but neither strike nor 
overtime ban (i.e. either work to rule/go slow and/or ’other’). The probability that a 
strike only outcome will occur during the wage bargain is given by
P(A2) = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 + + exb(A4> + emAs>
where A2-A5 represent scores (2)-(5) on the ACTION variable, X is the vector of 
explanatory variables and b is the vector of estimated coefficients. The marginal effect 
of each exogenous varible, Xj, is given by
SP(A,) -  * -— i -  = PQJ [P -  E  W
A=3
where (3 is the estimated coefficient on x  ^ So for example the marginal effect of an 
increase in union density on the probability of an overtime ban but no strike outcome 
(using estimates from Model I, Table 7.3) is
(0.033) [1.256 - {(-1.866*0.0115) + (0.050*0.0107) + (-1.380*0.005)}] = 0.042
Appendix A
Evidence from company accounts on the performance of new style deal plants
1. Introduction
One aspect of the research strategy on the FOA project was to acquire as much 
relevant information about the identified FOA and non-FOA plants as possible, without 
(or before) approaching the plants directly. The type of information sought was; the 
incidence of particular disputes procedures; the characteristics of the 
companies/workplaces, in order to assess any pattern of FOA or new style deal 
incidence; and performance indicators to measure the impact of FOA and new style 
deals. The basic disputes procedures of a number of the plants were identifiable from 
various industrial relations reports and studies. In terms of company/workplace 
characteristics and indicators of performance, two potential sources were the CBI Pay 
Databank and annual company accounts.
Unfortunately the first source of data, which would have provided the most 
valuable information, proved unprofitable because only one of the 101 plants identified 
was included in the CBI sample. Turning to the second source, annual company 
accounts, it was not clear what type of information was available, whether or not the 
available information was appropriate for measuring characteristics or performance, or 
for how many of the companies the accounts were accessible.
Company accounts are publicly available, for a small fee, at Company House, 
now located in Cardiff. However the accounts of the largest companies in particular 
industries are distilled into various business information reports, held in the Business 
Reference Section of the British Library in London. An assessment of the usefulness 
of company accounts data was made on the basis of these reports, before considering a 
comprehensive look at the individual accounts.
The information was assessed on three criteria: What type of information is 
available and what is its drawbacks? What company characteristics do the data reveal 
that is relevant to an assessment of the incidence of FOA and new style deals? Do the 
data allow an evaluation of the impact of FOA/new style deals and, if so, what was the 
impact?
In total, company accounts data were obtained on thirty-five (34.7%) of the 101
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identified plants. The data were collated from various business reports but principally 
ICC Business Ratio Reports which provide accounts information on the top 50-140 UK 
companies in particular industries. Other reports were also utilised but not all 
provided the same comprehensive level of information contained in the ICC Reports. 
The small size of the sample means that the potential for analysis of incidence and 
performance was quite circumscribed especially in terms of trying to assess any 
FOA/non-FOA variation. Therefore we concentrated on assessing the value of the 
data, and assessing what it could tell us about the sample as a whole rather than about 
variations between different groups within the sample.
2. Information available and its drawbacks
Annual company accounts provide a wide range of data on a firm’s economic 
performance, but the principal results collected for our purposes were turnover (Table 
A.l), profits (Table A.2) and employee remuneration per employee (Table A.3). 
Unfortunately there are a number of drawbacks concerning the data.
Employee remuneration information is not provided in many of the business 
reports, so these figures were only collected for the twenty-one companies listed in the 
ICC Reports. The number of employees was also usually provided in the latter reports 
and this is reported in Table A.4.
The accounts data is for the individual plant alone for only just under half of 
the plants (45.7%), but for the majority the data is either definitely for the company as 
a whole (42.9%) or not clearly for one or the other (11.4%). Note that the individual 
plants for which data is available may still be part of a larger company, but must have 
some sort of separate accounts status, hence the individual reporting. Unfortunately 
the lack of individual plant accounts for the majority means that no assessment of 
individual plant characteristics or performance can be made from the aggregated 
company accounts figures in the multi-plant companies. This makes the prospect of 
assessing the impact of FOA or new style deals through company accounts data 
somewhat limited.
The business information reports in general only list three years worth of 
accounts and because previous reports were not usually available the data in general do 
not cover more than this time period. Without a longer series of data, an analysis of
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the impact of a change in employment practices (the introduction of a new style deal) 
would be very difficult. This problem is compounded by the fact that the results are 
concentrated in the period 1986-1988, after the introduction of many of the deals.
This drawback means that the separation of the finanacial performance characteristic as 
a measure of incidence from that of the impact of FOA/new style deals is particularly 
difficult. In other words you can not make valid suppositions on the type of company 
that signs a new style deal on the basis of performance data after the fact.
3. Company characteristics and the incidence of FOA/new style deals
Company size: The group of companies who’s accounts are reported are 
probably disproportionately larger than the rest of the companies involved in new style 
deals, therefore the distribution of company size may not be similar across the whole 
set of new style deals. Note also that not all of the company reports listed the number 
of employees.
Of those listed in Table A.4, there are two very large companies with new style 
deal plants, BICC Cables and RHM Foods, both with over 39,000 employees (latest 
figures, 1988 and 1989 respectively) in the UK and also nine middle ranking 
companies with between 2,000 and 10,000 employees. The largest single-plant 
company is Toshiba Consumer Products UK (over 1000 employees) and the smallest is 
Star Micronics with only 25 employees (1989 figure).
Multi/single-plant: Again the company accounts group may be biased in 
favour of multi-plant companies compared to the whole new style deals group. 
Unfortunately the accounts themselves do not provide enough information to determine 
what proportion of the companies are single-plant. As stated above over 40% of the 
accounts listed are definitely for multi-plant companies, but this does not necessarily 
mean that the other 60% are single-plant companies. The precise split of the plants 
into multi or single-plant companies is therefore unclear.
Financial performance characteristics: The initial emphasis in the new style 
deals literature was that most of the established companies signing the agreements 
(usually on greenfield sites) were already quite successful (Bassett 1986). However, 
there is also evidence that some companies/plants with financial and industrial relations 
problems have been signing similar agreements in order to try to solve their problems 
(IRRR 1986). The relative size of these two groups was unclear, therefore one of the
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rationales behind using the accounts data was to actually provide some empirical 
evidence on the extent of different levels of financial performance across the new style 
deal plants.
Whilst accounts data can certainly provide some pointers about the relative size 
of these groups there are a number of problems associated with the data for an 
adequate analysis.
. The lack of longer time series of data is the most fundamental drawback here. 
As stated above, it is somewhat artificial to make suppositions on the type of 
company signing new style deals on the basis of performance data since the 
deal was signed.
. The multi-plant aggregation means that even if a company as a whole is 
making a loss (or a profit) the individual plant with the new style deal may be 
making a profit (or a loss).
. The absence of accounts data from a comparison group of similar companies 
which have not introduced new style deals suggests that any conclusions about 
the performance characteristics of our group may not have external validity. 
Unfortunately these various caveats mean that we are not able to assess the relative 
sizes of different financial performance groups amongst the plants but rather can make 
only general comments about performance levels.
The figures certainly show that the companies are not uniformly successful 
profit makers, fourteen of the companies listed made a loss in at least one of the years 
of available accounts data (see Table A.2 for the profit/loss figures). However, the 
majority of the companies have made profits (some very large) for most the years of 
recorded data. Seventeen of the companies have improved their profit performance 
year on year throughout the period of accounts data.
The profit/loss margin (profits divided by sales) is a better means of comparing 
financial performance across the companies and these figures are shown in Table A.5. 
Eleven of the companies have had profit margins consistently in the 0-10% range, and 
six have had profit margins over 10% throughout the recorded period. Of the 
remaining 18, three made profits every year (some years below 10%, others above), 
only three consistently made losses and twelve had mixed fortunes with losses in at 
least one year.
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The size of the losses was greatest at Chronar Ltd with margins of -63% and - 
44% in consecutive years. The highest consistent profit margin was in Shotton Paper 
with two years of profit margin over 25% and one over 12% and an average of over 
22%. It seems safe therefore to state at the very least that there is a spread of 
performance amongst the companies with new style deals such that company financial 
performance is not a key determinant of the incidence of new style deals.
4. Assessing new style deals by financial performance
Profits: The profits data presented in Tables A.2 and A.5 could also be used 
to test the impact of a new style deal if we had information on when the deal was 
introduced, accounts data from both before and after the introduction and some 
controls for other determinants of performance. Unfortunately none of these criteria 
are satisfied therefore second best means of analysis are required.
One, perhaps dubious, means of comparison would be to contrast the 
performance of the single-plant companies (and hence wholly covered by a new style 
deal) with the multi-plant companies (only partly covered by a new style deal). Both 
the highest and lowest profit margins (annual average) are in two single-plant 
companies. When banded into five categories of performance there seems to be a 
slight association between the single plant companies and poorer performance (see 
Table A.7) but of course this could be due to other factors such as the greater market 
share of the multi-plant companies or economies of scale.
Employee remuneration: There are some quite strange figures quoted in the 
employee remuneration data, including Star Micronics which reputedly disbursed from 
£19,590 to £23,640 per employee (1987 to 1989). In one company (GPT) the figure 
rises from £3,260 in 1988 to £13,250 in 1989, a rise in remuneration per employee of 
over 300%! Many of the figures appear baffling and even an index measure of 
remuneration (Table A.6) does not help to make them look less odd. In only eight of 
the companies are the index figures within a reasonable range (of plus or minus 7% 
points) from the national earnings index which averaged 8.36% over the period 1986- 
1989 (min 7.8%, max 9.1%).
Of course it may be that the figures indicate the effect of a new style deal on 
the responsiveness of pay bargaining to company performance to such an extent that
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employees earnings can vary as much as profits can from year to year. However the 
profit margins reported in Table A.5 do not vary anything like as much as the 
remuneration figures, nor is it the case that the ranking of companies by remuneration 
index in a particular year is similar to that of companies by profit margin in that year, 
or previous years.
A more sensible interpretation is that, in the majority of cases, the figures do 
not even approximate the changes in average earnings of the company’s employees but 
rather constitute some sort of residual figure in accounting terms. Unfortunately 
therefore it seems best to conclude that the idiosyncratic nature of the employee 
remuneration figures makes them an unproductive means of analysing the impact of 
new style deals or FOA on earnings.
5. Conclusions
Company accounts data do not seem to be a particularly useful source of 
information for evaluating final offer arbitration agreements (incidence or impact) or 
even new style deals more generally. There are a number of problems with the data: 
Not all companies’ accounts are readily available; the aggregation of accounts to 
company level means that the performance of individual workplaces can not always be 
isolated; data is not usually accessible over the long run so a pre-test/post-test analysis 
is not usually possible; and accounting practices mean that the employee remuneration 
figures do not seem to correspond to earnings data. Despite all these drawbacks the 
data are still of some interest because they provide some more depth to an analysis of 
the type of companies with new style deals. On this issue, the company accounts 
confirm the great diversity of companies with new style deals from the very profitable 
(BICC Cables) to the large loss makers (Norsk-Hydro), from high (RHM Foods) to 
low turnover (Afig Electronics), both multi-plant (AVX) and single-plant (Toshiba), 
from very large (BICC Cables) to very small (Star Micronics) workforces.
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2. Sources: (see bibliography for titles of individual reports under following headings) 
ICC Business Ratio Report: An Industry Sector Analysis, Hampton: ICC 
Business Ratios.
ICC Financial Survey and Company Directory, Hampton: ICC Financial Surveys. 
Infotech Financial Comparison and Market Directory, Nottingham: Infotech Services. 
Jordans. Bristol: Jordan and Sons.
World Electronic Company File 1990/91. BEP Data Services.
Table A.l 
Sales
Company name Level of Sales figures (£000s)
information 1989 1988 1986 1985 19841987
AB Electronics CO 208614 198744 171637 129891 122069
ABB Capacitors CO 25102 25467 22937
AFIG Electronics WP 1356 275
AIWA UK CO 34566 6956 26507
Anacomp ? 52039 36402 8341
Anglesey Aluminium WP 101160 79979 82158
Avel Transformers CO 9095 2686 2941
AVX CO 87746 55467 45876
Beck Electronics WP 2756 2551 1944
BICC Cables CO 2947000 2489000 2413000 2109000
Bonas Machine WP 16345 10690 9626 3358
Bowman Webber WP 4913 4364
Brother Industries UK ? 73178 66170 42147
Cadbury CO 488036 486036 442697
Christian Salveson CO 298187 204828 294959
Chronar WP 2020 1306
Coca-Cola Schweppes CO 660652 524003 447457 128680
Excel Wound Components WP 3345 2782 2098
Table A .l continued
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Sales figures (£000s) 
1987 1986 1985 1984
GPT CO 509100 138700
Hitachi Consumer Products UK WP 93679 82324 60455 34600 54500
IMI Pactrol WP 4026 2888 2085
Komatsu WP 84005 55008 18617
Lithgow Electronics WP 8497 9522 5493
NCR Co (Manufacturing) CO 260164 224927 193385 173174
Norsk-Hydro Fertilisers CO 306493 343678 354073
NSK Bearings ? 45639 37545 26629
RHM Foods CO 1786100 1668600 1543800
Sanyo Industries CO 40700 46700 18500 15300
Shotton Paper WP 85663 74499 66805
Sony UK ? 324523 312290 255210
Star Micronics WP 16660 10602 6946
St Austell Brewery WP 16964 15376 15008
Sun Valley Poultry CO 134734 115653 98253
TDS Circuits WP 8387 9535 8020
Toshiba Consumer Products WP 127104 106869 78792
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Table A.2 
Profits
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Profits figures (£000s) 
1987 1986 1985 1984
AB Electronics CO 15222 16400 8031 6439 4032
ABB Capacitors CO -1139 594 444
AFIG Electronics WP 9 19
AIWA UK CO -350 -1218 643
Anacomp ? -2698 1093 -593
Anglesey Aluminium WP 13387 5365 -4360
Avel Transformers CO 6 -91 25
AYX CO 3475 2235 1349
Beck Electronics WP 322 497 260
BICC Cables CO 156000 128000 101000 92000
Bonas Machine WP 2517 1519 1195 242
Bowman Webber WP -127 297
Brother Industries UK ? 1089 2156 3148
Cadbury CO 67837 52496 39400
Christian Salveson CO 46626 41975 38773
Chronar WP -890 -823
Coca-Cola Schweppes CO 31709 25191 9203 -1937
Excel Wound Components WP 74 -70 -3
Table A. 2 continued
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Profits figures (£000s) 
1987 1986 1985 1984
GPT CO 37900 37600
Hitachi Consumer Products UK WP 209 30 24
IMI Pactrol WP 537 414 382
Komatsu WP 111 -2334 -4961
Lithgow Electronics WP 101 496 248
NCR Co (Manufacturing) CO 45592 41401 41309 36023
Norsk-Hydro Fertilisers CO -16795 -29926 -3385
NSK Bearings ? 347 2104 2065
RHM Foods CO 176500 156000 116100
Sanyo Industries CO -1400 -2300 -1200
Shotton Paper WP 10783 21359 16786
Sony UK ? 5597 5346 3917
Star Micronics WP 1097 138 -140
St Austell Brewery WP 2320 2059 2016
Sun Valley Poultry CO 6959 4038 5100
TDS Circuits WP -1971 55 -473
Toshiba Consumer Products WP -786 959 554
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Table A.3
Remuneration per employee
Company name Level of Remuneration per employee figures (£000s)
information 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985
AB Electronics CO 9.42 8.67 8.22 7.52 6.87
ABB Capacitors CO N/A
AFIG Electronics WP N/A
AIWA UK CO 8.73 2.54 7.29
Anacomp ? 8.83 7.21 6.43
Anglesey Aluminium WP N/A
Avel Transformers CO N/A
AVX CO 11.13 8.38 7.96
Beck Electronics WP N/A
BICC Cables CO 11.38
Bonas Machine WP 12.38 9.73 8.28 3.34
Bowman Webber WP N/A
Brother Industries UK ? 7.47 6.84 5.98
Cadbury CO N/A
Christian Salveson CO N/A
Chronar WP N/A
Coca-Cola Schweppes CO 14.91 12.56 11.10 12.18
Excel Wound Components WP 6.48 7.06 6.58
Table A.3 continued
Company name Level of Remuneration per employee figures (£000s)
information 1989 1988 1987 1986 19g5
GPT CO 13.25 3.26
Hitachi Consumer Products UK WP 7.33 7.01 6.48
IMI Pactrol WP N/A
Komatsu WP 18.74 16.14 16.69
Lithgow Electronics WP N/A
NCR Co (Manufacturing) CO 14.31 13.51 12.80
Norsk-Hydro Fertilisers CO N/A
NSK Bearings ? 10.38 9.82 9.00
RHM Foods CO 9.12 8.78 8.63
Sanyo Industries CO N/A
Shotton Paper WP N/A
Sony UK ? 5.50 9.10 9.01
Star Micronics WP 23.64 19.81 19.59
St Austell Brewery WP 5.01 4.92
Sun Valley Poultry CO 8.68 8.10 7.42
TDS Circuits WP 12.38 12.37 11.52
Toshiba Consumer Products WP 6.78 6.29 5.92
11.34
to
O
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Table A. 4
Number of Employees
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Number of Employees 
1987 1986 1985 1984
AB Electronics CO 5290 5003 4211 3539 3480
ABB Capacitors CO 398 228 246
AFIG Electronics WP 58 39
AIWA UK CO 385 239 218
Anacomp ? 784 540 58
Anglesey Aluminium WP 829 779 852
Avel Transformers CO N/A
AVX CO 2558 2310 1439
Beck Electronics WP N/A
BICC Cables CO 44738 44370 45593 46419
Bonas Machine WP 266 224 232 257
Bowman Webber WP 131 105
Brother Industries UK ? 801 686 365
Cadbury CO 6317 6476 6786
Christian Salveson CO 6910 5865 6193
Chronar WP N/A
Coca-Cola Schweppes CO 4571 4736 4703 1459
Excel Wound Components WP 193 177 139
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Table A.4 continued
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Number of Employees 
1987 1986 1985 1984
GPT CO 9126 7727
Hitachi Consumer Products UK WP 947 940 870 950 1510
EMI Pactrol WP 139 105 65
Komatsu WP 356 317 189
Lithgow Electronics WP N/A
NCR Co (Manufacturing) CO 3759 3687 3455 3391
Norsk-Hydro Fertilisers CO 2524 3044 3190
NSK Bearings ? 651 548 467
RHM Foods CO 39189 38195 35686
Sanyo Industries CO 597
Shotton Paper WP N/A
Sony UK ? 1946 1972 1777
Star Micronics WP 25 21 17
St Austell Brewery WP 176 471 447
Sun Valley Poultry CO 2899 2781 2399
TDS Circuits WP 216 206 235
Toshiba Consumer Products WP 1113 1028 817
Table A.5
Profit/Loss Margin
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Profit/Sales % 
1987 1986 1985 1984
AB Electronics CO 7.30 8.25 4.68 4.96 3.30
ABB Capacitors CO -4.54 2.33 1.94
AFIG Electronics WP 0.66 6.91
AIWA UK CO -1.01 -17.51 2.43
Anacomp ? -5.18 3.00 -7.11
Anglesey Aluminium WP 13.23 6.71 -5.31
Avel Transformers CO 0.07 -3.39 0.85
AVX CO 3.96 4.03 2.94
Beck Electronics WP 11.67 19.48 13.37
BICC Cables CO 5.29 5.14 4.71 4.36
Bonas Machine WP 15.40 14.21 12,41 7.21
Bowman Webber WP -2.58 6.81
Brother Industries UK ? 1.49 3.26 7.47
Cadbury CO 13.90 10.80 8.90
Christian Salveson CO 15.64 20.49 13.15
Chronar WP -44.06 -63.02
Coca-Cola Schweppes CO 4.80 4.81 2,06 -1.51
Excel Wound Components WP 2.21 -2.52 -0.14
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Table A.5 continued
Company name Level of 
information 1989 1988
Profit/sales % 
1987 1986 1985 1984
GPT CO 7.44 27.11
Hitachi Consumer Products UK WP 0.22 0.04 0.04
IMI Pactrol WP 13.34 14.34 18.32
Komatsu WP 0.13 -4.24 -26.65
Lithgow Electronics WP 1.19 5.21 4.51
NCR Co (Manufacturing) CO 17.52 18.41 21.36 20.80
Norsk-Hydro Fertilisers CO -5.48 -8.71 -0.96
NSK Bearings ? 0.76 5.60 7.75
RHM Foods CO 9.88 9.35 7.52
Sanyo Industries CO -3.44 -4.93 -6.49
Shotton Paper WP 12.59 28.67 25.13
Sony UK ? 1.72 1.71 1.53
Star Micronics WP 6.58 1.30 -2.02
St Austell Brewery WP 12.14 13.11
Sun Valley Poultry CO 5.16 3.49 5.19
TDS Circuits WP -23.50 0.58 -5.90
Toshiba Consumer Products WP -0.62 0.90 0.70
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Table A.6
Employee remuneration index
Company name Level of 
information
% change on previous year 
1989 1988 1987 1986
AB Electronics CO 8.59 5.50 9.35
ABB Capacitors CO N/A
AFIG Electronics WP N/A
AIWA UK CO 243.73 -65.16
Anacomp ? 22.45 12.10
Anglesey Aluminium WP N/A
Avel Transformers CO N/A
AVX CO 32.79 5.27
Beck Electronics WP N/A
BICC Cables CO N/A
Bonas Machine WP 27.22 17.42
Bowman Webber WP N/A
Brother Industries UK ? 9.21 14.46
Cadbury CO N/A
Christian Salveson CO N/A
Chronar WP N/A
Coca-Cola Schweppes CO 18.75 13.18 -8.89
Excel Wound Components WP -8.22 7.20
GPT CO 306.22
Hitachi Consumer Products WP 4.62 8.20
IMI Pactrol WP N/A
Komatsu WP 16.07 -3.27
Lithgow Electronics WP N/A
NCR Co (Manufacturing) CO 5.91 5.56
Norsk-Hydro Fertilisers CO N/A
NSK Bearings ? 5.72 9.10
RHM Foods CO 3.86 1.71
Sanyo Industries CO N/A
Shotton Paper WP N/A
Sony UK ? -39.51 1.04
Star Micronics WP 19.34 1.13
St Austell Brewery WP 1.81
Sun Valley Poultry CO 7.16 9.20
TDS Circuits WP 0.08 7.38
Toshiba Consumer Products WP 7.67 6.33
9.41
147.86
12.85
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Table A.7
Comparison of the financial performance of single and multi-plant companies
Ranking Single plant companies
%
Multi-plant companies
%
1 25.0 13.3
2 6.3 13.3
3 18.8 33.3
4 43.8 26.6
5 6.3 13.3
Notes: (i) Ranking
1 = Profit margin >10% in every year
2 = Profit margin >0% every year and >10% at least one year
3 = Profit margin <10% but >0% every year
4 = Profit margin varies from >0% to <0% in different years
5 = Profit margin <0% every year
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Appendix B
The Postal Survey Questionnaire 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE 1980S
A. WORKPLACE INFORMATION (Please tick where appropriate)
We would like to ask you some general questions about your workplace to set the scene.
1. How many people work at this workplace?
Less than 25 
25-99 
100-249 
250-499 
500+
2. Please indicate the percentage of the workforce that are:
A) MALE
B) FULL TIME
0-24%
25-49%
50-74%
75-100%
0-24%
25-49%
50-74%
75-100%
3. Do you distinguish between manual and non-manual workers?
If YES, please indicate the percentage of the workforce that is
YES NO
MANUAL 0-24% 
25-49% 
50-74% 
75-100%
4. Which of the following best describes the main industrial activity at the workplace?
Please tick one box only
Metal manufacturing, ore and mineral extraction 
Chemicals and man-made fibres 
Mechanical engineering 
Office machinery, electrical engineering and instruments
Motor vehicles and parts 
Other transport equipment 
Other metal goods 
Food, drink and tobacco 
Textiles, leather, footwear and clothing 
Timber, wooden furniture, rubber, plastics 
Paper products, printing and publishing
Transport
Other (please specify)
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5. When did your company begin operations in this industry?
6. When were operations begun on this site?
7. Is the workplace part of a larger company?
8. If YES, where is the headquarters of the company?
Pre 1980 
1980-85
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Pre 1980 
1980-85
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
YES r—1 NO
IN THE UK 
OTHER EUROPE, EEC 
OTHER EUROPE, NON-EEC 
JAPAN 
USA 
OTHER
B. TRADE UNIONS
1. Are any trade unions or staff associations recognised for bargaining over the pay and conditions of 
employees in the workplace?
YES pm  Please answer Q2 
NO M  Please go to Section F
2. Which union(s) is(are) recognised?
AEU
EETPU
ISTC
GMB
MSF
TGWU
STAFF ASSOCIATION
Other (please specify)
3. What percentage of employees at this workplace are members of trade unions?
0-24% 
25-49% 
50-74% 
75-100% 
Don’t know
C. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
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1. Is there a collective agreement with the union(s)?
YES |— | Please answer Q2 
NO rfil Please go to Section F
2. If YES, what percentage of the workforce is covered by the collective agreement?
0-24% 
25-49% 
50-74% 
75-100% 
Don’t know
3. Does the collective agreement cover any of the following issues:
a ban on industrial action YES r~] NO
D. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE
1. Turning now to the procedures covering pay negotiations, in the pay negotiations with the largest 
bargaining group, is there a specified procedure for resolving disputes?
NO H
NO 11
NO HI
NO Hi
NO 11
NO 11
NO Hi
11
YES |— | Please answer Q2 
NO H  Please go to Section E
2. When was this dispute resolution procedure introduced?
Pre 1980 
1980-85
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
3. Has the dispute resolution procedure ever been used?
1986 87 88 89 90
YES
NO
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4. Does the dispute resolution procedure involve any of the following?
Conciliation YES 
NO
Mediation YES 
NO
Arbitration YES 
NO
Please answer Q5 
Please go to Section E
5. What is the procedure for referring a dispute over pay negotiations to arbitration?
Either party may refer a dispute YES |~ j  NO j~ j
Both parties must agree to refer the dispute YES j~~j NO j— j
Arbitration is automatically triggered once a certain 
stage in negotiations is reached without agreement YES |~ j  NO j— j
Other (please specify) YES |—j  NO j— j
6. Once arbitration has been triggered, how is the arbitrator chosen?
ACAS recommends an arbitrator YES r—I NO
There Is a standing arbitrator 
previously agreed by the parties YES NO
Arbitrator determined when necessary
by agreement between the parties YES | | |  NO j |||
Other (please specify) YES m  NO |”~j
7. What form does the arbitration take?
The arbitrator is free to make 
any decision within the terms of reference YES |™j NO | | |
The arbitrator chooses either the 
last offer of the firm or of the union 
(so-called ’final offer’ or ’pendulum’ arbitration) YES [~” j NO
Other (please specify) YES | j j  NO
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8. Does the procedure specify that the decision of the arbitrator will be binding on all parties?
YES jggj NO g |
E. PAY SETTLEMENTS
1. What was the approximate % pay settlement for the largest bargaining group in the following years?
1986 87 88 89 90
0-4% — —
5-7% — — — ■— ........
8-10%
10+%
Don’t know/can’t remember
2. Were any of the pay settlements contingent on major changes in work practices? (eg more flexible
patterns of hours or reduced demarcations)
1986 87 88 89 90
YES 111. lit In u II
NO ■ lit II lit Hi
If yes, please give brief details, 
1986
.— --------------
1987
1988
1989
1990
F. INDUSTRIAL ACTION
1. Was there any industrial action at this workplace in connection with the pay negotiations of the 
largest bargaining group in these years?
threatened
1986
11
87
■
88
■
89
■
90
■
taken H 11 □ H 11
If neither: Please go to Section G
288
2. If taken, what fonn(s) did the action take?
1986 87 88 89 90
Go slow/work to rule 
Overtime ban 
Strike
Other (please specify)
3. In the case of strike action:
. what percentage of employees at this workplace took strike action?
1986 87 88 89 90
0-24% — „ — ~ - r - —■
25-49% ,— —
50-74% — _ — _ —
75-100% ------ —-
Don’t know/can’t remember —— — V
how long was the strike?
Less than one day 
1-5 days 
More then 5 days 
Don’t know/can’t remember
1986 87 88 89 90
— —- — —
— — - ——
G. OTHER INFORMATION
1. How would you rate management/employee relations generally at this workplace? Please choose a 
number from this scale.
Very good 1
2
Good 3
4
Poor 5
6
Very poor 7
Don’t know 8
2. It is possible that we may wish to make further contact for additional information. Are you willing to 
be contacted?
y e s  mm n o
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Appendix C
Extracts from EETPU Model Agreement and disputes procedures from eight 
collective agreements.
The following extracts are verbatim records of the documents concerned except that 
some spelling errors are corrected and some agreements are abridged for the sake of 
space. The general substance of the grievance procedures are not affected in any 
particular case.
1. Extract from EETPU Model Memorandum of Agreement
Appendix V.3: Collective Grievance Procedure 
1) General
Where an issue concerns a group of employees, the procedure for raising the 
grievance will be as follows:-
i) Stage One
The item will be raised on the agenda of the Advisory Board by any Board 
member or the Company, and a Board recommendation sought. If nor 
resolution is found at Stage One, Stage Two will be implemented. Where it is 
mutually agreed to discuss an item without initial reference to the Advisory 
Board, for example, matters of interpretation of agreements, the item will be 
referred directly to Stage Two of the procedure.
ii) Stage Two
If the matter is not resolved after full consideration of the Board 
recommendation by both the Management and Union Members, it will be 
formally referred for resolution at this Stage, between the Company and internal 
Union representatives.
iii) Stage Three
If Stage Two fails to bring about a settlement, the local Full-time official will
become involved and then the National Officer of the Union.
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iv) Stage Four
If the matter is not resolved after every effort has been made by the Company 
and the Union officials, it will be jointly referred to ACAS for Conciliation.
This joint reference will be based on a mutual understanding that such a 
reference can assist in the process of jointly finding a self-solution.
v) Stage Five
If Stage Four fails to produce a mutually satisfactory resolution, then either side 
can proceed to Arbitration. The reference will be submitted to ACAS for the 
appointment of a mutually agreed independent Arbitrator. The Arbitrator will 
decide the issue on a ’Pendulum Arbitration’ basis. The brief to the Arbitrator 
will be to fully investigate evidence form both parties, relevant to the issue, and 
without compromise, to find for one party or the other. The Arbitrator’s 
decision will be binding on both parties and will represent the final solution to 
the issue.
OR
Stage Five Alternative (1)
If Stage Four fails to produce a mutually satisfactory resolution, then either side 
can proceed to Arbitration. The reference will be submitted to ACAS for the 
appointment of a mutually agreed independent Arbitrator to consider in full the 
relevant evidence submitted by both parties in order to find a solution. The 
Arbitrator’s decision will be final and binding on both parties and will represent 
the final solution to the issue.
OR
Stage Five Alternative (2)
If Stage Four fails to produce a mutually satisfactory resolution, the Union may 
recommend a withdrawal of labour. Any withdrawal of labour will only take 
place once the statutory ballot requirements have been observed and the action 
endorsed by the Union membership.
Source: EETPU
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2. Extracts from collective agreements of 8 new style deal plants
a. Important agreements not included in eight interview plants
i. Toshiba Consumer Products Ltd (Plymouth) and the EETPU, dated April 1981.
The trade union recognises that in those matters affecting more than one 
individual, or matters which concern the Company or a section as a whole, the 
representative does not take up an issue unless it has reached stage two of the 
procedure.
The subjects which should first be raised at the Advisory Board include: 
Company investment policy and business plans 
Company trading performance 
Company operating efficiency 
Company manpower and stability of employment 
Terms and conditions of employment including pay and benefits and 
conditions of service 
Work environment and conditions 
The following procedure shall apply:
Stage One Items raised on the agenda of the Company Advisory Board by
Advisory Board member of the Company.
Stage Two If the matter is not resolved a reference shall be raised by the area
official/national officer of the trade union within the Company.
Stage Three If the matter is not resolved a joint reference shall be made to an
independent arbitrator.
Arbitration Both the Company and the trade union shall represent their case to an
agreed independent arbitrator. The terms of reference will be to find in 
favour of either the Company or the trade union. A compromise 
solutions shall not be recommended. Both parties agree to abide by the 
decision of the arbitrator.
Source: Trevor (1988, Appendix 1 p. 245).
292
ii. Cadbury’s Ltd (Chirk) and the TGWU, dated 1982.
Procedure for resolving disputes
The parties to the agreement undertake:
To work within the procedure applicable to the site whether formally agreed or 
in being through custom and practice.
If procedure is exhausted, to co-operate with conciliation and mediation 
arranged through ACAS. If conciliation and mediation fail normally to accept 
the result of arbitration, but both sides reserve the right in exceptional 
circumstances not to participate in this final stage of procedure.
The form of the arbitration may be by mutual agreement that the trade union 
and company will present their case to the arbitrator who will then be required 
to decide which case has the greater merit. He would decide for one case or 
the other, cannot split the difference nor make further recommendations or 
observations. In making his decision his criterion would be to select the case 
which will improve the long term prosperity of the company and its Chirk 
employees in cases of "interest". In cases of "right" the arbitrator would make 
a decision in keeping with current agreements and natural justice. These terms 
of reference are subject to confirmation and variation be mutual agreement.
To avoid frivolous use of these procedures.
Source: Wilkinson (1987, Appendix, p. 35)
iii. Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd (Sunderland) and AEU, dated 1985.
Procedure
a. It is recognised by the Company and the Union that it is in their mutual interest that 
issues affecting employees should be dealt with effectively and speedily in an 
atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence and it is intended that most issues will be 
resolved informally between the employee(s) and his/their immediate supervisor. This 
may not always be possible, therefore the following formal procedure for the resolution 
of problems is agreed.
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Stage 1 If the issue is not resolved informally, the employee may discuss the
matter with his representative and together they may approach the 
immediate supervisor.
Stage 2 If the issue is not resolved at Stage 1, the employee, accompanied by
his representative, may raise the issue with the immediate supervisor and 
the appropriate Departmental Manager.
Stage 3 If the issue is not resolved at Stage 2, the employee, accompanied by
his representative, may raise the matter with the Personnel Manager and 
the appropriate Departmental Manager.
Stage 4 If the issue is not resolved at Stage 3, it may be referred normally to the
Company Council (or a sub-committee thereof) and exceptionally to the 
Union Divisional for discussion with an appropriate nominated by the 
Company.
b. The Company and the Union are totally committed to resolving such matters ’in 
house’ at as early a stage in the procedure as possible. However in exceptional 
circumstances, if this is not possible, unresolved issues will be referred to the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service for resolution. This will normally be 
by conciliation as it is recognised that such issues may not always be appropriate for 
arbitration. If, however, arbitration is appropriate the terms of reference will be agreed 
and the arbitrator will be allowed to decide positively in favour of one side or the 
other. The arbitrator will be asked to take account of those aspects of the issues that 
are already agreed. Both parties agree to accept the decision of the arbitrator.
Source: Wilkinson (1987, Appendix, pp. 38-39).
iv. Yuasa Batteries (UK) Ltd (Ebbw Vale) and the EETPU, dated 1986.
Collective Grievance Procedure
1. General
Where an issue involves a group of Company members, the procedure for 
raising the grievance will be as follows:-
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i) Stage One
The item will be raised on the agenda of the Advisory Board by any Board 
member or the Company, and a Board recommendation sought If no resolution is 
found at Stage One, Stage Two will be implemented. Where it is mutually agreed to 
discuss an item without initial reference to the Advisory Board, for example, matters 
of interpretation of agreements, the item will be referred directly to Stage Two of the 
procedure.
ii) Stage Two
If the matter is not resolved after full consideration of the Board, after 
recommendation by both the Management and Union members, it will be formally 
referred for resolution at this Stage, between Company and internal union 
representatives.
iii) Stage Three
If Stage Two fails to bring about a settlement, the Full-Time Official, National 
Officer or Executive Councillor of the Union will be involved.
iv) Stage Four
If the matter is not resolved after every effort has been made by the Company 
and the Union officials, it will be jointly referred to ACAS for Conciliation. This joint 
reference will be based on a mutual understanding that such a reference can assist in 
the process of jointly finding a self-solution.
v) Stage Five
If the conciliation process fails to provide an agreed resolution, the matter will 
again be referred to ACAS for the appointment of a mutually agreed independent 
arbitrator. The arbitrator will decide the issue on a ’Pendulum Arbitration’ basis. The 
brief of the arbitrator will be to fully investigate evidence from both parties, relevant 
to the issue, and to find for one party or the other - without compromise. This 
arbitration decision will be binding on both parties and will represent the final solution
to the issue. Wherever possible, this reference to ACAS will be on a joint basis.
295
However, if, after a period of ten working days from exhaustion of Stage Four, there is 
no joint agreement to progress the issue, either party can, if they so wish, refer the 
matter to ACAS for Pendulum Arbitration under Stage Five. As a matter of courtesy, 
the party making the reference will inform the other party prior to contacting ACAS.
Notes:
1. It is mutually agreed and fully understood that Stages Four and Five will rarely, if 
ever be used. There will be no unreasonable delay on either side at any stage.
2. Where the resolution of any collective issue is referred to a ballot, this can take 
place at the end of Stage Three or Four. Any ballot will be conducted in secret, the 
wording of the ballot papers to be agreed between the Company and the Union.
3. A secret ballot will be conducted on the premises or by postal system to each 
individual’s home (which ever is thought and agreed to be the most appropriate 
method).
4. If it is mutually agreed that a mass meeting may help to resolve an issue after 
Stage’s Three or Four of the Procedure, it may be held on company premises.
Source: Wilkinson (1987, Appendix, pp.41-43).
B. Four agreements from the eight interview plants
i. Iveco Ford Truck Ltd (Slough) and the TGWU, AEU and EETPU, dated 21/11/86.
4. Grievance Procedure
4.1 The Company and the Unions agree that, at each stage of the Procedure, every 
effort will be made to resolve grievances raised.
4.2 This Procedure covers any grievance directly affecting the employment of 
employees, with the exception of grievances connected with Works Standards 
and Health and Safety, which should be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of the appropriate Procedures set out in this Agreement.
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4.3 Stage 1: Any employee who wishes to raise a grievance directly affecting his 
employment must first discuss it with his Foreman who will, if necessary, 
ensure that the employee is aware of the help that can be obtained from the 
Shop Steward.
4.4 Stage 2: If the employee is not satisfied with the reply he receives at Stage 1, 
he may discuss the grievance with the Shop Steward, and together they may 
make a further approach to the Foreman who will complete a written procedure 
report of the grievance, recording the Failure to Agree, which both parties will 
be expected to sign.
4.5 Stage 3: If there is no satisfaction at Stage 2, the Shop Steward and the
Employee may raise the grievance with the appropriate Superintendent. The 
Foreman may be present at this meeting.
4.6 Stage 4: If no resolution has been reached at Stage 3, the Superintendent will
refer the grievance to the Personnel Manager, who will arrange appropriate 
discussions.
4.7 Stage 5: If the grievance has not been resolved at these discussions either Party
may:
(i) put the grievance on the Agenda for the next meeting of the Joint 
Works Committee, and/or
(ii) refer the grievance directly to the District Official(s) of the Union(s) 
involved for discussions arranged by the Personnel Manager.
4.8 The Grievance Procedure must be completed within ten working days of the 
date on which the grievance was put into the Procedure. All Parties will use 
their best endeavours to ensure that the grievance is resolved at the earliest 
possible stage of Procedure.
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4.9 In the exceptional circumstance that a grievance remains unresolved following 
Stage 5 (ii), the Procedure has been exhausted and both Parties will give 
consideration to referring the issue to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) for an independent judgement
Such action will be taken only with the mutual consent of both Parties. It will 
be understood by both sides that ACAS will judge the issue according to the 
principles of binding Pendulum Arbitration in respect of the final position of 
each Party at the conclusion of Procedure. To this end ACAS will be provided 
with the formal record of Procedure meetings together with a written 
submission from both Parties. Additionally, ACAS may invite either or both 
Parties to give oral evidence in support of the written submissions. ACAS will 
study the evidence submitted and will decide the issue in such a way as to 
accept either the Company submission or the Union submission. The decision 
will be communicated in writing to both Parties.
Source: Iveco Ford Handbook for Hourly Paid Employees.
ii. RHM Foods Ltd (Wythenshawe) and the GMB, undated and abridged.
5. PROCEDURE FOR AVOIDING AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Intention and General Principle
The Company and the Union recognise that any form of industrial action can 
damage our business and is, therefore, harmful to our customers, employees and 
shareholders alike. ... It follows therefore that in order to promote the success of our 
Company and it’s employees, all differences will be resolved by discussion and 
negotiation within a framework of mutual understanding and respect without the 
imposition of restrictive practices of any kind.
Collective and Individual Grievances
Many grievances are escalated through disputes procedures because of an initial 
lack of understanding of the true nature of the problem, and without full and proper
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discussion of the main issues. Grievances should therefore be discussed informally in 
the first instance between the employee concerned and their Supervisor/Departmental 
Manager. Every attempt should be made to resolve matters in this informal way. ... 
Should this method of dealing with the issue fail, then the following stages would be 
followed.
i) An issue affecting a number of employees from one section must be raised by 
the section’s accredited representative with the Departmental Head/Supervisor 
of the area concerned. The Departmental Head/Supervisor will arrange a 
meeting to discuss the matter as soon as possible. ...
ii) Should the outcome/decision fail to satisfy the employees concerned, then it 
will be referred to the Departmental Manager/Shift Manager who will arrange a 
meeting as soon as possible. ...
iii) Failing settlement at Stage (ii) the matter will be referred to the Personnel 
Manager, who will arrange a meeting within three working days after the 
matter has been referred to him/her. ...
iv) Failing settlement at Stage (iii) the matter will be referred to the Factory 
Manager who will arrange a meeting with Shop Stewards within five working 
days after the matter has been referred to him/her. ...
v) (Excepting individual grievances)
Failing settlement of Stage (iv) the matter will be referred to the Full-Time 
Officer of the Union and a meeting will be arranged with the Factory Manager,
vi) Should the matter remain unresolved after Stage (v), then the Company 
and the Union will consider the circumstances and decide upon the next 
most appropriate stage, which may include:-
a) Involvement of a member of Senior Management from Divisional 
Personnel; (a meeting with a member of Senior Management from 
Divisional Personnel will be held at the request of either party).
b) Mediation/Conciliation: (there must be mutual agreement before the 
matter is referred to the Mediation/Conciliation stage).
c) Arbitration.
The parties agree that arbitration will be the final stage in any dispute and the written 
terms of reference will be agreed beforehand. The Arbitrator will be asked to find
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wholly in favour of one side or the other. The Arbitrator’s decision will be final and 
binding on both parties. Status quo shall prevail until the procedure has been 
exhausted.
Source: Memorandum of Domestic Agreement.
iii. Sanyo Industries (UK) Ltd (Lowestoft) and the EETPU, dated 10/6/82.
7. In the event that the Company and the Union shall be unable ultimately to
resolve between themselves any discussion or disputes they may jointly agree 
to appoint an arbitrator and in this connection:-
(1) The Arbitrator will consider evidence presented to him by the Company 
and the Union and any factors that he believes to be appropriate
(2) The Arbitrator will decide in favour of one party
(3) The decision of the Arbitrator will be final and binding and will 
represent the final solution to the issue
CODE OF PRACTICE 
ARBITRATION
In the event that Arbitration is necessary the statements exchanged prior to the 
Union ballot will be provided unaltered to the Arbitrator. Further, both parties 
will submit to the Arbitrator and exchange statements of case at least one day 
prior to the arbitration hearing. The Arbitrator will hear evidence in support of 
the final positions of the parties as submitted prior to the union ballot. The 
Arbitrator will then act in accordance with clause 7 of the Sanyo agreement.
Source: Sanyo Staff Handbook.
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iv. Shotton Paper Company Ltd (Shotton) and the EETPU, dated 16/8/84 and abridged.
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
The grievance procedure provides all employees with the opportunity to resolve 
grievances as speedily as possible in a fair and equitable manner.
First Stage
If an employee has an individual grievance relating to his employment and 
wishes to raise it, he must in the first instance discuss the matter with his immediate 
supervisor. ... Every effort will be made to resolve it at this level.
Second Stage
If the employee and the recognised Union Representative are dissatisfied with 
the reply and wish to pursue the matter further, they should request the supervisor to 
arrange an interview with the Superintendent. ...
The Superintendent will then discuss the grievance with the employee and give 
him his decision normally within five working days of the interview. ...
Third Stage
If the employee and the recognised Union representative are still dissatisfied 
with the decision and wish to take the matter further, they may request the 
Superintendent to arrange an interview with the Department Manager. ...
The Department Manager will then discuss the grievance and will give a 
decision normally within five working days of the interview. ...
Fourth Stage
If the matter remained unresolved it will be taken up by the recognised full 
time Union Official with the Personnel Manager and/or the Director nominated by the 
Board. ...
The Personnel Manager and/or the Director will then discuss the grievance with 
the employee and will give him a decision normally within five working days of the 
interview. ...
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If the matter is not resolved at this stage and the parties agree, then it may be 
referred to the Executive level of the Union.
Fifth Stage
If the matter is not resolved at the previous stage, then it will be referred to the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service who will nominate an independent 
arbitrator acceptable to both parties.
The terms of reference of the arbitrator will be to find in favour of one party or 
the other. A compromise solution shall not be recommended. Both parties agree to be 
bound by the decision of the arbitrator.
The Company and the Union have reached this agreement with a mutual 
understanding that Stage 5 references will be rarely, if ever, needed. In particular, 
there is mutual trust that neither side will progress issues which will be detrimental to 
the other or both. The Company and the Union agree that there will be no delay on 
either side in implementing each stage of the procedure.
NOTES
(a) A member of the Personnel Department may be involved in the procedure from 
Stage Two onwards.
(b) Matters of collective interest should be raised by a recognised Union 
representative for the group in question, (author’s emphasis)
Source: Collective agreement.
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